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How is philosophy learned? A better question is how can thinking skills be
acquired? Te thinking in question involves attending to basic structures of
thought. Tis can be done well or badly, intelligently or ineptly. But doing it well 
Th
is not primarily a matter of acquiring a body of knowledge. It is more like playing 
a piano well. It is a “knowing how” as much as a “knowing that.” 
— sImon BlacKBurn1 
Practical Epistemology 
Tis is a book about what I am calling practical
epistemology. It refects two of my most deeply
held prejudices as a teacher. I believe that 
abstract questions in academic philosophy are
intrinsically interesting not just to profession-
als but to smart, inquisitive students as well. I
also believe that carefully refecting on the great 
questions in Western philosophy (What is knowl-
edge? Is it possible? Does God exist? Do we have
genuine free will?— to say nothing of the equally
important moral, political, and legal questions
that philosophers have posed and attempted to
answer) improves one’s general critical thinking
skills. So I would claim that a good philosophy
course is good for a lot more than just general
education credits and will be of value no matter
what your major is or career aspirations are. 
Te book begins with three classic questions
in the theory of knowledge—What is the value of 
truth? Can we know anything? What is the nature
of knowledge in the frst place? It then introduces
a little logic and a particular theory of evidence
evaluation— inference to the best explanation.
Tis view of argument analysis is the corner-
stone of my entire discussion throughout the
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book. We then turn our attention to some issues
in the history and philosophy of science—the
role of experiments, Semmelweis’s discovery of 
the causes of childbed fever, and Darwin’s theory
of common descent by natural selection. Te
book concludes with discussions of capital
punishment, evidence as narrative, and some
thoughts about the nature of evidence and truth. 
Critical Thinking 
This brings me to my second, and even
more deeply held, prejudice as a philosophy
teacher. I am committed to the value of critical
thinking—or, as it is sometimes called, practical,
or informal, logic—as a tool for undergraduate
and professional success. I pretend little modesty
here. I have heard from too many students that 
the techniques developed in chapters 4 through 
12 have proven not just useful but essential in
their other undergraduate and graduate classes,
and indeed, in their professional lives. 
Where I do claim some modesty, however,
is that I take little credit for discovering these
techniques. Tey were all frst articulated by my
friend and mentor, Larry Wright. I had the honor
of working with Larry as a teaching assistant 
when he was putting together his frst published
articulation of inference to the best explanation
as a procedure for argument analysis.2 Tat grad-
uate school experience fundamentally shaped
my perception of what it is to be a philosopher
and what it is to be an efective undergraduate
teacher. Inference to the best explanation has
gone on to inform much of what I have done in
my professional scholarship. It has also guided
my own teaching career. To Larry, I owe a debt of 
gratitude that cannot really be expressed. 
If this book accomplishes nothing else, I hope
it at least tempts readers to utilize the somewhat
structured, almost ritualistic procedure I am call-
ing the inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe
as a test of the quality of evidence presented in
an argument. I do believe that you will be pleas-
antly surprised at how ofen it proves useful. 
To My Student Readers 
I want this book to be fun, interesting, and use-
ful to you. Depending on your academic and
intellectual personality, it may prove impossible 
to accomplish all these goals. But even if I fail in 
conveying the intrinsic interest in philosophical
and intellectual questions, and even if you fnd 
my style boring or pedantic, I do hope you will 
discover the utility in the careful, systematic
study and analysis of arguments. Inference to
the best explanation is not the only approach
to argument analysis (though I remain con-
vinced it is the most valuable), but it is one that 
invites wide application to the kinds of argu-
ments we fnd in our daily and professional
lives and, of course, in the natural sciences and 
most of the rest of the typical undergraduate
curriculum. 
If I have any readers who are not in formal phi-
losophy courses or who are using this book as a
supplementary source, I’d like to extend a sincere
invitation. Each chapter concludes with some
exercises and what I am calling a quiz. If you’d like
feedback on any or all of these, I would be happy
to provide it. I should always be available at the
following email address: jjohnson@eou .edu. 
Please do feel free to contact me with any ques-
tions or requests for feedback. And, of course, I
would welcome hearing about any mistakes,






























         
 
   
ix 
typos, and the like. One of the joys of this form of 
publishing is that errors can be relatively easily
corrected. 
To My Fellow Philosophy Instructors 
I have used earlier drafs of this manuscript in
two pretty diferent courses. Te most straight-
forward of these are courses in critical thinking.
Although I’d like to think that all the material
would be useful in such contexts, I can well imag-
ine instructors who would choose to use only
chapter 1 and chapters 4 through 12 or maybe
chapter 13. Tis is the material that I have focused
most of my critical thinking teaching on for the
last forty years. 
The course that the book was originally
designed for, however, was an introduction to
philosophy course. At Eastern Oregon Univer-
sity, the course I created was called Self, World, 
and God. Te God part, of course, was issues in 
the philosophy of religion, and the self part was 
issues in philosophical psychology and cognitive
science. World was a catchall for epistemology, 
philosophy of science, and a general methodol-
ogy of analyzing arguments in terms of infer-
ence to the best explanation—the material
sketched out in this book. 
Two Further Debts 
All authors need to acknowledge the help and
support of their life partners. Understanding
and sustenance from those one loves most are
almost preconditions for successful writing. In 
my case, I have had the incredible good fortune 
to have a bright, talented, and unbelievably
supportive wife for almost ffy years now. Col-
leen is not just a beautiful lady that I love more 
than I can express, but for almost thirty years,
she was my closest colleague during exactly the 
time the material in this book was being tested 
in my courses and when I began to compose the 
earliest drafs of the chapters herein contained.
We team-taught together and discussed infer-
ence to the best explanation so ofen that it is
almost as hard to separate my thoughts on these 
questions from hers as it is to separate them
from Larry Wright’s. Tanks, Colly. 
Finally, I need to acknowledge and thank the 
Library at Portland State University for award-
ing me a grant to complete this book as part of 
their PDXOpen: Open Access Textbooks initia-
tive. In particular, I owe Ms. Karen Bjork, head 
of digital initiatives, a huge thanks and shout-
out. Karen not only championed my project from
the beginning but coached and cajoled to keep
me on track in my writing and fnally secured
additional funding for professional copyediting. 
Tank you very much, Karen. 
Notes 
1 Simon Blackburn, Tink (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 5. 
2 Larry Wright, Better Reasoning (New York: Holt,














       
     
 
   
 
 














To say that democracy is a space of reasons is to say that the practice of demo-
cratic politics requires the giving and acting for reasons. Tat is, in a democratic 
state, disagreements between citizens ought to be handled in the arena of reason 
alone, and arguments legitimizing the uses of state power must be backed by rea-
sons. And crucially, the “reasons” spoke of are reasons for believing what is true, 
as opposed to reasons for what will win us the election, make us rich, or damn our 
enemies. In short, to think of democracy as a space of reasons is to see the ideals 
of democratic politics as requiring a commitment to the rational pursuit of truth. 
—mIchael lynch1 
A Lofty Goal and a Practical Goal 
Tis book has two major goals. One is to invite
you— no, really to implore you— to enter
what Michael Lynch calls the “arena of rea-
son.” Lynch’s quote may suggest that politics
is where reason and truth are most important.
I completely agree with him that democratic
politics is one area of our lives that requires
attention to the ideals of truth and good reason. 
But I think he would agree with me that lots of
other intellectual afairs—the pursuits of sci-
ence and medicine, the demands of a profes-
sion, and the immensely complicated problems 
of a meaningful personal life, to name just a
few— are equally dependent on the standards
of the arena of reason. 
Te other goal is to give you a tool for navi-
gating within the arena of reason. I wish I could 
give you a magic bullet for discovering the truth,
but I think we all know that’s only a fairy tale.
What I do believe, however, is that there are
some very useful techniques for approaching, if
not discovering, the truth. Tis book will empha-
size one of these methods. It has the technical
name inference to the best explanation, but more 







           
  
 





       
 
      
 
   




   


























as a procedure for distinguishing good evidence 
from poor, weak, or even nonexistent evidence. 
Tere is something almost paradoxical about 
both my goals. I’m going to spend the next cou-
ple of hundred pages laying out this approach 
to evidence and truth and hopefully luring you 
into the arena of reason by showing you that 
it’s fun, interesting, and valuable. Te potential 
paradox lies in my absolute conviction that you 
are already frmly ensconced in the arena of
reason—that you already value truth and that 
you are already an accomplished evaluator of
evidence. 
So why bother writing my book? Consider an 
analogy. You are skilled at something— playing 
the piano or playing golf. But you are also frus-
trated. You are not as good at it as you’d like to 
be. You decide to go to a music teacher or golf
pro to improve your playing. If you are lucky
enough, you’ll fnd someone who can take that 
skill you already have and hone it, help you
break some bad habits, show you some new
tricks, encourage you to practice, and voilà, sig-
nifcantly improve your game. I’d be a joke as a 
golf instructor, and I don’t play music at all, but 
I guess I’m arrogant enough to think I might be 
a pretty good critical thinking coach. 
The Skills and Values You Already Have 
Perhaps you abhor politics, think that history is 
boring, or believe that contemporary science
is completely beyond you. I hope to change your 
mind about all that. But even if I fail, you’re still 
stuck in the arena of reason. You care about the 
truth or, in less pretentious jargon, what is true 
and what is not. Someone tells you your lover
is unfaithful. Is he right, maliciously lying, or
simply misinterpreting quite innocent remarks 
and actions? You certainly care about the
answers to those questions. Your doctor tells you
not to worry about the symptoms you describe 
and that you’ll be just fne. You’d be crazy not to 
care if she’s an expert in that area of medicine or
if she has misdiagnosed your condition. A friend
tells you that class is canceled today, but if a good
grade matters to you, you’ll care a lot whether he
knows what he’s talking about. 
Consider the case of poor Connie. She thinks
her boyfriend is—in the kind of innocent sense
of 1950s high school—cheating on her. He claims
he’s innocent. She cares a heck of a lot whether
her theory is true. But her suspicions are not 
simple paranoia; she believes she has some good
evidence and is so sure she’s right that she is
going to break up with him. She lays out her case
in a poem (well, really a corny pop song). 
Lyrics to “Lipstick on Your Collar” can be
found here: https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/ 
conniefrancis/lipstickonyourcollar.html. Con 
nie Francis performing her song can be found 
here: https://youtu.be/YMlALAaEwfA. 
Here’s her story in a nutshell. She and her
boyfriend had gone to a record hop. He excused 
himself, saying he wanted to get a soda. But he 
was gone for a half hour. When he returned,
Connie spotted a lipstick stain on his shirt collar.
He told her that it was her lipstick. She thought 
about this but realized that her lipstick was baby
pink, while the stain on his shirt was bright red. 
Just as she was fguring this all out, her best 
friend, Mary Jane, walked in, and Connie saw
that Mary Jane’s lipstick was all messed up. Con-













































had been making out—smooching—during the 
half- hour absence. 
Connie’s no lawyer, no rocket scientist, nor
even a college student yet, but she’s no fool either.
She’s smart enough to read the signs, diagnose
what’s going on, and lay out a persuasive case.
Connie’s skills are precisely the skills that all
intelligent human beings possess, and these are
the skills we will be building on in this book. 
Truth and the Contemporary 
Academic Culture 
Te scholarly community sends us lots of sig-
nals that we don’t value truth or at least that we 
should not value it. A lot of serious scholarship 
in philosophy, the history of science, sociology, 
literary criticism, and more tells academics like 
me that all truth and knowledge is relative to
who we are—our race, sex, age, ethnicity, and
historical circumstances—and that there’s no
such thing as the “absolute” (real?) truth. Con-
sider the thoughts of Richard Rorty: 
We need to make a distinction between the claim
that the world is out there and the claim that truth
is out there. To say that the world is out there, that is
not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that
most things in space and time are the efects of causes
which do not include human mental states. To say
that truth is not out there is simply to say that where
there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences 
are elements of human languages, and that human
languages are human creations. 
Truth cannot be out there— cannot exist indepen-
dently of the human mind—because sentences cannot
so exist, or be out there. Te world is out there, but
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions
of the world can be true or false. Te world in its
own— unaided by the describing activities of human 
beings— cannot . . . 
Te world does not speak. Only we do. Te world 
can, once we have programmed ourselves with a lan-
guage, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose 
a language for us to speak.2 
I believe that Rorty is on to something very
important here but that his insight is seriously 
mischaracterized— that he is, if you will, saying 
something that is both true and false at the same
time. 
Connie is a human being with a brain, cen-
tral nervous system, and sense organs. She sees 
things—the lipstick stain, its color, and the color
of her own lipstick. She hears things— her boy-
friend’s lame excuse. And she forms a theory
about what’s been going on. Her theory is, to
use some loaded language, “in her head,” and
the facts that make her theory true or false “are 
out there.” How do we link up the theory (what 
Rorty calls the “mental states,” “sentences,”
or “descriptions of the world”) with the facts?
Tings would be bad enough if all we had to do 
is propose an account of how brains and sense 
organs can allow us to see and hear things. Phi-
losophers have been working on these problems 
for 2,500 years, and I have to report to you that 
there’s still a lot of work to do. 
But there are other serious problems as
well. All Connie’s neural occurrences give rise
to beliefs—“your stain is red, but my lipstick
is baby pink.” Some of her beliefs are true, but 
others are false. Connie’s brain and sense organs
seem to play a central role in helping her distin-
guish the true beliefs from those that are false. 


























   
 
  
      
         



























central insight is that there is a whole other
story to be told in terms of Connie’s nurture. All 
her attempts to discover the truth, to fnd evi-
dence for what is true, are colored by who she
is, and that is both a help and a hindrance. We
don’t just see and hear the world; we learn to 
see and hear the world. We are endowed with a 
remarkably powerful central nervous system by 
natural selection (or perhaps as a gif from God).
We all have this simply by virtue of being human
beings. But we are also the product of our back-
grounds, our learning, our experiences, and our 
prejudices. It’s a sad fact but still a fact, I think, 
that men and women, blacks and whites, and
young and old are doomed to think in somewhat 
diferent ways. How can there be a truth about 
whether climate change is real or whether uni-
versal health care is a wise policy when you and 
I are fated to see things diferently because of
our diferences in age, ethnicity, and gender—to
say nothing of political afliations and religious 
convictions? 
Tough once an enthusiastic proponent, I’ve 
come to reject this relativistic view for two rea-
sons. Rorty tells his nurture story persuasively 
but sort of forgets about the nature story. Con-
nie’s central nervous system isn’t just there; it’s 
there for a reason. Its whole purpose is to pro-
vide her with data about that world out there. 
And human central nervous systems seem to be
doing their jobs pretty darn well. It’s not just that 
we have survived as a species but that we have
survived so successfully that we have become the
only species capable of altering the entire world.
So, yes, we have a problem with cultural relativ-
ism, and it is a problem we will be forced to deal 
with for the remainder of this book. But we also 
have exquisitely designed physical apparatus
that allow us to form pictures of the world out
there (perhaps as it really is). 
All the very abstract academic stuf also has a
very unfortunate spillover. It is sometimes used
as a discussion stopper, even among academics
themselves. If the only people I can talk with,
productively disagree with, and maybe even
reason with to some shared view are exactly
like me, the world is going to be a pretty lonely
place. Connie is certainly a product of who she
is. Her age, sex, race, and socioeconomic class
inevitably infuence what she sees and what 
she thinks about. I take that as a given. But 
what she’s thinking about is not just “in her
head,” even if her sentences, beliefs, and theo-
ries are. You and I can think about her theory,
make judgments about its cogency, and ofen-
times come to agreement about all this, regard-
less of the countless diferences in who we are,
how and when we were born, and our unique
social and educational backgrounds. Since there
is a world “out there” with boyfriends, best 
friends, and osculation (even if those descrip-
tions are the products of our shared culture), I
think it makes perfectly good sense to ask what 
really happened when he was gone that half
hour or more. And that’s really just another way
of asking whether her theory is true. 
Truth and the Popular Culture: 
The Need to Respect Diferences 
You may well ask what all the abstract philoso-
phy, social science, and evolutionary biology has
to do with our concerns in this book. Well, I’ve 
already given you one reason for including it.
Te problem of cultural expectations and biases 












































its core. Furthermore, a lot of your teachers and 
other intellectual authority fgures are products 
of this academic culture, and I think you need to 
know where they’re coming from. Finally, these 
theoretical considerations have found their way 
into the popular epistemological culture. 
A lot of my students are unapologetic rela-
tivists in two very diferent ways. One is quite
laudable. Many of you embrace diversity. You
admire the fact that we bring diferent perspec-
tives to discussions and investigations. You are 
loath to disparage those who think diferently
about religion, politics, or other things that 
matter deeply to you and your peers. You rec-
ognize that lots of thoughtful and decent people 
see things very diferently than you do when it 
comes to abortion rights, the death penalty, or
even climate change. One very understandable 
reaction to this is to think everyone has a right 
to his or her own beliefs. 
In the sense of a First Amendment right to
freedom of thought and speech, I completely
agree with this sentiment. It’s one thing, how-
ever, to have the right to think what you think
or believe what you believe; it’s quite another
to have the right to be correct about what
you think and believe. My students sometimes
say things that I fnd paradoxical. Tey tell me
that their truth is simply diferent from mine.
Sure, I believe that natural selection is spot- on, 
so it’s true for me. But they believe that it’s god-
less and silly to think that “man came from mon-
keys,” so evolution is false for them. Tat’s just 
another discussion stopper. It forecloses any real
shared dialogue and investigation of which one 
of us is right. We won’t spend much time in this 
book (though in another book I hope to write, it 
will be central) on purely moral disputes such as
the pro-life/pro-choice controversy or the case 
for and against animal rights. We will spend
some time a little later on the constitutionality, 
if not the morality, of the death penalty. And
we will spend a fair amount of time looking at 
the evidence for descent with modifcation by
natural selection. Consider the disagreement 
about climate change. Tere’s a lot of passion
on both sides. Tat’s obvious. People certainly
have a right to not be persecuted because of
their beliefs on questions such as these— not to 
be downgraded by their professors. But do these 
rights mean that there’s no correct answer to the
ultimate question of whether human cultural
and industrial practices are contributing to cli-
mate change? Or even whether climate change is
really occurring? Being tolerant of other’s views 
is a good thing, but being unwilling to seek some
common ground or even fnd a correct answer is 
either laziness or intellectual cowardice. 
Truth and the Popular Culture: 
“Fake News” and “Alternative Facts” 
Tis leads to my students’ second reason for
their relativism, if not outright skepticism.
None of us are climate scientists, so we are reli-
ant on outside sources for most of our informa-
tion. But outside sources seem to tell us diferent 
things. Te “liberal” press tells us one story
about climate change, while “conservative”
media tells a very diferent one. Te president of 
the United States tells us that mainstream media
are guilty of feeding us “fake news.” I believe he 
is very wrong about this. But whom should you 
believe—your philosophy professor or the presi-
dent? My guess is that the way you answer this 

















      
 
 
   
  

















    
 
   
  
  




























my credentials, or even with the president and 
who he is. It’s more likely that your confdence 
in either of us is shaped by the media sources
you listen to, who you voted for in the last elec-
tion, and what your friends and family tell you. 
In a way, this is just the problem of cultural rel-
ativism all over again. But something seems to
have changed just in the short time between my 
generation and yours. 
I am really nervous about where this discus-
sion must proceed. Every generation seems to
look at the younger generation not just with 
puzzlement but with a funny kind of judgment. 
Tey’re going to hell in a hand basket! My par-
ents couldn’t really understand the music I lis-
tened to or why I opposed the war in Vietnam. 
I’m still trying to get my head around hip-hop,
and I’m bafed about why climate change is a 
real controversy. But the cultural change I’m
focusing on now is not generational. 
Let me see if I can make this clearer by telling 
you about how I learned to enter Lynch’s arena of 
reason. School played a huge role, of course, but 
there were other important shared sources that 
united my generation with that of my parents.
My friends, my parents, and my teachers all read
the Los Angeles Times, watched the evening news
on one of the three major networks, and basically
shared a common stock of information about 
what was going on in the world around us. We
disagreed plenty about how to interpret the data,
but at least, we all had the same basic collection
of facts to disagree about. Of course, there were
plenty of critics and skeptics about these sources.
Some saw the Times and CBS News as lackeys of 
the capitalist corporate culture. Others claimed
they were nothing but liberal, antireligious pro-
paganda. But these complaints were directed
more at “editorial policy”—what stories were
run, how much time and line space were devoted
to them, and the like—and, yes, at the political
views endorsed on the editorial pages. But almost
everyone agreed about what the basic facts
reported in the stories were. Now, I don’t want to
overstate the confdence we had about all this. We
worried that we weren’t getting the whole story
about the war or that the Warren Commission
lied to us about the Kennedy assassination. But 
these were the exceptions, not the rule. 
Your generation, however, often gets its
information about what’s going on from very
idiosyncratic web sources. And be they liberal
or conservative, they ofen seem to disagree not 
just about how to interpret the facts but as to
what the facts are in the frst place. I can’t remain
neutral here. Some sources are more reliable than
others! Some sources are completely unreliable!
If you are serious about the truth, if you care
about reason, you must fnd some trustworthy
sources of information about what’s going on
around you—the worlds of politics, science,
and everything else that matters. I’m perfectly
happy to share the sources that most inform my
beliefs about what’s going on in the country, the
world, and other areas that I care about, includ-
ing sports, movies, music, and even science. Tey
are without question the New York Times and
National Public Radio, particularly Morning Edi-
tion. Tis is partly a matter of habit, preference,
and convenience. It’s also a matter of trust. Some
of you are, no doubt, aghast. Of course those are
his sources! He’s a liberal, and they’re blatantly
liberal sources. Tat’s probably true, but my
best friend hates both of these sources because
he believes that they have sold out the search





































in their coverage. But my sources don’t have to
be your sources. I’d be genuinely happy if all my
students came into my courses truly informed
about what’s going on via information they
gained from equally conservative sources such 
as the Wall Street Journal or the Economist. 
A Plea for Critical Thinking 
My entire professional life has been dominated
by courses in critical thinking. When I began
graduate school, I had the privilege of working 
with Professor Larry Wright as one of his teach-
ing assistants in his course on critical thinking.
Tis was truly a life-changing experience. It was
in his course that I frst learned of inference to
the best explanation, and it is this method of evi-
dence evaluation that informs much of my teach-
ing and much of my professional research. I have
re-created much of what I learned from Profes-
sor Wright in countless critical thinking courses
that I have taught and in some cases created. All
this forms the heart and soul of this book. 
As I think about it, however, perhaps the most 
important lesson I learned was not the details
of a particular approach to critical thinking but 
just the value of taking a little time out of a busy 
undergraduate career focused on the details of
majors, minors, and career training and paus-
ing to refect on the more general questions of
reason, truth, and logic. I take great gratifcation
that some of my most satisfed critical thinking 
customers have been not marginal students
who needed to be taught how to think correctly, 
whatever that’s supposed to mean, but truly
excellent students who already possessed all the 
necessary skills and tools for academic success. 
To return to an earlier analogy, even great pia-
nists and golfers beneft from devoted practice
and a little coaching now and then. 
So welcome to the arena of reason, which, of
course, you’ve been in almost the entirety
of your life. And welcome to critical thinking.
If you give it half a chance, I can almost prom-
ise you that you will fnd the things we explore 
together in this book interesting and fun. I also 
remain confdent that most of you will fnd the 
central approach to evidence and the discovery 
of truth that we will be developing personally,
academically, and professionally useful. 
ValuIng truth 
exerCIses 
1. Generally speaking, do you think Connie has good evidence for her theory that her boy-
friend was smooching Mary Jane during his absence at the record hop? Why? 
2. What do you think is the strongest argument for the claim that truth is always relative to 
whom people are, their background, their experiences, their age, their sex, their race, and 
so on? 
3. What do you think is the strongest argument against this relativist view? 
























Every other quiz in this course will focus on course content. The majority of the quiz grade 
will be determined by how successfully you demonstrate your mastery of the material pre-
sented in the readings and lectures. This frst quiz, however, is a little diferent. Here, I am 
asking you to honestly refect on yourself as a thinker. The grade on this quiz will be deter-
mined by how sincere and self- refective your essay is. 
I am asking for a short—no more than three double-spaced pages—essay that addresses 
the following three questions: 
1. How much of your thinking about important issues—political, moral, religious, and so
on— do you believe is determined by your individual background? Your age, sex, race, fam-
ily political leanings, and the like? 
2. To the degree that at least some of your thinking about these kinds of issues is partially 
determined by these cultural facts about yourself, do you believe that you can “transcend”
them and reach a more “objective” evaluation of the way things “really are”? How might 
you do this? 
3. What are your major sources of information about politics, moral controversies, and these 
sorts of things? 
I fully expect the grades on this frst quiz to be quite high. All you need to do to receive 
full credit is to take just a little time to truly refect on these questions. 
Notes 
1 Michael P. Lynch, “Democracy as a Space of Rea-
sons,” in Truth in Politics, ed. J. Elkins and A. Norris 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2012), 158. 
2 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4–5,

























I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my mem-
ory tells me lies, and that none of the things it reports ever happened. I have no 
senses. Body, shape, extension and place are chimeras. So what remains true?
Perhaps just one fact that nothing is certain. 
— renÉ Descartes1 
Descartes and the Arena of Reason 
It’s hard to imagine a thinker more committed
to the arena of reason than René Descartes. In
addition to being one of the most important 
philosophers in the entire history of Western
philosophy, he was a groundbreaking math-
ematician (remember those dreaded “Cartesian 
coordinates” you hated in high school algebra?), 
one of the most prominent physicists of his era, 
and a committed theologian. He counts as one of 
the true giants of Western thought. 
He begins his most important work, Te Med-
itations on First Philosophy, by sharing a nagging
worry. 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of
falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my child-
hood, and by the doubtful nature of the whole edifce 
that I had based on them.2 
When he speaks of falsehoods he accepted in his
childhood, I don’t think he’s speaking of Santa
Claus or the tooth fairy but simply things that
he believed uncritically, on the basis of authority
and common sense, that eventually turned out to
be false. Te problem wasn’t just that he had been
misled by the authorities and tricked by common
sense but that his life’s missions— philosophy,
mathematics, physics, and theology—were all














   
  




         
 
 




   































So what to do? He continues with his con-
struction metaphor: 
I realized that it was necessary, once in my life, to
demolish everything completely and start again
right from the foundations if I wanted to establish
anything in the sciences that was stable and likely
to last.3 
Epistemological demolition just for the sake
of demolition is a pretty silly project. But Des-
cartes is interested in demolition, like much
of contemporary urban renewal, for the sake
of new construction. He wants new founda-
tions that will allow him more confdence in
his philosophical and scientifc thinking. He’s
immediately confronted with two serious prob-
lems. What is going to be an efcient method
for his demolition (a wrecking ball, bulldozers, 
or dynamite?)—he has an awful lot of beliefs,
afer all—and what is going to be his standard
for stability once he has cleared the ground and 
begins his new construction? He answers these 
questions with a radical proposal. 
Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back 
my assent from opinions that are not completely cer-
tain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from
those that are patently false. So, for the purpose of
rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I fnd
in each of them some reason for doubt. And to do
this I will not need to run through them all indi-
vidually, which would be an endless task. Once the
foundations of a building are undermined, anything 
built on them collapses of its own accord; so I will
go straight for the basic principles on which all my
former beliefs rested.4 
Confdence-Undermining 
Possibilities 
Your car is in the shop, but a friend has gra-
ciously loaned you her pickup. As you are
driving along a long desolate stretch of rural
highway, you suddenly think about gas. Fortu-
nately, when you look down at the gauge you see 
that you have almost three-quarters of a tank.
You continue your drive peacefully contemplat-
ing your planned trip over Christmas break. Te 
next morning your friend calls you with some
unsettling news: “I forgot to tell you yesterday
when you picked up the truck that the gas gauge 
is all screwed up. It always reads three- quarters 
of a tank.” 
Two things follow pretty directly from this
little story. Your reassurance last night on the
highway was ill-founded. It may have been psy-
chologically comforting to read the gauge as
saying that you had plenty of gas, but you now
know that there was no good reason for your
confdence. It was merely good luck that you
had enough fuel to get home. In addition, read-
ing the gauge in the future will never produce
the kind of conviction you felt last night—nor
should it. 
Tere are people with a certain kind of intel-
lectual temperament who are called skeptics.
A skeptic might have the feeting worry about 
having enough gas, look at the gauge, and feel
relieved but then start to wonder: “How do I
know this gauge works properly?” Even with-
out the friend’s call the next morning, the skep-
tic can work herself into a state of doubt where 










   
      
  
 


















          









   
 
       
  
11 
One way of reconstructing the skeptic’s rea-
soning is as follows: 
1. I can be confdent that so- and- so because of
such- and- such. 
I can be confdent that I have plenty of gas 
because the gauge reads three-quarters of 
a tank. 
2. If this-and-that were true, however, such-
and-such would no longer justify my conf-
dence in so-and-so. 
If the gauge were broken, however,
its reading three-quarters of a tank
wouldn’t justify my confidence that I
have plenty of  gas. 
3. Tis- and- that is possible, and I cannot prove 
that this- and- that is not true. 
Te gas gauge could be malfunctioning,
and I have no proof that it is not. 
4. Terefore, since such-and-such cannot be
ruled out, I can no longer be confdent that 
so- and- so. 
Terefore, since the gauge’s being broken 
cannot be ruled out, I can’t be sure that I 
have plenty of gas. 
Tere are many circumstances where this
kind of skeptical thinking is demanded. A sales-
man calls you on the phone and ofers to sell you 
stock worth more than one thousand dollars a 
share for only a hundred. You damn well bet-
ter go through something such as the following 
reasoning: 
1. I can be confdent that the stock is a good deal
because the salesman told me so. 
2. If he’s lying, however, I can’t trust him. 
3. It’s possible that he’s lying, and I cannot prove
that he’s not lying. 
4. Terefore, since his lying cannot be ruled out,
I can no longer be confdent that the stock is 
worth so much. 
One of the oldest questions in philosophy is 
whether this kind of skeptical reasoning can
be generalized across the board. Should our
intellectual confidence in so-and-so—what 
our senses tell us, the word of scientists, or
whatever—be undermined by our failure to rule
out some confdence- undermining possibility? 
Dreaming and the External World 
Here’s a general purpose skeptical argument—a 
confdence- undermining possibility— that may 
well have already occurred to you. What if you’re
not really reading this but just having a vivid
dream about reading it? Doesn’t the possibility of 
life’s being a dream or any particular instant
of it being a dream rule out the possibility of
any kind of knowledge? Some philosophers have
suggested that it might. 
One whole school of philosophy claims that 
the senses must be the ultimate source of all sub-
stantive knowledge. Other schools do not insist
that the senses must produce all knowledge; there
may be other sources as well. All parties agree,
however, that the senses are directly involved
in most of what we claim to know. Tat’s what
makes the dream hypothesis so serious. In one
fell swoop, it shakes our confdence in everything
the senses have to say. You believe that you’re in
trouble in your philosophy class because of the












   
 











         
 































is just a dream, your dream experiences tell you
nothing about what your term paper looks like.
Concrete examples can be multiplied endlessly. It 
seems imperative that we fnd a way of circum-
venting the dream hypothesis. 
Folk wisdom, of course, provides tests for
distinguishing waking from dreaming. You can 
check your conscious state by pinching yourself 
or seeing if your visual experiences are in color. 
Unfortunately, these tests are psychologically
inaccurate. Surely you have enough imagination
to pinch yourself within a dream. I have ofen
had dreams where something bad or embarrass-
ing was happening, and in the dream, I would
say to myself, “I wish this was just a dream.” 
If there are no sure methods for distinguish-
ing waking states from dreaming, as many
philosophers have claimed, then the following 
argument is both seductive and worrisome. 
1. I can be confdent that there is an external
world outside of my mind because of what 
my senses tell me. 
2. If I were dreaming, however, my sense expe-
riences would no longer justify my conf-
dence in the external world. 
3. It is possible that I am dreaming now, and I
cannot prove that I am not dreaming. 
4. Terefore, since all this being a dream cannot 
be ruled out, I can no longer be confdent that 
there is an external world. 
As bad as all this seems, there’s worse to come. 
The Evil Computer Scientist 
We know that you think you are reading a
book about epistemology, considering weird
possibilities such as life’s being a dream, and
worrying about how you are going to get tested 
on this stuf. We apologize for the ruse. We sim-
ply couldn’t think of any other way to tell you. 
Tis has gone on too long; you need to know the 
truth. 
Tree years ago last summer, you were a pas-
senger on a motorcycle and there was a terrible
crash. Te driver was killed and you were brought 
to the hospital alive but just barely. Te doctors
quickly determined that you didn’t have much
of a chance, but you were put on life support
while relatives were notifed and decisions could
be made. 
We need to tell you now about Dr. Malgenius. 
He was an eccentric polymath with expertise in 
medicine, neurophysiology, and computer sci-
ence. He happened to be spending a year on a
fellowship at the hospital to which they brought 
your mangled body. Afer it was determined
that you would not survive—the injuries were
simply too severe—your family was approached
about the possibility of harvesting some of your 
organs for transplants and medical research.
At this point, Dr.  Malgenius came forward
with a most unusual request. It turned out that 
your brain had survived the crash unscathed,
and Malgenius wanted to use it to test his new 
hypothesis. Just before the life support was shut 
down, your brain was surgically removed and
placed in an artifcial environment. It sits in a
vat of circulating nutrient liquid to this day! 
We won’t go into the details of your for-
mer life, the promising poetry or the joy in
mountain climbing; it’s all too sad. What you
need to understand is your current situation.
Everything—your memories of your child-
hood or yesterday; your thoughts, feelings, and 
       
   
  

















    
  
  
   
 










          






emotions; your wishes, hopes, and fears; all
of it—is a computer-driven illusion. Dr.  Mal-
genius’s hypothesis was that a healthy human
brain could be attached to his supercomputer
and that a “virtual life” program could be sim-
ulated on the brain-computer system. You are
“living” proof of his theory. 
All of us involved with this project are sorry. 
We now see how wrong it was. Just tell us what 
to do; we will respect your wishes. Dr. Malgenius
is dead and gone. No one here in the lab plays
jokes anymore— making you think you see with 
intuitive clarity that 2 + 3 = 5 or that there are no 
even primes greater than two and the like. We
can simply let your life program continue, or we 
can wipe the memory banks clean. It’s your call. 
Te so-called brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is
what we might call the ultimate confdence-
undermining possibility. It is an updated version
of a possibility frst considered by Descartes. He 
worried about a godlike “evil genius.” 
I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely
good and the source of truth, but rather some mali-
cious demon of the utmost power and cunning has
employed all of his energies in order to deceive me.
I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours,
shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the 
delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare 
my judgment.5 
Whether it is stated in a contemporary, science-
fction voice or in that of sixteenth- century aca-
demic philosophy, the reasoning here fts the
familiar pattern. 
1. I can be confdent of anything—science,
mathematics, or the existence of the external
world because of processes of sense experi-
ence and logical reasoning in my mind. 
2. If I were a brain in a vat tricked by a team
of evil computer scientists, any reasoning or 
experience would no longer justify my conf-
dence in anything. 
3. It is possible that I am just a brain in a vat, and
I cannot prove that I am not a brain in a vat. 
4. Terefore, since I cannot rule out my being a 
brain in a vat, I can no longer be intellectually
confdent of anything. 
In one sense, there is absolutely no reason for
believing that you are a brain in a vat. I would
bet few of my readers have ever considered such
a possibility. But in another sense, the hypoth-
esis is a possible one and one for which there is 
no way of demonstrating its falsity. How could 
you ever tell? What tests could you conduct?
Dr. Malgenius is so tricky that he might cause
you to think you’ve come up with some sound
argument to defeat this possibility, but that rea-
soning might itself be one of his tricks. You seem
stuck, and so does every other person who has 
gone through this bit of skeptical reasoning. 
Can I Know Anything? 
Te conclusion to the above argument was that 
“I can no longer be intellectually confdent 
of anything.” Have we really managed to call
everything into doubt? Dr. Malgenius can cause 
us to have any sense experience he wants; he can
cause us to think 2 + 3 = 5 when it really equals 
7. He seems to have the power to trick us about 
virtually anything he chooses. 
Descartes noticed that virtually all our













   
  






























       
 
  


















Dr.  Malgenius tricked you about almost every
detail about yourself in the little story above. 
I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes,
or fesh, or blood or senses, but falsely believing that I 
have all of these things.6 
Could the trick be so perfect that he fools you into
believing that you exist, even when you don’t? We
have already seen that he can fool you about how
you exist—you’re just a brain in a vat afer all. But 
could he cause you to be mistaken about the very
fact of your existence? Descartes thought not. 
But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely
nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no hands, no
minds, no bodies. Does it not follow that I too do not
exist? No: if I convinced myself of something then I cer-
tainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power
and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiv-
ing me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is
deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can,
he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as
I think that I am something. So afer considering every-
thing very thoroughly, I must fnally conclude that the
proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it
is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.7 
Te confdence-undermining possibilities
discussed above, I hope, were somewhat com-
pelling. But so is the following bit of reasoning. 
If I am mistaken about what the gas gauge is
saying, there must be a “me” who is mistaken.
If I am having a dream about all this stuf, there 
must be a “me” who is doing the dreaming. If
I am a brain in a vat being tricked by a perfect 
computer illusion, there must be a “me” who
is fooled by this illusion. In a diferent work
on these same topics, Descartes expressed this
insight in the famous Latin phrase Cogito ergo
sum—I think, therefore I am. Tere must be a
“me” who is doing the thinking any time I engage
in skeptical thinking, and so it appears that one 
thing remains immune from the confdence-
undermining possibilities of skeptics. 
Skeptics might respond to this last consider-
ation in a couple of ways. Te dyed- in- the-wool 
skeptic might remind us that Dr. Malgenius was 
able to trick us about things such as 2 + 3 = 5
and all bachelors being unmarried. Maybe he
is causing us to think that it is self- evident that 
there must be a “me” in order for Malgenius to 
fool us when in fact this thought is utterly fal-
lacious. I, personally, am willing to concede
Descartes’s point that complete skepticism is
ruled out by the Cogito argument. But we must 
remember that we have gained damn little, a
technical victory over the skeptic, at best. If
all that I can claim to know is that I exist, then all
mathematics, science, and the everyday world
are closed of. But these are precisely the areas 
where questions about what we know are the
most interesting and the most important. 
The Quest for Certainty 
It is time to take stock of the arguments so far. 
Have the skeptics really forced us to abandon
most of what we previously thought we knew? 
If you are like me, you’re not very happy with
this conclusion. Unfortunately, logic and good
evidence ofen lead us to conclusions that we
don’t like but have to accept. Is there any hope
for salvaging science and common sense as reli-
able sources of knowledge? Maybe, but frst, we 
have to concede some ground to the skeptic. 
  
 
     
 























Te intellectual standards of certainty and
indubitability have the advantage that the per-
son who insists on them will never be mistaken. 
Descartes’s procedure—sometimes called meth-
odological doubt—is a very efective way of
avoiding intellectual error. It may be, however, 
that the demand for absolute certainty comes
at too high of a price. It strikes most of us as
extreme to reject all of what the senses tell us or 
all mathematics and logic because we were able 
to imagine bizarre confdence-undermining 
possibilities. Perhaps the lesson that we should 
learn from the skeptic is to set our standards a 
little more realistically. If insisting on certainty 
leads to skepticism, and I am willing to provi-
sionally concede that it does, then we should not 
insist on certainty. 
I am not suggesting that we should not 
demand some very exacting intellectual stan-
dards for those things that we really know. We
need stringent criteria for knowledge, but they
must be realistic enough to produce some non-
trivial examples of genuine knowledge. In the 
remainder of this book, I will argue that a feshed-
out concept of good evidence will allow us to dis-
tinguish many instances of genuine knowledge
from other intellectual temptations for which we




1. What is a confdence-undermining possibility? How does the possibility of one lead to
skepticism? 
2. Could it be that you are not really considering this exercise but merely dreaming that
you are? How could you tell one way or another? What does all this have to say about 
knowledge? 
QuIz two 
In chapter 2, I make a big deal about Dr. Malgenius. Explain what this little story (or example 
or thought experiment) was—that is, how it works. What is the epistemological point the 
story makes? What does it tell us about the nature of knowledge? Explain my suggested view 
about the nature of knowledge that attempts to negate the infuence of Dr. Malgenius and 
other similar stories such as the dream hypothesis. 
3 Descartes, 12. Notes 
4 Descartes, 12. 1 René Descartes, Meditations of First Philosophy, trans. 
5 Descartes, 15. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), 16. 6 Descartes, 15. 
2 Descartes, 12. 7 Descartes, 16– 17. 


























         
 
ChaPter three 
The Concept of Knowledge 
So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account,
his mind does truly think of it, but he does not know it, for if he cannot give and 
receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he 
has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to him and he is fully 
equipped with knowledge. 
— plato1 
Defnitions and Word Games 
Suppose that we are concerned with the ques-
tion of economic justice— the fact that a few are
ridiculously wealthy, while many are pitifully
poor. We might convene an academic confer-
ence to discuss the issue and suggest some sort 
of coherent social policy. Economists might tell
us about how income distribution is empirically
related to national productivity. Political sci-
entists might tell something about relative tax
rates and the amount of government services.
Sociologists could address the social efects of
long- term poverty. Historians could give us some
sense of whether the problem is better or worse
than it was a hundred years ago. It would not be
at all surprising if a philosopher contributed a
paper on the meaning of economic justice. In one
way, such a contribution seems necessary and
foundational. Afer all, how can we reasonably 
construct some social policy aimed at greater
economic justice if we are not crystal clear as to
what we mean by this concept? In another light,
however, the philosopher’s contribution seems
frivolous and even counterproductive. If there
is wide agreement that there is a problem that













   
 
     
    
 
   
     
 















         

























with long-dead thinkers such as Plato, Adam
Smith, and Marx may strike us as an irrespon-
sible waste of time and intellectual energy. To
carry this example just a bit further, suppose
the philosopher’s paper ofers a defnition of
economic justice that suggests some kind of ten-
sion with other widely held values and social
policies and goes so far as to suggest that we will
never have a concept of economic justice that 
everyone will feel comfortable with. Now the
philosopher’s concern with theory and the def-
nition of terms may strike us as subversive. It 
may be difcult and controversial to articulate a 
theory about the nature of economic justice that 
everyone will agree with. Nevertheless, we know
injustice when we see it. And to suggest that we
spend our time defning terms and teasing out 
subtle philosophical arguments rather than
ofering constructive solutions to the obvious
problems that plague our society is both dan-
gerous and immoral. But all this is quite unfair. 
No sane philosopher is going to suggest that 
we spend all our time and energy in academic
theoretical pursuits. Obviously, there are crises 
that call for immediate action, and we all rec-
ognize the need to make decisions on less than 
perfect information. But there is also a need for 
abstract theoretical work. It does seem crazy
to propose signifcant social changes that will
afect all of us without some kind of clear under-
standing of what we are trying to bring about. 
Pausing to refect on the nature of economic
justice—defning our terms, as they say—may
be worthwhile even in a time of some urgency. 
Please excuse the above digression. I have
included it because I believe that many begin-
ning students see much of traditional episte-
mology in the same uncharitable light that our 
philosopher was portrayed. Every reader of this 
book is a mature speaker of English. Te verb to
know and the abstract noun knowledge are fairly 
normal words within the English language.
Obviously, we must know what they mean. We 
will discover, however, that it proves exceed-
ingly difcult to articulate a clear and coherent 
defnition, or theory, of knowledge. 
The Myth of Defnition 
Tis chapter discusses the prospects for ofering 
a helpful analysis, or defnition, of the concept of 
knowledge. As a starting point, we need to take a
little time dispelling a common misunderstand-
ing about the importance of defnition in every-
day contexts, as well as philosophical contexts. 
It is widely believed that people do not know
the meaning of the words they use—they do
not know what they are talking about—unless
they can provide adequate defnitions for all
those words. Tis is simply a mistaken view of
meaning. 
Someone can be an excellent athlete— a hit-
ter in baseball, for example—yet be a very poor 
coach or teacher of how to hit. Surprisingly, per-
haps, others can be mediocre hitters but turn into
outstanding hitting coaches. Te reason these
things are possible is that there is all the difer-
ence in the world between doing something and 
describing, or explaining, how to do something. 
Tink for a moment about those things that you 
are most skilled at doing—shooting free throws,
playing a musical instrument, riding a bicycle,
and so on. How confdent would you be that you 
could teach someone else how to be skillful at 
these activities? Could you write a manual for









        
 
 
   
   
  
 










     
 















Speaking a language is much more like hit-
ting a baseball than being a good hitting coach. 
Language is a skillful activity that human
beings master with remarkable facility in ways 
that philosophers, psychologists, and linguists
are only beginning to appreciate. I can safely
assume that any reader of this book is an accom-
plished enough user of English that you know
full well the meaning of almost every word that 
philosophers have spent a great deal of time and 
energy trying to analyze or defne. You all know 
the meaning of terms such as beauty, justice, and 
knowledge because you can use sentences such as
the following to communicate with other Eng-
lish speakers. 
1. Tat’s a beautiful painting. 
2. Simple justice demands that all the kids get 
to play. 
3. You don’t really know that the Dodgers will
win the pennant; you just hope they will. 
All this is important because it is so easy to
forget in the middle of philosophical battles.
We are going to analyze the concept of knowl-
edge in this chapter. We will see that this task
is difcult, controversial, and perhaps in the
end, impossible to complete satisfactorily. Tis
doesn’t mean for a second that you or the great 
minds of Western philosophy do not know how 
to use words such as know and knowledge for the 
purposes of clear communication. 
The Need for Conceptual Clarity 
Although I stand 100 percent behind what I said 
previously, this doesn’t mean that careful concep-
tual analysis is not important. People sometimes
make remarkable claims about knowledge. We
have just seen how the skeptic can put together 
plausible and disturbing arguments that we
know next to nothing. Te arguments of the last 
chapter are classical examples of the sorts of
intellectual concerns that occupy the attention
of professional philosophers. Disputes about 
knowledge are not limited to philosophers,
however. We ofen hear that modern scientists
do not know that evolution by natural selection 
is true. Many claim that it is only a “theory.”
Tis is sometimes backed up with an argument. 
Science, so this line of thinking goes, is only con-
cerned with what can be directly observed or
proved with laboratory experiments. But evolu-
tion, it is sometimes claimed, cannot be directly 
observed, both because it is too slow of a process
and because the most interesting observations
would have needed to take place in a time before 
there were human observers. Furthermore,
creationists claim that no controlled laboratory 
experiment can prove that evolution is true. 
If we are to make any progress in understand-
ing, let alone resolving, these kinds of intellec-
tual disputes, we are going to need to be much
clearer in our own minds as to what counts as
knowledge. I claim to know that I am at my com-
puter composing this chapter. Te skeptic tells
me I don’t know this afer all; it might only be a 
dream. I am quite sure that I know that natural 
selection is true. Creationists claim that I don’t 
and that my “faith” in the theory is no diferent 
from religious belief. How can we possibly hope 
to make progress toward resolving these dis-
putes without some fairly specifc agreement as 
to what counts as genuine knowledge? 
For some, the kind of conceptual analysis in 
which we engage in this chapter can be fun and 


























































exciting in its own right. Most of you, however, 
should see it as a necessary means to an end. I
assume most of you care about whether scien-
tists know what they are talking about. If you
are like I am, you think they probably do. But 
to really feel confdent about this, you need to
have some answers to the philosophical skeptic
who says it might all be a dream and the proce-
dural skeptic who argues from a specifc model 
of scientifc knowledge to doubt about things
such as evolution and climate change. To answer
either of these skeptics productively, you need
some agreement about the nature of knowledge. 
Knowledge and Belief 
Human beings seem to be a very credulous spe-
cies; we believe an amazing variety of things.
Our ancestors believed in witches, that the earth 
was fat, and in the divine right of kings. People 
today believe that their futures are foretold in
horoscopes, that good writing can be accom-
plished in frst drafs, and that their favorite
sports team will fnally get it together. From the 
perspective of history, it is easy to fnd countless
beliefs that we sincerely held that strike us as
foolish, dangerous, and immoral. But of course, 
not all beliefs ft into this category. 
Other things we don’t merely believe, we
know. I, of course, believe that I am a philoso-
phy professor, a one-time sofball player, and
a husband to a beautiful woman. But I don’t 
just believe these things, I know them. Te dis-
tinction between belief and knowledge is not 
like the one between being a sibling and being 
an only child—it is not an exclusive, either/ 
or diference. It is rather like the distinction
between an automobile and a convertible. To be 
a convertible is to be a special kind of automo-
bile. As logicians put it, being an automobile is a 
necessary condition of being a convertible. Not 
all automobiles are convertibles, but all convert-
ibles are automobiles. 
Traditional models, or defnitions, of knowl-
edge have attempted to articulate a list of nec-
essary conditions that are jointly sufcient for
having genuine knowledge. Te abstract noun
knowledge is kind of artifcial. I think we will do 
better to use the more familiar verb. Our obser-
vations about knowing and believing suggest the
frst entry on our list of necessary conditions: 
J knows P only if: 
i. J believes P. 
Tere is a fairly common way of talking that 
seems to call this into question. Suppose we
have a friend who is headed for heartache partly 
because he refuses to take seriously the obvious 
evidence of his lover’s infdelity. We might say, 
“Jake knows that she’s untrue, but he can’t bring 
himself to believe it.” Or perhaps we have a col-
league who is foolishly refusing to take heed of 
medical symptoms: “Sarah knows something is 
wrong but just won’t believe it.” How seriously 
should we take the claim that both Jake and
Sarah have knowledge but lack belief? Not very. 
Jake sees the obvious signs and has his
moments of doubt. Sarah too. If they didn’t,
we wouldn’t be inclined to say they knew. It is, 
of course, possible for people to be perversely
dense. People can be totally oblivious to things 
that are perfectly obvious to others. Connie may 
genuinely believe that her lover is totally faith-
ful despite the lame excuses and the lipstick on 












     
 
  
   
 























Connie knows this, though perhaps she should. 
When we use the “knows but doesn’t believe”
idiom, we are getting at something interesting
about Jake and Sarah. Tey seem to be engaging 
in what philosophers call self- deception. Tis is 
an important issue in both philosophy and psy-
chology but really says nothing about how to
defne knowledge. 
I take it to be settled that knowledge implies 
some kind of genuine conviction or intellectual 
confdence. Tus the frst necessary condition
of knowledge turns out to be relatively secure, 
uncontroversial, and philosophically straight-
forward. Would that we could say the same
about the conditions to follow. 
The Search for the Truth 
You are the district attorney, and you’ve got a 
great case. Te defendant is the kind of lowlife 
that society needs to do something about. You’ve
got the goods on him too, lots of physical evi-
dence, a clear motive, and witnesses. Te case
will be an easy one to try, and it will be a feather 
in your cap to be the one who put him away. You 
just “know” that the slime ball’s guilty. Tere’s
only one problem with this scenario; the guy
didn’t do it. It does not matter how sincere your 
belief is nor how good the evidence seems to
be—if what you thought you knew turns out
to be false, it’s back to the drawing board. Truth 
is an absolute precondition for knowledge.
Unfortunately, truth is a philosophical mess. 
Contemporary philosophy is about as far from
consensus about the nature of truth as any issue
in the feld. Some believe that truth is correspon-
dence with reality. Others believe that it is coher-
ence with other widely held beliefs. Yet others
claim that the assertion that “snow is white is
true” is just a fancy way of saying that “snow is
white.” All these theories of truth have plausible
arguments in their defense, and all sufer from
serious conceptual problems. Professional phi-
losophy doesn’t know what truth is. I don’t know
what it is either, but I will nevertheless say a little
more about truth toward the end of this book. 
In spite of all the confusion about the nature
of truth, however, the relationship between truth
and knowledge is as clear as could be. Te only
beliefs that we have that are viable candidates 
for being knowledge are those that are true. Te
surest way to defeat someone’s claim that they
know something is to show that what they claim
to know is false. Tis suggests a work-around
epistemological defnition of truth: 
the ConCePt of know
ledge 
truth =df not-false 
Admittedly, this is a pretty trivial defnition. It 
does, however, have the advantage of separating
philosophical disputes about the nature of truth 
from the noncontroversial connection between 
truth and knowledge. 
Tus truth supplies a second necessary con-
dition for knowledge. We can expand our evolv-
ing model of knowledge as follows: 
J knows P only if: 
i. J believes P. 
ii. P is true. 
Epistemic Justifcation 
Perhaps we already have all that we need. Te
concept of knowledge seems both subjective
and objective. To believe something is to be in a 
























   

































certain cognitive state that individual “subjects” 
fnd themselves in or fail to fnd themselves in. 
For that belief to be true (or not-false) it must 
be dependent on things entirely independent 
of those subjects— the way things “objectively” 
are. Condition i takes care of the subjective ele-
ment, and ii covers the objective. What more do 
we need? 
I have been hoping for a raise. Unfortunately, 
my latest evaluation lef a lot to be desired, and 
the state’s budget looks pretty bleak. Forever the 
optimist, I continue to think the best. I woke up 
yesterday and as I was having my morning cofee
I glanced at my horoscope. Te entry for Pisces 
was way cool: “You will receive something long 
overdue and well deserved. All the signs are pos-
itive.” My raise! What could be clearer? I went to
work with a smile on my face absolutely conf-
dent that I would get the good news. And I did! 
Te governor decided that all state employees
should get a modest salary adjustment, and that 
afernoon, we were all formally notifed. 
Te two conditions for knowledge are satis-
fed. Johnson believes that he will get a raise, and
it is true that he will get a raise. Does he therefore
know that he will get a raise? Most of us would
be very reluctant to say he possesses knowledge.
What he believes turns out to be true but merely
by coincidence or good luck. Te subjective ele-
ment of belief and the objective element of truth 
seem much too tenuously connected. What seems
to be missing is some reason or evidence in sup-
port of my belief. Sure, the horoscope is a reason
in the sense of providing a psychological expla-
nation for why I happen to have this belief. But 
it’s such a poor reason—it’s so unreliable—that 
we attribute the belief ’s truth to good fortune
and not the strength of the reason. 
Epistemologists have adopted the idiom of
normative obligation to get at the stronger con-
nection between belief and truth that is required
for genuine knowledge. You are entitled to claim 
knowledge, according to this way of thinking
about things, only if your belief is justifed—that 
is, just in case you have very good reason for
thinking it is true. Tus on the so-called stan-
dard analysis of knowledge a third necessary
condition of knowledge, one that completes
the package and makes it jointly sufcient, is the
justifcation condition. 
J knows P if and only if: 
i. J believes P. 
ii. P is true. 
iii. J is justifed in believing P. 
What Does It Take to Be Justifed? 
We have seen how skeptics can produce a for-
midable battery of arguments designed to show
that we are never completely justifed in believ-
ing anything. Te problem concerns the connec-
tion between truth and justifcation. Te only
standard that completely eliminates the possi-
bility of our beliefs being held in error is one of 
self-evidence or certainty. But as the Cartesian
project has convinced most of us, epistemological
certainty is unattainable. Tis means that what-
ever model of knowledge is fnally endorsed will
be committed to some sort of epistemic fallibil-
ity. Tis is not that serious a worry for most natu-
ral or social scientists but does run counter to the
dominant tradition in Western epistemology. 
Self-evidence and certainty may have set 
unrealistically high standards for knowl-
















































superfcial appearance of being clear and iden-
tifable. Models of knowledge that substitute
criteria for epistemic justifcation must be pre-
pared to state some new criterion for distin-
guishing unfounded belief from a promising 
theory and from established knowledge. Te
contemporary literature ofers many intrigu-
ing possibilities— some highly formal and some 
quite commonsensical—but none that have won
anything approaching consensus. 
I suggest that we understand the idea 
of epistemic justification in terms of evi-
dence. Te things that we know are those true
beliefs for which we have very, very, very good
evidence—what a lawyer calls proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Good evidence is something 
that we are all familiar with and something that 
we can learn to reliably spot. I will be ofering in
the chapters to follow a model of—or a kind of
formula for testing for—good evidence. I hope
to convince you that this model captures almost 
everything we care about when we assess the
quality of a person’s evidence or for that mat-
ter, their claims to knowledge. 
Let’s transform the standard analysis of
knowledge in light of all this into the following: 
J knows P only if: 
i. J believes P. 
ii. P is true. 
iii. J has exceedingly good evidence for P. 
An Unsolved Problem 
If you were reading very carefully, you may
have noticed a slight diference in the way I
stated the standard analysis of knowledge at 
the end of preceding section and the section
immediately before that one. You are all smart 
enough to see the obvious change in condi-
tion iii, but can you fnd the other diference?
Te way the philosophic tradition has defned
knowledge is to articulate necessary and suf-
fcient conditions for knowing something. Te
standard analysis of knowledge claims that the 
three necessary conditions are, taken together, 
sufcient for knowing something. In my state-
ment of a “transformed” analysis, I wimped out 
a bit. I claimed that my three conditions were all 
necessary— that’s what the “only if ” signifes—
but I lef it open whether the three conditions
were sufcient. Here’s why. 
Consider the following little thought experi-
ment. My wife and I have spent the last hour
collaborating on our special spaghetti sauce.
Just as we are getting ready to serve dinner, we
discover that we are out of Parmesan cheese.
We divide responsibilities—she will toss the
salad and serve dinner; I’ll make the emer-
gency run to the store. While at the store, I meet 
a colleague doing research in contemporary
epistemology—she wants an example of knowl-
edge. I suggest that I know there is a spaghetti
dinner sitting on our dining room table right 
now. And as luck would have it, it’s true that a
spaghetti dinner is on the table. I believe it, it’s
true, and I’m justifed in believing it. All is well.
Well, maybe not. Afer I lef, our German shep-
herd, Guido, got rambunctious and knocked the
pot of simmering spaghetti sauce on the dirty
kitchen foor. My wife considered violence
against the dog, but before anything could hap-
pen, a neighbor arrived with a pot of lefover
spaghetti sauce, announcing that she was leav-
ing on vacation and it would surely spoil before
she returned. Tus the spaghetti sauce that




























made my knowledge claim true is unconnected
to the spaghetti sauce that provided the justif-
cation for my belief. It is odd in the extreme to
claim that I had knowledge of the pot of spa-
ghetti sitting on my table. It is pure serendipity
that my belief turned out to be true. 
A lot of contemporary epistemology has
been concerned with ruling out these kinds of
“Guido” cases (actually, they are called Gettier
examples, afer the philosopher who frst made 
them famous). Many philosophers have sug-
gested that some fourth or ffh or sixth and so 
on condition must be added to our analysis of
knowledge. I am not sure whether I personally 
agree. To be on the safe side, however, I will be 
content with the above transformed analysis.
Te epistemic action in this little book will focus 
on condition iii anyway. What the heck is it to
have evidence or good evidence or exceedingly 
good evidence for something? 
exerCIses 
1. What is the myth of defnition? Does it show that the traditional philosophical quest of 
defning terms (analyzing them) is unnecessary? Why, or why not? 
2. Explain why having a true belief that something is the case is not good enough for claiming
to know that it is the case. 
3. What does the “Guido” example show us about knowledge? 
QuIz three 
Here’s something I claim to know: climate change (global warming) is very real and very dan-
gerous. How would the epistemological skeptic respond to this? Given the view of knowledge 
defended in this chapter, what would need to be true if my knowledge claim is correct? 
Notes 
1 Plato, “Teatetus,” in Plato: Te Collected Dialogues, 
trans. F. M. Cornford (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-



























When we give reasons for holding a view or reaching a conclusion, the process is
intrinsically articulate. Giving reasons requires language, concepts and skill with
words, not just a simple ability to talk. For two (or more) people to share their rea-
soning requires a kind of refective articulateness, an ability to express reasoning 
in a way that is intelligible to a particular audience. . . . What we will call “argu-
ment” here is meant to capture everything we make explicit when we give reasons
for a view or proposition. . . . Much of the difculty in reasoning together comes
from simply not understanding each other’s arguments— from not understanding 
the signifcance of the words to express reasons and the views they support. 
— larry wrIGht1 
The Importance of Arguments 
I am in an unusual career, where arguments
dominate my professional life. I am paid to teach 
my students what philosophers have had to say 
on a great array of topics. Almost always, these 
philosophers, whether they are the historical
“biggies” or contemporary thinkers, support 
their theories with arguments. Obviously, if I
am going to do my job, I need to help my stu-
dents sort out the good arguments from the bad. 
As a professor, I also participate in what is called
“shared governance,” and as a consequence, I
am required to vote and help decide policies,
curricula, and other matters of university
importance. Administrators and my colleagues 
consistently defend positions of great signif-
cance to the institution with impassioned argu-
ments. Since I take this part of my profession
very seriously, I fnd it essential to decide which 
of these arguments I fnd most persuasive. 
Most of us are not simply consumers of argu-
ments, we are producers as well. In my own pro-
fessional work, I present and defend theories
about privacy, the Constitution, the death penalty,
the existence of God, and a number of other phil-





















   
 
      
 
 
       
    










   
  
 




















topics. As an active participant in shared gover-
nance, I take sides, advocate positions, and occa-
sionally lead the charge for particular causes. All
this demands that I defend my views. In these
cases, it is my name on the argument, and there
is a heightened sense not just of ownership but 
of personal and professional responsibility. I
need my arguments to be as strong as they can be
not just convincing but plausible and hopefully
pointing in the right direction. 
Your life may not be as argument-intensive as
mine, but if you stop to refect a bit, I think you’ll
fnd arguments all around you. Advertisers make
arguments for why you should buy their prod-
ucts and politicians for why they deserve your
vote. You may need the advice from accountants
and economists, hopefully backed up with argu-
ments, to plan for a major business investment 
or your retirement. And you are a producer of
arguments as well. Tat memo you wrote to your
boss for a change in the way things are done or
the case you just made to your partner about the
need to buy a new car is an argument. 
Tis book is about arguments and a suggested
technique for distinguishing good arguments
from bad ones. Tese general hints are intended 
to be of use both when you fnd yourself in the 
position of the consumer of an argument and
when you must make some decision about the
quality of its evidence as well as when you are
the producer of the argument and desire to pres-
ent the strongest evidence you can. I don’t claim 
to have a magic bullet that will automatically
show the truth about complicated issues. But I
think you will be pleasantly surprised at how
ofen this technique proves useful for think-
ing through these issues, fnding out where you 
stand, and even beginning the process of formu-
lating your own arguments about them. 
What Is an Argument? 
One potentially misleading aspect in some of my
previous examples is that when it comes to con-
troversial issues such as abortion or the death
penalty, tempers can be high. And trust me,
debates about curriculum or university policy
can be just as emotionally explosive. Tere is
a perfectly fne use of the word argument that 
basically means a verbal fght. Joe and Sally got 
into a terrible argument about his failure to do 
his share of the house cleaning. Tat is not what 
we will mean by the term, however. Sure, there 
will be times when arguments are very impor-
tant, and disagreements about their strength
or weakness will touch our emotions as much
as our reason. Tere will be many other times,
however, when arguments are simply there for 
our consideration, and we can assess them free 
of any passion or personal commitment. Indeed,
as much as is possible, I would recommend
adopting the more dispassionate approach, even
when you feel strongly about what is at issue. 
It is useful to see an argument as a com-
plex arrangement of three quite different
things. There will be what logicians call a
conclusion—some theory, hypothesis, or position
that the argument seeks to defend. Tere will be 
premises— facts, data, or evidence that the argu-
ment uses to support the conclusion. And there 
will be a relationship between the premises and 
conclusion whereby the conclusion follows from
the premises. We can schematically represent an
argument as follows: 
 
 








































Let’s begin at the bottom. Every argument will
have a conclusion—that’s part of the defnition of 
an argument. When we put an argument in what 
we will be calling its schematic form, it will always
come at the end, under the big, heavy line. But in
the real world of arguments, we should treat the
term conclusion as technical jargon. Conclusions
don’t always come at the conclusion of a person’s
argument. Sometimes they come at the beginning. 
Dick’s cheating on Jane. He told her he had to work 
late, but Sally saw his car at Joe’s Bar. Not only that, 
he leers at other women, and the last three times she 
called him, he didn’t answer. 
Sometimes they come in the middle. 
Charlie’s take-home exam was word-for-word identi-
cal to Sarah’s. Clearly, Charlie copied it from Sarah. 
Te guy’s a loser, never comes to class, and doesn’t
know how to write very well. 
And, of course, some of the time, they are at the 
end. 
Te light from virtually every galaxy is “red-shifed.” 
Tis shows that every galaxy is moving away from
every other galaxy. Terefore, the physical universe 
is expanding. 
I have used the lowercase letter t in my sche-
matic representation to stand for theory. Te
subscript “0” is used to do two jobs. Although
there is only one theory defended in the argu-
ment’s conclusion (though that single conclu-
sion can be complicated and composed of many
parts—“therefore, Jake did it or helped plan it,
or someone read his diary”), we will need to
keep track of other possible theories besides
the one defended in the argument. So “0” can
be understood as the number zero and starting
a sequence of numbered theories. But the “0”
can also be read as the letter o and standing for
original—the original theory or conclusion in
the argument. 
To standardize things, we will use the low-
ercase letter e to stand for an individual bit of
evidence. Tere are no set numbers of prem-
ises, or pieces of the evidence, in an argument.
Sometimes there will be just a single datum,
and sometimes, there will be quite a bit of sup-
porting data. Te previous examples illustrate
not just that conclusions can come in many
places in the statement of an argument but 
that the same holds true the statements of the
evidence. 
Let’s recast our schematized argument in
terms of evidence for a theory: 
argum
ents 
e1. Evidence (datum) 
e2. Evidence (another datum) 
e3. Evidence (another datum) 
. . . 
en. Evidence (another datum) 
t0. Theory 




















































We’ve said a bit about the top and the bottom in 
our schematic representation of an argument.
What about that conspicuous, big, fat line? In
good arguments, the conclusion follows from
the premises; the evidence supports the theory.
What exactly is this relationship of support or
following from? Tat turns out to be a very con-
troversial issue in both philosophy and math-
ematical logic. 
In some cases, the relationship is semantic. 
If we just understood enough about the mean-
ings of all the words in the premises, we would 
see that the conclusion has to be true. Ofen the 
examples are pretty trivial. 
e1. The number is even. 
e2. The number is greater than seventeen. 
t0. The number is not prime. 
Other times, however, there’s quite a bit of
information hiding in the premises, and the
conclusions are a little surprising and quite
signifcant. 
e1. The fgure is a plane triangle. 
t0. The interior angles of the fgure equal
exactly 180°. 
Arguments of the previous type have a tech-
nical name. Tey are called deductive arguments. 
In a successful deductive argument, the relation-
ship between the premises and conclusion (it’s 
artifcial here to call them evidence and theory)
is a very special one. Logicians call it validity. 
Valid arguments are ones where if the premises
are true, the conclusion has to be true. Many col-
leges and universities have whole courses on
deductive (or symbolic) logic. Very sophisticated
techniques are developed for determining valid-
ity. We will not spend time reviewing this mate-
rial because as interesting (and just plain fun) as
it is, one almost never fnds deductive arguments
being put forward outside of academic philoso-
phy and mathematics. 
A second way of connecting premises to con-
clusions relies on the technical felds of mathe-
matics and statistics. We cannot as conveniently 
ignore these arguments, since they play huge
roles in contemporary science. Our approach to 
them, however, will be a little indirect. Rather
than going through the basics of probability
theory and then developing statistical tests for
making sense of numerical data, we will treat
these arguments as special cases of inductive
arguments. Tis latter jargon simply means that 
the argument claims that the conclusion follows 
from the premises but not deductively— that is, 
it is possible for the premises to be true, yet the 
conclusion turns out to be false. Now, of course, 
it should be relatively rare that in good induc-
tive arguments, the premises would be true and 
the conclusion false; otherwise these arguments
will not be very useful. It is a matter of great 
controversy in logic, philosophy, and even the
sciences as to how we describe this relationship 
between evidence and theories. Te rest of this 
book is devoted to showing you one way of char-
acterizing this relationship. 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
Consider the three short examples mentioned
previously. We had purported evidence that 
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Dick was unfaithful—the leering, the excuse
about being sick, the car outside the bar, and
the missed phone calls. We had purported evi-
dence about the copied take-home exam—the
word-for-word identical submissions, Charlie’s
chronic absences, and his failures as a writer.
Finally, we had the evidence about the expand-
ing universe— the red- shifed light from distant 
galaxies. In each of these cases, the suggested
theory explains signifcant parts of our evi-
dence. Charlie being a cheater doesn’t explain
his bad writing, but it sure helps us understand
how the two exams ended up being the same.
Dick’s cheating (in a very diferent way) would
explain why he was at the bar when he said he
was sick. And an expanding universe explains
the Doppler shif we observe in the light from
galaxies. 
Tis suggests a generalization. Suppose we
treat the theory being defended in an inductive 
argument as an explanation of the data (at least 
some of the data) contained in the evidence. We 




Inference to the best explanation assumes this gen-
eral picture of inductive arguments. Te rela-
tionship of support or following from becomes
one of good explanation. Evidence for a theory is
strong, or good or sound, if and only if, the the-
ory best explains the relevant data that is being
ofered as evidence. Tis defnition of good evi-
dence gives us a very useful device for testing 
the quality of purported evidence. 
In the next chapter, I intend to lay out a kind 
of practical test for answering questions about 
the strength of arguments, about the quality of
evidence. Does Connie have good evidence that 
her boyfriend was smooching Mary Jane during 
his absence at the record hop? Is there a strong 
argument that Charlie copied the take-home
exam? Do astronomers really know that the phys-
ical universe is expanding? We can only begin
to answer these questions when we are in abso-
lute agreement about what the argument is in
the frst place. 
A Couple of Arguments 
from Sherlock Holmes 
Let’s look at a couple of examples of evidence
that lead to some conclusions for Sherlock
Holmes. 
Here are the missing links of the very simple chain:
1. You had chalk between your lef fnger and thumb 

























      
  
   















put chalk there when you play billiards, to steady the 
cue. 3. You never play billiards except with Turston. 
4. You told me, four weeks ago, that Turston had an 
option on some South African property which would 
expire in a month, and which he desired you to share 
with him. 5. Your check book is locked in my drawer, 
and you have not asked for the key. 6. You do not pro-
pose to invest your money in this manner.2 
Te beginning of Te Adventure of the Dancing 
Men begins with a little case study in Sherlock
Holmes’s “deductive” method. Holmes’s method,
of course, is not deductive in the formal logi-
cian’s sense but inductive, or better, abductive. It 
is an inference to the best explanation. Holmes 
possesses a fair amount of data. 
e1. Watson had chalk between his left fnger 
and thumb. 
e2. He uses the chalk when he plays billiards. 
e3. He only plays billiards with Thurston. 
e4. He told Holmes four weeks ago that Thur-
ston had an option on some South African 
property, which would expire in a month. 
e5. Watson’s checkbook is locked in Holmes’s
drawer. 
e6. Watson has not asked for the key. 
Holmes explains all this with the hypothesis
that Watson has decided against the investment.
Holmes goes on to explicate his reasoning with 
the metaphor of a chain. 
You see, my dear Watson . . . it is not really difcult to 
construct a series of inferences, each dependent on its 
predecessor and each simple in itself. If, afer doing 
so, one simply knocks out all the central inferences
and presents one’s audience with the starting-point
and the conclusion, one may produce a startling, though
possibly a meretricious, efect. Now, it was not really
difcult, by an inspection of the groove between your
lef forefnger and thumb, to feel sure that you did not
propose to invest your small capital in the gold felds.3 
Although I think it is clear that Holmes exag-
gerates when he claims that the inferences
follow in sequential lockstep, the insight that 
explanatory reasoning ofen proceeds in steps
is important. Here is how I would schematize
Holmes’s inference. 
e1. Watson had chalk between his left fnger 
and thumb. 
e2. He uses the chalk when he plays billiards. 
e3. He only plays billiards with Thurston. 
t′ 0. Watson played billiards with Thurston
last night. 
e4. He told Holmes four weeks ago that Thur-
ston had an option on some South African 
property, which would expire in a month. 
e5. Watson’s checkbook is locked in Holmes’s
drawer. 
e6. Watson has not asked for the key. 
t″ 0. Watson has decided against the 
investment. 
Each of these inferences is to an “alleged” best
explanation. t′ 0 explains the chalk on his hand
and is consistent with Holmes’s background
knowledge of Watson’s preferences in playing
partners. t″ 0 explains the lack of a request for
the key and is consistent with Holmes’s knowl-
edge of what Watson told him four weeks ago
and the location of the checkbook. 































fIgure 1. Dancing men cypher 
Retrieved from Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle, The Return of Sherlock Holmes, 
http:// www.gutenberg.org/ ebooks/ 108 
(accessed June 26, 2018). 
argum
ents 
But Te Adventure of the Dancing Men is not
really about chalk and South African invest-
ments; it’s ultimately about murder and a couple
of other mysteries that lead to the murder and 
its solution. 
Here’s a link to a lovely webpage that includes 
the full text of the short story: https://etc 
.usf.edu/lit2go/178/the-return-of-sherlock 
-holmes/ 3228/ chapter -iii -the -adventure 
-of-the-dancing-men/. 
You’ll enjoy the story, and it would be great 
practice if you paused here for a while and tried 
your hand at schematizing Holmes’s argument 
for what happened at Ridling Torpe Manor. 
Consider, first, the mystery that gives the
story its name. Holmes shows Watson a piece
of paper with the above pencil markings.4 
Tis is our frst piece of evidence. 
e1. The dancing men document 
Watson immediately ofers an account: “Why,
Holmes, it is a child’s drawing.” Holmes thinks 
otherwise. Te dancing men drawings “have a 
meaning,” but they might be “arbitrary” (think 
“one if by land and two if by sea”) or they might 
be “systematic” (a cipher). Holmes bets on the
latter. His client, Mr. Cubitt, has provided more 
data: 
e2. Mr. Cubitt’s wife, Elsie, received a letter 
from America that very much upset her. 
e3. Other dancing men inscriptions, on both 
paper and chalk applied to buildings, have
turned up at Ridling Thorpe Manor. 
e4. Holmes has knowledge of the relative
frequency of letters in the English language. 
t′ 0. The dancing men fgures stand for let-
ters. And the messages are in English. 
Holmes breaks the code. He is now able to trans-
late the diferent messages that have turned up. 
Tis leads to the second mystery: Why is
Elsie so reticent to tell her husband about her
past? Why is she so upset and frightened by the
dancing men messages? Why did she stop her
husband from confronting the stranger they
caught in the act of scrawling one of the mes-
sages? Holmes is in a position to answer many
of these questions simply by decoding the
messages he has. In addition, Holmes explains
Elsie’s reticence and fear in terms of some con-
nection to criminal activities in her past, and
he knows that the correspondent is named Abe
Slaney. A cable to a colleague in the States con-
frms that Slaney is “the most dangerous crook
in Chicago.” Slaney is imploring Elsie to return
to him and fnally threatening her. Holmes and
Watson have plenty of evidence that necessi-








































e5. The contents of the messages 
e6. Slaney is the most dangerous crook in
Chicago. 
e7. Slaney’s threat to Elsie 
t″ 0. Elsie, and perhaps Mr. Cubitt’s, lives are 
in danger. 
• The study window was shut and
fastened. 
• The house was locked from the inside, 
and no one could have left. 
• They were both conscious of the smell 
of powder from the time they awakened
upstairs. 
Sadly, they are too late. Immediately upon
their arrival at the train station, they learn of
the tragedy. 
“It’s a terrible business,” said the stationmaster. “Tey
are shot, both Mr. Hilton Cubitt and his wife. She shot 
him and then herself—so the servants say. He’s dead 
and her life is despaired of.”5 
Te stationmaster has, of course, not only intro-
duced crucial new evidence but also ofered an 
explanation. Holmes proceeds to the murder
scene, interviews two servants, and examines
the room where the bodies have been found. 
e8. Cubitt is shot dead, and Elsie is gravely 
wounded with a gunshot to the head. 
e9. A revolver is found, still containing four 
bullets. 
e10. The servants report several things: 
• Both were awakened by the sound of a 
loud gunshot. 
• A short while later, they heard a second 
shot. 
• The victims were downstairs in the
study. 
• A strong smell of gun smoke in the
study. 
Tere are still several pages to go in Te Adven-
tures of the Dancing Men, but Holmes has now
basically solved the case. His reasoning is classic
inference to the best explanation (IBE). How and
why did Mr. Cubitt and Elsie come to be shot?
Why were the servants conscious of the smell
of powder while upstairs? And what about the
mysterious Slaney? 
Holmes is particularly fascinated by the pow-
der aroma upstairs— “I commend that fact very 
carefully to your attention.”6 Holmes’s provi-
sional hypothesis is that the window must have 
been open and the draf carried the smell. Care-
ful examination of the study produces one last 
crucial bit of evidence. 
e11. A third bullet is discovered in the win-
dow sash. 
A third bullet! Someone else is involved! Tey
examine outside the window and discover
important new data. 
e12. Trampled fowers, large masculine foot-
prints, and a spent cartridge 
But why only the sound of two gunshots? Te
frst one was extremely loud. Might it “have been
two shots fred almost at the same instant”?7 

































       
 
 
   
   
  















      
 
  
      
33 
Holmes proceeds to entrap Slaney, and he con-
frms that he was one of the authors of the danc-
ing men messages and that he and Mr.  Cubitt 
exchanged gunshots through the window. Te
story never tells us precisely what happened to
Elsie, but we know, just as Holmes knew. 
t0. Slaney sought to win Elsie back and
was refused. He came to the manor and
exchanged almost simultaneous gunshots
with Cubitt. Elsie closed the window and
either heartbroken at the death of her
husband, guilt-ridden and feeling partial
responsibility, or misguidedly seeking to
preserve her husband’s good name, shot
herself in the head. 
Schematizing the Argument 
Let me state something explicitly. Te single
hardest part of argument analysis or the IBE
recipe may ofen be simply identifying what the
argument is in the frst place. Tere are a num-
ber of reasons for this. First and foremost,
people aren’t always as clear as the might be
when they state their arguments. But there are
other complicating factors as well. My guess
is that Conan Doyle would have said he wasn’t 
presenting an argument at all but simply tell-
ing a story. Still, I think it’s clear that the story
is about Holmes’s following the evidence and
coming to a conclusion about what happened.
Add to all that some arguments touch on deeply
divisive moral and political issues and few of
us read them and set our personal politics to
the side. Tese unavoidable biases that we all
carry with us will ofen tempt us to simply
misread what the argument is. Finally, as we
get a hint of in this short story but becomes
daunting when an argument is developed over
the course of a whole book, the sheer number
of words, thoughts, and sentences makes it 
extremely challenging to keep the structure of
the argument clearly in mind. 
Granted all this, the frst step in the IBE pro-
cedure that we will develop in the next chap-
ter is not only the most difcult; it is the most
important. If we misrepresent what the argu-
ment is, then all our work in analyzing it will
be a waste of time. Who cares if you show “the
argument” to be a spectacular success or a dis-
mal failure if it wasn’t the real argument in the
frst place? 
Useful schematization requires three vir-
tues, all of which defy simple characterization.
First and foremost, as we have just emphasized,
you should strive for copy fdelity. Your task is
to characterize “the other person’s argument,”
a representation of his or her evidence. You
may think of better ways to make the argu-
ment, or you may even think that the evidence
points in a diferent direction. Tat’s all fne
and good and will be useful in later steps. Right 
now, however, your job is to faithfully repre-
sent the argument as it was stated. You want to
also strive for brevity. We just saw how an argu-
ment might take up several pages of a short 
story but just imagine when we look in a later
chapter at Darwin’s “abstract” of his theory in
On the Origin of Species9 and try to keep straight 
all the evidence presented in more than four
hundred pages. In order for your schematiza-
tion to be useful to you, you will need to keep
your representation of the evidence down to,
say, no more than a page. Finally, and most 


















        
  
  




















          
 
  


















in your schematized arguments. You want to
present the argument in the strongest form you
can. Tis is not because you are being nice or
discounting the previous virtue of copy fdel-
ity. It is because you want to avoid at all costs
weakening the evidence in the way you choose
to schematize it. Tis is particularly important 
when you are dealing with arguments with
which you disagree. If you come to the judg-
ment that the evidence is weak, you need to
make darn sure that you’ve given the evidence
its best shot. 
Start at the Bottom (Find 
the Conclusion) 
We’ve already discussed the fact that conclu-
sions may come anywhere in a statement of
an argument. Still, in the schematic form I am
urging on you, they always come at the bot-
tom; they are always are identified as t0 (“0”
to start a sequence of explanations and o as 
a reminder that this explanation is the origi-
nal one), and they are always explanations of
the data, not simply statements of the data. I
strongly suggest that you begin your schema-
tizing of the argument by trying to identify its
conclusion. 
Ofentimes, you will fnd hints in the state-
ment that will guide you to the argument’s con-
clusion. Tere are many words and phrases that 
are commonly used to alert readers or listeners 
that an inference is being drawn. Some of the
classics you will fnd in any introductory logic
book are as follows: “therefore,” “hence,” “so,”
“it follows that,” and many others. But at other 
times, you are simply expected to pick out what 
the theory is that is supposed to be supported
by the evidence. Te best advice in these latter 
cases is simply to ask yourself something very
general and vague such as “What’s the point of
all this?” or, as suggested previously, “What the 
heck is going on?” Once you have a candidate,
now see whether it explains some of the data in 
the argument. If it doesn’t seem to, you might 
want to look for another candidate as the argu-
ment’s conclusion. 
Two other general comments are appropri-
ate here. First, don’t get discouraged. Tis is
hard stuf. It will get easier and more natural
as you get more experience using the recipe.
And second, there will be times when you fail
to discover a conclusion to begin your schema-
tization because the passage of prose in front 
of you is not an argument in the frst place. We 
obviously use language do lots of things— make 
simple assertions, push people’s buttons, or sim-
ply vent—stating an argument is only one use
of language. 
Find the Relevant Evidence 
In Te Adventure of the Dancing Men, we learned 
a lot of stuf. Holmes enjoyed playing with Wat-
son’s head. Mr. Cubitt was “a tall, ruddy, clean
shaven gentleman.” And that Inspector Martin 
was a “dapper little man, with a quick, alert 
manner and a waxed moustache.” Tis is just
good literary technique. Tere’s also the impor-
tant information at the end of the story when
Slaney is arrested and confesses. But these
data are only tangential to solving the murder. 
Te data in e1 through e12, however, are crucial
to understanding what happened, and all of it 
should be included in a complete schematization
of the argument. 
 
       
 
   
  





          
 
  
   







    
   
35 
Another Brokenhearted Teenager 
Here’s a sad story. 
Lyrics to “It’s My Party” can be found here:
https://genius.com/Lesley-gore-its-my-party 
-lyrics, and Lesley Gore performing her song can
be found here: https://youtu.be/acRMALrg1t4. 
Lesley is in tears, and she assures us we would be
too if something similar happened to us. So what 
the heck happened? She doesn’t spell it out, but 
she knows and so do we. Take some time, now, 
and schematize Lesley’s argument. What is her 
evidence that Johnny is no longer hers and has 




1. What is an argument? What are the three components of any argument? 
2. How can you have a big argument, with lots of name-calling, without either party present-
ing an argument for why they feel aggrieved? 
3. What do you think of the quality of Holmes’s evidence for his theory that Watson had 
decided not to go ahead with the investment? Why? 
QuIz four 
The following article comes from the New York Times. Your task is to schematize the argu-
ment for the conclusion that William Henry Harrison died from enteric fever. The article
“What Really Killed William Henry Harrison?” by Jan McHugh and Philip A. Mackowiak,
March 31, 2014, is available here: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/science/what-really
-killed -william -henry -harrison .html 
Notes 
1 Larry Wright, Critical Tinking (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), ix. 
2 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, “Te Adventure of the Danc-
ing Men,” in Te Return of Sherlock Holmes (New York:
W.  R. Caldwell, 1905), http://www.gutenberg.org/







9 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of






















Inference to the 
Best Explanation 
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would 
explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be
several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject 
all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the inference. 
Tus, one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a “bet-
ter” explanation for the evidence than would any other hypothesis, to the conclu-
sion that the given hypothesis is true. 
— GIlBert harman1 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
We have been treating the expression inference
to the best explanation as technical jargon. It is a 
way of looking at evidence or at least purported 
evidence in an inductive argument. If we look
at the component words in this expression, we 
will discover quite a lot. First of all, we are deal-
ing with an inference. For most purposes, we can 
consider this as just another way of saying that 
we have an argument to be considered. Tis
inference is to an explanation. But we are not 
dealing with just an inference to an explanation 
but to the best explanation. Tis implies two
very important things. First, in order for there 
to be a comparison, there must be other possible 
explanations of the data in the argument, rival 
explanations. And the argument is also commit-
ted to this original explanation being better than
all these rivals. Terefore there seems to be some
rank ordering of the explanatory candidates,
even if this is not explicitly stated. 
I will use all this as a way of articulating a test
of the quality of evidence within an argument. 
Tis test will be most straightforward when you 
are what I have called a consumer of an argu-





        
     
 
  
     








































boyfriend was smooching Mary Jane. Holmes
had evidence about Watson’s decision about the 
investment and about what happened at Ridling 
Torpe Manor. We must decide whether these
arguments are any good. Was the evidence for
these hypotheses strong? What I am going to
call the inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE)
“recipe” is a procedure for answering these
kinds of evaluative questions. 
Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation Recipe 
1. Schematize the argument. 
2. List some serious (hopefully challeng-
ing) rival explanations. 
3. Rank order all the explanations—the original
along with the rivals. 
4. Based on the rank order, see if the origi-
nal is the best explanation. If it is, the evi-
dence has passed the test and looks pretty
good. If it isn’t, it’s failed the test, and the
evidence is weak and maybe nonexistent. 
Let’s frst apply the test or recipe to the simple 
argument presented in the pop song “Lipstick
on Your Collar” that we introduced in chapter 1. 
Schematizing Connie’s Argument 
Tat fateful evening at the record hop, Con-
nie was confronted with data, mainly her own
simple observations, which cry out for expla-
nation. Where did the lipstick stain come from?
Why was he gone for so long? Why did he say it 
belonged to her when the stain was red and her
lipstick was baby pink? Why when Mary Jane
appeared was her lipstick all a mess? Although 
neither a trained natural scientist nor an
experienced detective, Connie easily forms an
explanatory hypothesis. When she then writes
her sad song, she implicitly asks us to account 
for what happened. Here’s how I would sche-
matize Connie’s evidence for her theory that 
her boyfriend had been smooching Mary Jane
when he lef her alone at the record hop. 
e1. He left Connie all alone at the record hop. 
e2. He was gone for half an hour or more. 
e3. When he returned, there was a lipstick
stain on his collar. 
e4. When confronted, he claimed that the
stain came from Connie’s lipstick. 
e5. The stain was red. 
e6. Connie’s lipstick was baby pink. 
e7. Mary Jane’s lipstick was all a mess. 
t0. He had been smooching Mary Jane dur-
ing the half- hour absence. 
Rival Explanations (of Connie’s Data) 
For our purposes, rival explanationswill be accounts
of the data that fat-out deny the original explana-
tion and substitute a completely diferent story
of the data ofered as evidence. It will be useful
to imagine each truly rival account of evidence as
starting out with a lengthy preliminary phrase—
“no, no, no, he was not smooching Mary Jane dur-
ing his absence from the record hop; rather . . .”
Tis is important because the original explanation
might be phrased in very diferent language. 
t′ 0. He and Mary Jane ditched Connie so
they could make out. 
Or an account might ofer a more (or less)
detailed account of what happened. 
    
  
















        
 
 






        
 




t″ 0. He headed for a soda pop but met Mary 
Jane and couldn’t control himself. 
t2. Mary Jane staged the whole thing out of 
revenge. 
Neither t′ 0 nor t″ 0 will count as rival explana-
tions. If you were to challenge Connie with them,
I don’t think she would say, “Oh, yeah, maybe I
was wrong,” but rather she’d exclaim, “Exactly!” 
So what else might have happened? Connie
never suggests any rival explanations, but they
are easy enough to formulate. He went out for a 
soda pop, just as he said. When asked about the
lipstick stain, he responded that it came from
Connie, since she was the only one he had been
smooching. Te laundry detergent his mother
uses lef a residue on his collar that chemically
changed the baby pink lipstick to a bright red
color. Mary Jane had been smooching a new
guy she met at the record hop, and this messed
up her lipstick. We can label this rival explana-
tion t1. 
t1. The lipstick changed from pink to red
because of a chemical reaction with his
mother’s laundry detergent. 
Or the circumstances might be more sin-
ister. He lef Connie all alone because he was
feeling ill but thought it more decorous to say
he wanted a soda pop. Mary Jane has been har-
boring a grudge against Connie since the last 
student council meeting. She found him in the
lobby, distracted him, and wiped lipstick on his 
collar. Afer he lef to return to Connie, Mary
Jane smudged her lipstick with the back of her 
hand. When he returned and was asked about 
the stain, he told Connie it was hers because she 
was the only one he had been smooching. Let’s 
label this one t2. 
t1 and t2 were the rival explanations that I
came up with when I frst used this example
in a conference paper several years ago now. I
subsequently used the example in quizzes in
several of my critical thinking courses. Many of
my students suggested a rival explanation that 
I now believe is much more challenging to Con-
nie’s original theory than either of my earlier
attempts. Perhaps the stain really did come from
Connie but not that evening at the record hop.
She might have been wearing bright red lipstick 
when they smooched last weekend. He’s not too 
hot at doing his laundry regularly and wore the 
stained shirt to the record hop. 
t3. The stain came from a previous episode 
of smooching when Connie was wearing red 
lipstick. 
Rank Ordering Explanations 
(for Connie’s Argument) 
We now have on the table four competing
accounts of what happened at the record hop. 
t0. He had been smooching Mary Jane dur-
ing the half- hour absence. 
t1. The lipstick changed from pink to red
because of a chemical reaction with his
mother’s laundry detergent. 
t2. Mary Jane staged the whole thing out of 
revenge. 
t3. The stain came from a previous episode 
of smooching when Connie was wearing red 
lipstick. 
























     








   
   
 















Inference to the best explanation asks us to
judge one of these explanations as better than all
the rest. How in the world do we start the pro-
cess of judging one explanation as superior to
another? What counts and what doesn’t count in
such a comparison? We will address this in some
detail in a later chapter, but for now, let’s simply 
phrase the question as “Which account makes the 
best sense of what we know?” 
I assume that both t1 and t2 would rank way 
down on your list, compared to t0 and t3. Isn’t 
part of the reason for this, the fact that both of
them introduce something “out of the blue” to
explain the absence? Where did this mysterious 
laundry detergent come from? Or this whole
grudge on the part of someone she had consid-
ered her best friend? 
What about t0 and t3, however? Tey both
seem reasonable enough. Let me simply assert 
some factors that do not count in rank ordering 
explanations. Te best explanation is not neces-
sarily the one we like the best, nor the one that 
best accords with our politics, religion, or moral 
perspectives. It is the one that is most plausible. 
Here comes a scary fact! You have to make the
judgment about which explanation is best. Tere
is no “objective,” “reliable” test or formula you
can utilize that automatically identifes the best 
explanation. Te whole recipe, therefore, rests
on a step that is candidly, unavoidably subjective. 
When it comes to favors of ice cream or styles of 
beer, being subjective means that people’s prefer-
ences are relative to who they are and are, conse-
quently, all over the place. If evidence evaluation
is the same, we’re done for, and I can stop writing
my book and teaching my courses as I do. Fortu-
nately, I believe, explanatory plausibility is very
diferent from beer preferences. Even though
each of us, individual subjects, must rank order
alternative accounts for ourselves, it turns out 
that in a great number of contexts—courts of law,
the natural sciences, and even stories about suspi-
cious lipstick stains—subjective judgments about 
plausibility can turn out to be intersubjective. 
When all is said and done, when we think about it 
as free from prejudice and bias as we can be, we
discover widespread agreement about what the
best explanation is. We are the most intelligent 
species that has ever existed, and part of being
intelligent is being darn good at spotting the best 
explanation of what’s happening around us. 
I rank order our four explanations in the fol-
lowing order: 
t0. He had been smooching Mary Jane dur-
ing the half- hour absence. 
t3. The stain came from a previous episode 
of smooching when Connie was wearing red 
lipstick. 
t1. The lipstick changed from pink to red
because of a chemical reaction with his
mother’s laundry detergent. 
t2. Mary Jane staged the whole thing out of 
revenge. 
I grant you that t0 and t3 are pretty close to one 
another, but I think Connie would not have been 
so surprised at all of this if she regularly wore
bright red lipstick, and besides, the whole idea 
of Connie having red lipstick is sort of out of the 
blue as well. 
Assessment of (Connie’s) Evidence 
Te whole purpose of the inference-to-the-best-
explanation recipe is to assess the quality of
 
     
 
    
 
       
 










   
   
  





















evidence in an argument. We need to fnd the best 
explanation. Te whole test depends on what is
in frst place. In my considered judgment, Con-
nie’s theory was the best explanation, and there-
fore, her evidence is pretty good. For all the talk
about intersubjectivity, I fully realize that some
of you will have ranked t3 ahead of t0. Tose of 
you who have come to that judgment would say
that since there is a better explanation of the
facts at the record hop, Connie’s evidence is weak. 
I have been asking my students to use the
inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe to
assess the quality of evidence presented in an
argument for more than three decades. Te sin-
gle most common mistake that my students make, 
including some of the best and most intelligent, is to
forget about the purpose of the recipe and neglect
to ofer an assessment of the evidence in the argu-
ment. Tey ofen beautifully schematize it, come
up with some challenging rival explanations, and
ofer subtle and insightful comments about how
and why they have rank ordered as they have but 
then remain silent on the quality of the evidence.
I am almost tempted to include a ffh step in the
recipe saying something such as the following: 
5. Conclude your analysis with one of the fol-
lowing two sentences: “Since the original
theory proved to be the best explanation of the
data in the evidence, the argument’s evidence
is pretty good (strong, etc.)” or “Since there is a 
better explanation of the data in the evidence,
the argument’s evidence is weak (poor, nonexis-
tent, etc.).” 
Step 4 requires an explicit evaluation of the evi-
dence, as it was presented and schematized, in 
the original argument! 
What about Ties? 
Suppose you came to the conclusion that 
smooching Mary Jane and smooching Connie
last weekend were equally plausible explana-
tions of all the data you had? What happens
in the recipe when the original and one of the
rivals are tied for frst place? 
Tis is a classic half- full, half- empty kind of 
dilemma. You might say that since the original 
is tied as the best explanation, there’s some evi-
dence for that conclusion. You might also say,
however, that since there’s a rival explanation
that’s tied as the best explanation, the evidence 
is not so hot. I think that whichever way we go, 
the message is really the same. Te original’s
being tied as the best explanation allows us to
see why someone would ofer the argument in
its defense in the frst place and why there is
some evidence that seems to support it. A rival 
being tied as the best explanation tells us that 
the evidence is far from conclusive. Ideally, in
such a case, we go out and do a little more inves-
tigating and see if we could discover some new 
data that would help break the tie. And indeed, 
the whole subject of new data is the topic for
our next chapter. But before heading there, let’s 
apply the recipe to scientifc argument. 
The Origins of Natural Language 
Te following comes from an article by two
prominent cognitive scientists, Stephen Pinker 
and Paul Bloom: 
All human societies have language. As far as we know 
they always did; language was not invented by some 
groups and spread to others like agriculture or the















































alphabet.  .  .  . Te grammars of industrial societies
are no more complex than the grammars of hunter-
gatherers. . . . Within societies, individual humans are
profcient language users regardless of intelligence,
social status, or level of education. Children are fuent 
speakers of complex grammatical sentences by the age
of three, without beneft of formal instruction. Tey
are capable of inventing languages that are more sys-
tematic than those they hear, showing resemblances
to languages that they have never heard, and obey
grammatical principles for which there is no evidence 
in their environments. . . . Te ability to use a natural 
language belongs more to the study of human biology 
than human culture; it is a topic like echolocation in 
bats or stereopsis in monkeys, not like writing or the 
wheel. . . . We argue that language is no diferent from 
other complex abilities to such as echolocation or ste-
reopsis, and the only way to explain the origin of such 
abilities is through the theory of natural selection.2 
Pinker and Bloom’s thesis is that our knowledge 
of syntax or grammar is not something we learn 
but is innate, something we are born with. Spi-
ders don’t learn to spin webs; they simply spin 
them. Bats don’t learn to use echolocation; they 
simply use it to navigate. Babies don’t learn
grammar; they already possess it as they learn
their native language. 
Please take a moment to try your hand at 
schematizing Pinker and Bloom’s argument 
before reading further. 
The Argument Schematized 
Pinker and Bloom are defending a scientifc
hypothesis about the origins of natural language
and their conviction that its history lies in natu-
ral selection. 
t0. The only way to explain the origin of
language is through the theory of natural
selection. 
Tey present a good deal of data in support
of their theory. Here is how I would schematize 
their evidence: 
e1. All human societies have language. 
e2. They always have had language. 
e3. Language was not invented and did not 
spread. 
e4. Contemporary grammars are no more
complex than those of hunter- gatherers. 
e5. Humans are profcient language users
regardless of intelligence, social status, or
level of education. 
e6. Children are fuent speakers of complex 
grammatical sentences by the age of three, 
without beneft of formal instruction. 
e7. Children are capable of inventing lan-
guages that are more systematic than those 
they hear, showing resemblances to lan-
guages that they have never heard and obey-
ing grammatical principles for which there is
no evidence in their environments. 
t0. The origin of language is explained
through the theory of natural selection. 
Rival Explanations (of Pinker 
and Bloom’s Data) 
A superfcially similar theory was frst introduced
by Noam Chomsky in the late 1950s. He argued
that natural selection produced larger brains and
that the ability to master a natural language so


















































size. He was quite emphatic that language was not 
“selected for” in our evolutionary history. Chom-
sky’s view was expanded upon by the important 
evolutionary biologist Steven Gould: 
Yes, the brain got bigger by natural selection. But
as a result of this size, and the neural density and
connectivity thus imparted, human brains could per-
form an immense range of functions quite unrelated
to the original reasons for the increase in bulk. Te
brain did not get big so we could read or write or do
arithmetic or chart the seasons—yet human culture,
as we know it, depends upon skills of this kind. . . . Te
universals of language are so diferent from anything 
else in nature, and so quirky in their structure, that
origin as a side consequence of the brain’s enhanced
capacity, rather than a simple advance in continuity
from ancestral grunts and gestures, seems indicated.
(Tis argument about language is by no means origi-
nal with me, though I ally myself fully with it; this
line of reasoning follows directly as the evolution-
ary reading for Noam Chomsky’s theory of universal
grammar.)3 
t1. Natural selection produced larger, and
more neurally dense, human brains. It was 
a “side consequence” that these brains gave 
us such remarkable language abilities. 
My next rival explanation comes from my
own teaching. Several years ago, I was teach-
ing a philosophical psychology course, and as
a part of it, I had my students read Pinker and
Bloom’s article and the one by Stephen Jay Gould 
from which I have taken the above quote. In a 
take-home essay exam, I asked my students to
discuss the controversy and take sides on which 
argument was stronger. One of my students,
a philosophy minor who had taken several
courses from me and knew all about inference
to the best explanation ofered a rival explana-
tion of Pinker and Bloom’s evidence, which she 
argued was better than either t0 or t1. I was so
taken with the originality of her argument that 
I ofered to coauthor with her and see if we could
get her idea published. We were successful!4 
Joyclynn Potter is a committed theist. But she
is also a good philosophy student. Her belief is a 
cornerstone of who she is and how she thinks.
She is, however, intellectually curious and
far from close-minded. She sympathetically
read and understood Pinker and Bloom’s argu-
ment and Gould’s rival argument. She rejected
both, not because they were both secular natu-
ralist in spirit nor because they both endorsed
evolution by natural selection, but because she 
felt that both had explanatory problems and
that traditional theism ofered a better account 
of what we know about language. Here’s how I 
tried to express Joci’s position. 
What is the best explanation of these facts about
human language? Tere is wide consensus that there
is something innate and almost certainly biological,
but a totally secular evolutionary account is mad-
deningly difcult to produce. Teists, however, can
easily hypothesize that both a uniquely human abil-
ity to acquire and use a natural language as well as
mental syntax that structures human thought in a
quasi-linguistic manner (a language of thought)
are the products of an infnitely wise and benefcent
creator.5 
InferenCe to the Best exPlanatIon 
t2. The uniquely human ability to acquire




























































I want to share with you an idea that I am very 
taken with these days. It comes from a contem-
porary philosopher, as it turns out a very candid 
Christian philosopher, named Peter van Inwa-
gen. He proposes an audience for arguments (at 
least those that occur in philosophical debates) 
that is psychologically impossible but is useful
to imagine nonetheless. 
Te audience is composed of what we might call ideal 
agnostics. Tat is, they are agnostic as regards the
subject- matter of the debate. . . . Each member of the 
of the audience will have no initial opinion about [the 
subject of the debate]. . . . My imaginary agnostics . . . 
would very much like to come to some reasoned opin-
ion [on the debate] . . . indeed to achieve knowledge
on that matter if it were possible. . . . Tey don’t care 
which position .  .  . they end up accepting, but they
very much want to end up accepting one or the other.6 
Ideal agnostics are absolutely indifferent— 
intellectually, personally, and in every way that 
might bias them— about what the best explana-
tion is. But that doesn’t mean they don’t care.
Tey are also passionately committed to fguring 
out which explanation is the strongest. 
I’m no ideal agnostic and neither are you.
But I think we are both well served in our dis-
cussions and investigations to pretend that we
are. Indeed, I am suggesting that any time we
evaluate another’s potential evidence, we try as 
hard as possible to adopt the position of the ideal
agnostic, knowing all along that we will fail in
certain respects. When we are presenting our
own argument, I would also suggest that we pre-
tend our audience is not composed of partisans 
but rather ideal agnostics. 
Tis whole little subsection might strike you
as a tedious distraction. I am belaboring all this
because we all carry with us biases that will
inevitably afect some of our rank ordering of
explanations. Tat is the position I fnd myself
in with the current argument. I care very deeply
about arguments in the philosophy of religion
and cognitive science. I have great respect for
all the scientists involved in the debate about 
language, and I also have great respect for Joy-
clynn Potter and the tradition she represents
within natural theology. I have thought and
written about these issues for my entire career.
Certainly my lifelong skepticism about religion
afected my evaluation of the evidence just as
Joci’s committed faith afected hers. In the end,
we had to agree to disagree, but hopefully, we
understood one another’s arguments better,
and we were ultimately in a position to share
our joint thinking with a larger professional
audience. 
Rank Ordering the Explanations 
(for Pinker and Bloom’s Argument) 
While reading and grading Joci’s exam and
later while collaborating with her, I came to
agree even more strongly with Pinker and
Bloom. Here’s how I rank order the three
competing accounts of what we know about
language. 
t0. The origin of language is explained
through the theory of natural selection. 
t1. Natural selection produced larger, and
more neurally dense, human brains. It was 
a “side consequence” that these brains gave 
























      
   















   
  
  





t2. The uniquely human ability to acquire
and use a natural language is a gift from
God. 
Chomsky and Gould would undoubtedly
invert t0 and t1. Joyclynn was forced in the exam 
to commit herself on whether t0 was better than 
t1, and as I remember, she preferred t0. But she 
dramatically disagreed with her teacher and
ranked the three hypotheses as follows: 
t2. The uniquely human ability to acquire
and use a natural language is a gift from
God. 
t0. The origin of language is explained
through the theory of natural selection. 
t1. Natural selection produced larger, and
more neurally dense, human brains. It was 
a “side consequence” that these brains gave 
us such remarkable language abilities. 
Disagreements 
What in the world do we do about passionate, but 
reasoned, disagreement? Stephen Jay Gould and 
Noam Chomsky were two of the most important 
scientists of the latter twentieth century. Steven
Pinker and Paul Bloom are stars of the twenty- 
frst century. Based just on their credentials,
it’s impossible to take sides. Joyclynn Potter is
no natural scientist, but she’s a very smart and 
thoughtful woman. What are we to make of the 
obvious fact that very intelligent and very hon-
orable people disagree about where the evidence
points? 
Some might argue that all this shows a 
fatal faw in the whole inference-to-the-best-
explanation approach to evidence. How can
I continue to argue—as I already have and
intend to even more vigorously in a later
chapter—that we are skilled explainers when
equally smart and committed people so dis-
agree as to what the best explanation really
is? Te short answer is that this is simply the
nature of evidence. Lots of times, it points in
a clear direction, and we can expect some-
thing like intersubjective agreement. In these
easy cases, which I believe constitute the vast 
majority of times when we consciously evalu-
ate evidence, inference to the best explanation
brings us close to the standard of knowledge
we developed in chapter 3. Te evidence for the
hypothesis that smoking is a causal factor in
lung cancer is so strong that we don’t simply
say that the evidence points in that direction;
we rather say that we now know that smoking
causes lung cancer. 
We’re probably not at that degree of certainty
about what happened at the record hop nor do 
we yet possess the full story about the origin of 
natural language. Still, we possess lots of rel-
evant evidence. Inference to the best explana-
tion helps us reach our personal evaluation of
the evidence and hopefully helps us understand 
the reasoning of those who see things difer-
ently. None of us—not our greatest scientists,
Supreme Court justices, nor just the smart 
people we interact with regularly— possess the 
so-called God’s-eye view, which would allow
the simple “perception” of the truth. Since we
don’t, the best we can do is rely on evidence to 
help point us in the direction of the truth. And as
the history of science or contemporary debates 
in jurisprudence and cognitive science tell us,
we simply have to expect a certain amount of
reasoned disagreement. 
InferenCe to the Best exPlanatIon 
 

















          
 

















     

















Don’t Forget about the Final 
Assessment of the Evidence! 
When I assess the evidence for Pinker and Bloom’s
hypothesis utilizing the inference-to-the-best-
explanation recipe, my rank ordering in step 3
commits me to my fnal evaluation. For me, t0 pro-
vides the best explanation of the evidence adduced
in support of Pinker and Bloom’s hypothesis.
Terefore, the evidence they marshal is very strong. 
Chomsky and Gould would come to a very
diferent evaluation of the evidence. For them,
t0 fails to provide the best explanation of Pinker 
and Bloom’s evidence; t1 provides a better expla-
nation. Terefore, the evidence presented in the 
article is poor. 
Joyclynn Potter would agree with Chomsky
and Gould but for a very diferent reason. She
also believes that t0 fails to provide the best 
explanation of Pinker and Bloom’s evidence, but 
she is convinced that t2 is the superior explana-
tion. Terefore, she would also say that the evi-
dence in their article is poor. 
A Magical Encore? 
Quite by accident, I discovered a glitch in the
iPod sofware. On a Saturday night last year, my 
wife and I went to a banquet for the League of
Oregon Cities. Te entertainment was Pink Mar-
tini, a Portland band I like a lot. I had already
planned that I was going to ask for two songs
when they came back for an encore— “Lilly” and 
“Que Sera Sera.” As it turned out, they did “Que 
Sera Sera” as part of their concert, and there was
no chance to ask when they did their encore.
On Sunday, as we drove back from Portland,
I plugged in my iPod to listen to them again. I
set the settings to “All” and to “Shufe Songs.”
Tis meant that my iPod searched through both 
of their albums, found all thirty-six songs and
played them in “random” order. Tat’s the glitch!
Te last two songs were “Lilly” and “Que Sera
Sera.” Te exact encore I had imagined the night 
before! What are the odds of this? My theory is 
that these two songs came up last, not randomly,
but because of all the Pink Martini songs, I lis-
ten to these two the most ofen. I am thinking of
writing to Apple to tell them about the problem. 
Tis crazy philosopher has a theory that there
is a glitch in the iPod sofware. For practice, and
to make sure you’ve got the IBE recipe down pat,
take a few minutes, and using all four steps in the
inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe assess
the quality of evidence he has for this theory. 
exerCIses 
1. What is a rival explanation? 
2. What are the four steps in the inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe? Why was I
tempted to add a ffth step? 
3. What is the advantage of imagining all argument analysis, or evidence evaluation, as a
discussion between ideal agnostics? 
4. At the end of chapter 4, I ask you to schematize Leslie’s argument for her theory that
Johnny had left her and taken up with Judy (p. 35). That was step 1 in the IBE recipe. Now 
use the other three steps to determine whether Leslie’s evidence is strong, weak, or just 
so- so. 
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QuIz fIVe 
On July 20, 2013, an article appeared in the New York Times arguing that female family mem-
bers can make males more generous. Here’s a link to the article: https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/ 07/21/ opinion/ sunday/ why-men -need -women .html. 
Use all the steps in the IBE recipe to assess the quality of evidence for the claim that “the 
mere presence of female family members—even infants—can be enough to nudge men in
the generous direction.” 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon & Schus-Notes 
ter, 1995), 390. 
1 G. Harman, “Te Inference to the Best Explanation,” 4 Jefery L. Johnson and Joyclynn Potter, “Te Argu-
Philosophical Review 74, no. 1 (1965): 89. ment from Language and the Existence of God,”
2 Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom, “Natural Language Journal of Religion 85, no. 1 (January 2005). 
and Natural Selection,” in Te Adapted Mind, ed. 5 Johnson and Potter, 84. 
Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Toby 6 Peter van  Inwagen, Te Problem of Evil (New York:
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 451. Oxford University Press, 2006), 44. 
3 Stephen J. Gould, “Tires to Sandals,” Natural His-
tory, April 1989, 8–15, quoted in Daniel C. Dennett,















New Data and 
Experimentation 
We must trust to nothing but facts: these are presented to us by nature and can-
not deceive. We ought, in every instance, to submit our reasoning to the test of
experiment, and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment 
and observation. 
—antoIne lavoIsIer1 
The Crazy Philosopher’s Evidence 
As you will remember, Johnson thought he had 
discovered evidence that there was a glitch in
his iPod sofware. His schematized argument 
was as follows: 
e1. Johnson went to a Pink Martini concert, 
planning to ask for a specifc encore. 
e2. “Que Sera Sera” was played during the
concert. 
e3. He never got a chance to ask for “Lilly.” 
e4. On the ride home the next morning, he 
set his iPod to play all thirty- six of the Pink 
Martini songs. 
e5. He set the iPod to “Shufe Songs.” 
e6. He listened to all thirty- six songs. 
e7. The last two songs played were “Lilly”
and “Que Sera Sera”— the imagined encore 
from the night before! 
e8. “Lilly” and “Que Sera Sera” are the
two Pink Martini songs he listens to most
often. 
t0. There is a glitch in the iPod software—
rather than playing the songs in completely 
“random” order, it is weighing things accord-

























       
 
 
   
 























Tere are thirty-six Pink Martini songs in
Johnson’s iPod. What are the odds of his imag-
ined encore occurring on the drive home? Let’s 
spend just a minute and fgure that out. “Lilly” 
came up as the next to the last song played. Te 
odds of this happening are straightforward. Any
one of thirty-six songs could have come up here,
so the odds are 1/36. But to have the encore, you 
had to also have “Que Sera Sera” come up last. So 
what are the odds of that happening? It’s actually
easy to fgure out. We already know the odds of
“Lilly,” so it’s a question of “Lilly” and “Que Sera 
Sera.” Since “Lilly” has already been played, the 
odds of “Que Sera Sera” are 1/35, and the odds
of “Lilly” and “Que Sera Sera” are 1/36 × 1/35,
or 1/1,260. But of course, I would have also had 
my encore if the last two songs had been “Que
Sera Sera” and then “Lilly.” Te odds of this hap-
pening fgure out exactly the same— 1/1,260. So 
the odds of my encore popping up— “Lilly” and 
“Que Sera Sera” or “Que Sera Sera” and “Lilly”
are 1/1,260 + 1/1,260, or 1/630. 
Certainly, one thing that would explain that 
1/630 shot coming up on the ride home is that 
my imagined encore was composed of my two
favorite (and most listened to) Pink Martini 
songs, and the program was illegitimately tak-
ing this into account in generating the “random”
play order. But I hope it’s obvious by now, it’s easy
enough to think of lots of rival explanations. 
t1. This was just a true, 1/630 coincidence. 
t2. This is not a software glitch; the iPod soft-
ware is designed to do exactly this. 
t3. The iPod software is illegitimately weigh-
ing things, not by number of times played, 
but something else—length of the songs,
where they occur in the album, and so on. 
t4. The philosopher set his iPod incorrectly. 
t5. The philosopher dozed in and out on the 
drive home and only thought that these two 
songs came up last. 
t6. The problem is in Johnson’s iPod—the
hardware, not the software. 
My students have been worrying about what 
happened for the last several years on quizzes,
ever since this really happened on a drive back
from the Oregon League of Cities. Tey pretty
generally rank the coincidence hypothesis as
a much better explanation, though they are
ofen surprised once they see the math that
the odds are really 1/630. Tey also don’t seem
to have too much confdence in their profes-
sor, since explanations such as t4 and t5 are
consistently ranked ahead of t0. So accord-
ing to the inference-to-the-best-explanation
recipe, these students are committed to saying
that Johnson’s evidence for the glitch theory is
pretty weak. 
Why Don’t You Just Test It? 
I’ve told you this little anecdote for two very
diferent reasons. One, of course, is I wanted a 
little exercise that would allow you to apply the 
inference-to-the-best-explanation test from
chapter 5 to an argument. Te other, though, is 
to tell you about a very common feature that my 
students have felt compelled to add to their dis-
cussions. Tere is almost a sense of frustration 
or least the need to lecture their professor. Tey 
suggest, indeed insist on, a very simple test of
the glitch hypothesis. 
Look, isn’t there an obvious way to settle this 
matter? Turn of the iPod, reset everything, play
 
  
   
 
        
 
























      
  
  
Pink Martini’s songs again and see what hap-
pens. What is being proposed here is a classic
little experiment—the kind of thing that some
philosophers and scientists say is the defning 
condition of real science. I hope to convince you 
in the next couple of chapters that there is some-
thing brilliantly right about this claim but, at the
same time, dangerously misleading. 
A Pretty Picture of Science 
Here is an idealization about the natural sci-
ences. Te scientist is really smart and is trained 
to go about her business in a very special, almost 
ritualized, way. She goes out and observes the
world. Being smart and being trained to be a 
careful observer, she notices things. Sometimes 
she is puzzled by the things she observes and
she asks questions, Why am I observing this?
She starts looking for an explanation. Being 
smart and creative she thinks about this really
hard and comes up with a possible answer—a 
hypothesis or a theory. Tis is all fne and good,
but according to the pretty picture, it’s only
now that the rules of science kick in. It’s not 
good enough to just have a theory; the theory
must now be tested. Te scientist must devise
an experiment and let the results of the experi-
ment determine the fate of her theory. 
Bear with me for a bit of technical stuf in 
symbolic logic. Logicians talk about conditionals, 
“if . . . then” sentences. Tere are two valid infer-
ences that follow directly from a true conditional. 
1. If the fgure is a plane right triangle, then
the interior angles total 180°. 
2. The fgure is a plane right triangle. 
51 
3. The interior angles total 180°. 
Tis inference is called modes ponens. A kind of
mirror image inference is called modes tollens. 
1. If the fgure is a plane right triangle, then
the interior angles total 180°. 
2. The interior angles do not total 180°. 
3. The fgure is not a plane right triangle. 
Finally, there is a tempting inference that is not 
valid but is rather a logical fallacy, afrming the 
consequent. 
new
 data and exPerIm
entatIon 
1. If the fgure is a plane right triangle, then 
the interior angles total 180º. 
2. The interior angles total 180º. 
3. The fgure is a plane right triangle. 
You can easily spot the fallacy by noting that the 
fgure might total 180° because it’s a triangle,
but, at the same time, not be a right triangle but 
rather, say, an equilateral triangle. 
OK, so what does all this have to do with the 
pretty picture of science and maybe Johnson’s
iPod? Well, suppose the conditional sets up
something we might expect to see in an experi-
mental circumstance, given the theory we are
testing is true. 
1. If the theory is true, we will see . . . in the 
experiment. 
By the inference of modes tollens, we will be














   
  













songs, “Right in Time” and “Essence,” the most. 
So if I set my iPod to play all her tracks and to
shufe them, I am predicting that the two songs 
will be played last. 
Suppose I do all this with my iPod and listen 
to all her songs—more than a hundred, I’d say.
We can imagine four diferent outcomes to the
experiment. Focusing on the last two songs, we 
might observe any of the following. 
1. If the theory is true, we will see . . . in the 
experiment. 
2. We see . . . in the experiment. 
3. The theory is true. Options en c and en d are interesting and deserve 
further study, but let’s set them to the side and 
en a . The two songs come up as the last two 
played. 
en b. Neither song is in the last two. 
en c. Only “Right in Time” is in the last two. 
en d. Only “Essence” is in the last two. 
1. If the theory is true, we will see . . . in the 
experiment. 
2. We do not see . . . in the experiment. 
3. The theory is not true. 
Experiments, according to the pretty picture,
provide tests that can show us that theories are 
false. Tey cannot, however, show us that theo-














A Better, But Untidy, Picture of 
Scientifc Disconfrmation 
Now, the theory about the iPod hardly counts
as deeply scientifc, but suppose we imagine an
experiment nonetheless. Te conditional that sets
all this up looks something such as the following: 
focus on the “pure” experimental outcomes.
According to the pretty picture, en b conclusively 
establishes that the glitch theory is false. But
isn’t that a little extreme? We’ve already honed 
our skills at rival explanations—surely we can
imagine scenarios where the glitch hypothesis
is (was) true but neither song played last. 
1. If there is a glitch in the software, so that 
when the iPod is set to play all the songs 
by an artist and is set to “shufe” these
songs, then rather than playing them in
random order, it will play the most often 
listened to tracks last. 
I could test my theory by reprogramming every-
thing with the Pink Martini tracks, but since I’ve
ofered a general theory, let’s test it with a dif-
ferent artist. I have lots of Lucinda Williams’s
albums, and I’m certain I listen to two of her
t1. Between the drive home and the
experiment, iTunes downloaded a newer
(debugged) version of the software. 
t2. The glitch only occurs in playlists shorter 
than ffty songs. 
t3. There is a countervailing glitch when any 
of the songs are classifed as “country.” 
It’s doubtful in the extreme that a negative
experimental outcome can falsify a theory,
though it certainly can provide strong evidence 








































Te problem here goes back to the original
conditional that set up the experiment in the
frst place. Remember the diference between a 
sound argument and a valid one? Te if . . . then 
sentence that gets our inference going in the frst 
place states an absolute connection between the
glitch theory and the predicted outcome of
the experiment. But the rival explanations we
have just considered above seem to show that 
this connection is not so absolute afer all.
Almost always the conditional that sets up our
experiment contains what Larry Wright calls a 
weasel word. A more modest, but also more accu-
rate, statement of the predicted experimental
outcome will look more like this: 
If the theory in question is true, then all 
things being equal we will see  .  .  . in our
experiment. 
We predict that we will observe an as-yet-
undiscovered planet at such-and-such location
in the night sky, but certainly not if the observa-
tory is socked in by clouds. We expect the solution
to turn a certain color in our chemistry experi-
ment but not if the test tube is contaminated. 
When we include this suppressed, but under-
stood, ceteris paribus clause,2 our inference
looks a little more problematic. 
1. If there is a glitch in the software, so that 
when the iPod is set to play all the songs 
by an artist and is set to “shufe” these
songs, then, all things being equal, rather 
than playing them in random order, it will 
play the most often listened to tracks last. 
2. “Essence” and “Right in Time” did not play
last. 
Two valid conclusions can be derived from
these premises. One, of course, is that the glitch 
hypothesis is mistaken. But as a matter of pure 
logic, it is equally legitimate to infer that all
things in our experimental circumstances were 
not equal. 
Does any of this mean that the “scientifc
method” and the requirement that we experi-
mentally test our theories is a waste of time?
Nothing could be further from the truth. Let’s
go back to our original “evidence” for the glitch 
theory but add to it the new data from our
experiment. 
new
 data and exPerIm
entatIon 
e1. Johnson went to a Pink Martini concert, 
planning to ask for a specifc encore. 
e2. “Que Sera Sera” was played during the
concert. 
e3. He never got a chance to ask for “Lilly.” 
e4. On the ride home the next morning, he 
set his iPod to play all thirty-six of the Pink 
Martini songs. 
e5. He set the iPod to “Shufe Songs.” 
e6. He listened to all thirty-six songs. 
e7. The last two songs played were “Lilly”
and “Que Sera Sera”—the imagined encore 
from the night before! 
e8. “Lilly” and “Que Sera Sera” are the two 
Pink Martini songs he listens to most often. 
e9. When Johnson tried the “shufe all
songs” routine for Lucinda Williams, his
most listened to songs did not come up last. 
t0. There is a glitch in the iPod software— 
rather than playing the songs in com-
pletely “random” order, it is weighing
























     
 
  





























We’ve already imagined some rivals to e9, but I 
assume that you would all agree with me that 
t0 has been seriously weakened by our experi-
ment and that the random fuke hypothesis or
the operator error rivals look even better. 
Te moral here is straightforward. When
a theory suggests that we can expect to see some-
thing as yet undiscovered and we go out and look
for this thing but don’t fnd it, this is highly rel-
evant new data that almost always hurts the sta-
tus of the original explanation as being the best 
explanation of everything, including, of course, 
the experimental results. 
A Better, But Untidy, Picture 
of Scientifc Confrmation 
None of what I have just told you is earthshak-
ing nor is it unknown by careful scientists and 
philosophers. Still, the pretty picture, partly
because it is so pretty, can allow us to lose sight 
of the subtleties of experimental design and
protocol. Maybe even more problematic for the 
pretty picture is the evidential value of experi-
mental confrmation. 
Suppose I program my iPod to play all 116
Lucinda Williams tracks. I set the iPod to shuf-
fe the songs and then sit back for a really long 
time and wait to see what the last two songs are.
Sure enough, up pops “Essence” and “Right in
Time” as the last two played. What do you think 
of my glitch hypothesis now? 
According to the pretty picture, my theory
has been put to the test and perhaps surpris-
ingly, has survived the test. But it would be
the fallacy of afrming the consequent to say
that the experiment has confrmed my theory.
We’ve already seen that if confrmation means
“logically derived” from the experimental setup 
and results, that’s exactly right. But none of this 
means that the experiment hasn’t produced very
strong evidence that the songs are not playing in
purely random order.3 
What is the best explanation of e1 through e8 
when we add the positive experimental result 
below? 
e9. When Johnson tried the “shufe all songs”
routine for Lucinda Williams, his most lis-
tened to songs did indeed come up last. 
All the rivals we thought of with Pink Martini
are still possible, but hardly any seem plausible 
any longer. One of the most seriously misleading
features of the pretty picture is that it sets up an 
asymmetry between experimental confrmation
and disconfrmation. We’ve seen why as a mat-
ter of deductive logic this asymmetry exists. But 
no such asymmetry exists when we see experi-
mental results as additional data that the tested 
theory and its rivals must explain. 
The Signifcance of New Data 
One of the remarkable things about the natural
sciences is that we can devise experiments and go
looking for highly relevant new data. But new data
can cause us to rethink our evidence or feel even
more confdent about it in any of the arguments
we’ve been thinking about, not just the scientifc
ones. If we fnd out that Dick’s been in the hospi-
tal with pneumonia and that he loaned his car to
his buddy, Sam, things are going to seem much
more promising for Dick and Jane. And if we fnd
a copy of Sarah’s midterm on Charlie’s laptop, the

























Tree very important things follow from
all this. Te frst is that evidence evaluation is
always relative to what we presently know. If
we learn new things and assemble them in new 
arguments, there will be times when our origi-
nal conclusion will be strengthened, times when
it will be weakened, and times when it will be
pretty much lef untouched. Te second is that 
new data are always possible. Te fact that we
could imagine rival explanations means that 
we can imagine new evidence for these rivals.
But this last fact leads to our third moral. Just
because new data are possible, it does not mean 
that our assessment of the current evidence is
unreliable. If all the rivals are farfetched, then 
the chances of fnding new data that supports
them are pretty slim. We do, of course, need a
certain kind of intellectual modesty. We concede
that things could change on the basis of new dis-
coveries. But at the same time, for some kinds of
evidence, we can be pretty confdent that they
won’t change. 
new
 data and exPerIm
entatIon 
exerCIses 
1. According to the “pretty picture of science,” why is it possible to disconfrm a scientifc 
theory but never confrm one? 
2. What kind of new data would strengthen Connie’s evidence about what happened at the 
record hop? What kind of new data would weaken her theory? 
QuIz sIx 
For the past few years, I have been forming an uncharitable hypothesis about one of my col-
leagues. He is Professor Hide-Smith- Jones, who teaches in the Department of Hermeneutic 
Metaphysics. I believe that he virtually gives away grades and demands almost no work from 
his students. His courses are wildly popular with students and have very high enrollments. 
What started my suspicions was a number of students who complained about the workload 
in my courses, who I later discovered were all hermeneutic metaphysics majors. A couple of 
my online students explicitly compared my course to Hide-Smith- Jones’s courses, accusing 
me of being unfair and unreasonable. This past weekend, I went into the university’s database
and looked at the transcripts for all my advisees in the past fve years. Many of them had 
taken at least one course with Hide-Smith- Jones. I discovered that on average, the grades 
they earned in his courses were .78 grade points higher than their total grade point averages. 
1. Use the tools of inference to the best explanation to assess the quality evidence we have 
for Johnson’s theory that Hide- Smith- Jones is an easy grader who doesn’t demand much 
from his students. 
2. Explain a test or experiment that could be conducted to test Johnson’s hypothesis. 
3. Using inference to the best explanation, show how new data could be discovered that
would either help (confrm) or hurt (disconfrm) Johnson’s theory. 
     
 
        
   


















1 Antoine Lavoisier, Elements of Chemistry, trans.
Robert Kerr (Edinburgh, Scotland: Dover, 1790),
xiii–xvii, http://www.iupui.edu/~histwhs/H374.dir/
H374.webreader/ Lavoisier.elements.html. 
2 Te online Merriam-Webster Dictionary defnes ceteris
paribus as “if all other relevant things, factors, or ele-
ments remain unaltered.” 
3 It is, of course, true that devices such as iPods do not 
truly generate anything randomly. But their random 
number generating algorithms simulate random-
ness for all practical purposes. 
    
 
    
  
   
 
  








   
 
 
      
  
 




A Case Study 
As a simple illustration of some important aspects of scientifc inquiry, let us
consider Semmelweis’ work on childbed fever. Ignaz Semmelweis, a physician of
Hungarian birth, did this work during the years from 1844 to 1848 at the Vienna 
General Hospital. As a member of the medical staf of the First Maternity Divi-
sion in the hospital, Semmelweis was distressed to fnd that a large proportion
of the women who were delivered of their babies in that division contracted a
serious and ofen fatal illness known as puerperal fever or childbed fever. In 1844, 
as many as 260 out of 3,157 mothers in the First Division, or 8.2 per cent, died of
the disease; for 1845, the death rate was 6.8 per cent, and for 1846, it was 11.4 per 
cent. Tese fgures were all the more alarming because in the adjacent Second
Maternity Division of the same hospital, which accommodated almost as many 
women as the First, the death toll from childbed fever was much lower: 2.3, 2.0, 
and 2.7 per cent for the same years. 
— carl hempel1 
Childbed Fever 
Just imagine what it must have been like to be
young, poor, and pregnant in the early 1840s in 
Vienna and fnd yourself assigned to the First 
Division of the “lying in” ward at the Vienna
General Hospital. Your chances of dying from
a terrible disease known as childbed fever, or
puerperal fever (pere in Latin for “child” and
parere for “to bring forth”), was between 10
and 20 percent. Te word on the street was that 
this was true, as in the halls of government that 
instituted a commission to study the problem,
and of course the doctors were all too aware of
the severity of the disaster. 
Childbed fever was recognized and formally 
identifed by Western medicine all the way back 
to ancient Greece. Although an obviously seri-
ous medical issue, it had only reached epidemic 
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proportions at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. In order to appreciate the signifcance 
of Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause and
treatment of childbed fever, we need to imagine 
a time, surprisingly recent, in which the true
nature of infection, the role of microorgan-
isms, and the so-called germ theory of disease
were completely unknown. Doctors had specu-
lated about what was going on in these usually 
fatal cases, but in fact, they really had no clue
about the disease’s etiology. Tis fancy Latin
term simply means “cause,” or “causal history.” 
In fact, there were two distinct sorts of causal
ignorance about childbed fever. One had to do
with the causal origins of the disease. Te other 
was the causal progression of the disease within
the victim’s body. Tis helps us understand
why the prevailing theories about the disease
were so wildly misguided. 
Te two theories that focused on the second 
causal question both misunderstood—indeed,
misidentifed—the massive amounts of pus in
the poor infected woman’s body. One theory that 
went clear back to the Greeks misdiagnosed the
putrid fluid as a corrupted form of lachia,
the naturally occurring fuid that accompanies
normal delivery. Tis led to much speculation
about the efects of the latter stages of preg-
nancy. Te other, which was favored by Semmel-
weis’s teachers and supervisors, misidentifed
the pus as corrupted and misdirected milk. Te 
reason for this physiological disaster was a com-
plete mystery. 
A very diferent causal account of childbed
fever focused on its causal origins. Doctors were 
struck by the epidemic proportions of the disease
and other epidemics they were familiar with,
such as cholera and smallpox. Tey attributed all
this to a generic cause called miasma, or “atmo-
spheric cosmic- telluric changes.” But as to what 
all this really was, they were again completely
ignorant. Nevertheless, at least three theories
about puerperal fever were on the table for doc-
tors to investigate. 
t1. Lochial discharge theory 
t2. Lactescent fuid theory 
t3. Miasma 
Ignác Fülöp Semmelweis 
It is time to introduce the tragic hero to our story,
Ignác Semmelweis. He was born of relatively
humble origins in Hungary in the year 1818. At 
this time, Hungary was a relatively insignifcant 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and its
capital, Budapest, took a distinct backseat to the 
empire’s capital of Vienna. Even within his Hun-
garian background, Semmelweis faced another 
source of prejudice—his family spoke a rather
obscure regional dialect, and he carried a dis-
tinct accent for his entire life. All this is relevant 
to understanding Semmelweis’s academic and
professional life because like many victims of
ethnic prejudice; he seems to have always seen 
himself as an outsider within the privileged
class and sufered from something many of my 
students can identify with— a fear and loathing 
of formal academic writing. 
Nevertheless, Ignác was a gifed student. He 
began college as a law student at the University 
of Vienna but was soon won over to the study of
medicine. Splitting time between the University
of Vienna and the Royal University of Pest, he
completed his degree in 1844 and went looking 
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Vienna General Hospital. He was unsuccessful
in his applications to study under two gifed
younger researchers in the pathology depart-
ment and was forced to “settle” for an assistant-
ship in the obstetrics department. At this time, 
obstetrics was a new and rather undistinguished
specialty. 
So at the age of twenty-eight, Ignác Sem-
melweis began as the second in charge of the
Maternity Division of the Vienna General Hos-
pital. Medical education was very diferent in
those days, and this young, newly minted doctor 
assumed major responsibilities in clinical medi-
cine, research, and hospital administration. We 
will pick up the sad conclusion to Semmelweis’s 
biography directly, but we need to frst turn our 
attention to the scientifc problem he immedi-
ately encountered and his systematic discovery 
of the solution. 
The Vienna General Hospital 
For someone who is far from young, it pains
me to admit how ofen the history of science
reminds us that the truly signifcant scientifc
breakthroughs are made by younger research-
ers. Tere is nothing particularly surprising 
about this, of course, because younger think-
ers are almost by defnition less tied to the past,
both in terms of prevailing knowledge and in
terms of their own personal and professional
standing. 
Te Vienna General Hospital was a classic
mix of these generational divides. Te Germanic
system put great value on experience, loyalty,
and political connection. Te senior members
of the faculty were described by one writer in
1876 in the following colorful language: 
a generation that had been reared in an intellectual
straight- jacket with dark spectacles before their eyes 
and cotton wool in their ears. Te young people turned
somersaults in the grass, and the old men, whose bod-
ies had been hindered in their natural development
by the lifelong burden of state supervision, felt their
world about their ears, and believed that the end of
things was at hand.2 
On the other hand, the hospital possessed some 
of the fnest young medical researchers in the
entire world. Tree of them deserve a brief
introduction. 
In 1844, Karl von  Rokitansky, at the age of
forty, became the director of pathological anat-
omy. He made huge contributions to medical
knowledge and formalized the practice of con-
ducting autopsies by trained experts of every
fatality in the hospital. Semmelweis was a
true disciple of Rokitansky’s methodology and
although not a member of the pathology depart-
ment, was trained by him in the proper tech-
nique of conducting autopsies of the fatalities
in the maternity division. 
Joseph Skoda, who among other things
invented the stethoscope, was also an advocate 
of pathological anatomy. His sole professional
interest seems to have been in the diagnosis of 
disease, not its treatment. He felt that medicine, 
at least in his time, should concern itself with
the prevention of disease, through an under-
standing of its causes, and not worry about the 
treatment, since it always seemed so inefective
anyway. From Skoda, Semmelweis learned
the importance of careful pathological observa-
tion and a fxation on understanding both the
causal origins of disease and its causal progres-


















      
 






































Ferdinand von Herba was really a contem-
porary of Semmelweis. He, just like his young 
friend and colleague, was very much a disciple
of the new pathological and diagnostic tech-
niques being taught by Rokitansky and Skoda.
He took this background and used it to remark-
able advantage by almost single-handedly
beginning the specialty of dermatology. Herba’s
role in Semmelweis’s story is twofold. He was
friend and confdant to Ignác as he sufered
through the childbed fever epidemic, and he
was the frst to fnally share the discovery with 
the medical community, in both a professional
presentation he gave and a short medical jour-
nal publication. 
What Was Then Known 
I want to share with you a rather lengthy excerpt 
from a marvelous book on Semmelweis, Te Doc-
tors’ Plague, by the contemporary medical histo-
rian Sherwin B. Newland. You will notice that 
Dr.  Newland summarizes Semmelweis’s back-
ground knowledge of the magnitude and details 
of the childbed fever epidemic by introducing 
each short paragraph with the phrase “obser-
vation no.” It is almost as though Newland is
consciously schematizing the preliminary evi-
dence in terms of our inference-to-the-best-
explanation (IBE) recipe, and we can mentally
substitute our convention of replacing the
“observation no.” with the appropriate e and
subscript. 
Observation no. 1: Te same number of deliveries took 
place in the hospital’s two obstetrical divisions, usu-
ally between 3,000 and 3,500. Te only diference
between them was that deliveries in the First Division 
were carried out by doctors and medical students and 
those in the Second Division by midwives and students
of midwifery. In the First Division, an average of 600 
to 800 mothers died each year from puerperal fever; 
in the Second Division, the fgure was usually about
60 deaths, one- tenth as many. 
Observation no.  2: Although childbed fever
raged violently in the First Division, there was no
such epidemic outside the hospital walls, in the city
of Vienna. Te mortality of home delivery, whether
by midwives or private doctors, was low. Even when
they gave birth in alleyways and streets, the so-
called Gassengeburten, mothers who self-delivered
rarely died. 
Observation no. 3: Despite a general impression to 
the contrary, the decades of carefully kept statistics
at the Allgemeine Krandenhaus showed that neither 
the incidence nor the mortality of puerperal fever was 
related to the weather, as epidemics ofen were. 
Observation no. 4: Greater trauma during deliv-
ery appeared to increase the likelihood that a mother 
would develop puerperal fever. Tis was true of no
other epidemic disease. 
Observation no. 5: Closing the ward for a period of
time would always stop the mortality. When mothers 
were delivered elsewhere during that time, they did
not get sick. 
Observation no, 6: The infant delivered of a
woman who subsequently died of puerperal fever
would not infrequently die of a fever similar to its
mother’s. In such cases, the fndings on autopsy were 
similar to those identifed in the mother.3 
Diferences in the Divisions 
Consider the confusion in the two kinds of
disease etiology we have discussed. Semmel-








    
 
   
    
  


























milk and miasma accounts of childbed fever.
Miasma, or “epidemic infuences,” has a tough
time explaining observations two, three, and
four (e2, e3, and e4). It seemed obvious that the
causal origin of the epidemic must lie in some
way with diferences between the two mater-
nity divisions. 
Most philosophers of my generation know of
Semmelweis’s story because of a very infuential
little textbook: Philosophy of Natural Science by
Carl Hempel, one of the most sophisticated pro-
ponents of the “pretty picture of science.” He
interprets Semmelweis’s careful procedure as
one of conducting a series of miniexperiments 
to rule out possible causal diferences between 
the two divisions. As long as we remember that 
experiments are simply a systematic way of
gathering relevant new data and then reassess-
ing the explanatory virtues of the competing
hypotheses, this is a very useful way of inter-
preting Semmelweis’s method. 
One of the minor diferences between the
divisions was the position of the woman at 
birth: “A new idea was suggested to Semmel-
weis by the observation that in the First Divi-
sion the women were delivered lying on their
backs; in the Second Division, they delivered
on their sides. Tough he thought it unlikely,
he decided, ‘like a drowning man clutching at 
a straw,’ to test whether this diference in pro-
cedure was signifcant. He introduced the use
of the lateral position in the First Division, but 
again, the mortality remained unafected.”4 We 
are ofered a new rival explanation: 
t4. Delivery in the supine position causes
childbed fever. 
Te new data from Semmelweis’s miniexperi-
ment, however, drops this hypothesis way down 
on the rank ordering. sem
m
elw
eIs and ChIldBed feVer 
e7. Changing to the lateral position for deliv-
ery in the First Division made no diference 
in the mortality rates. 
Another interesting diference had to do with
the administering of the Catholic last rights, of 
all things. 
Various psychological explanations were attempted.
One of them noted that the First Division was so
arranged that a priest bearing the last sacrament to 
a dying woman had to pass through fve wards before 
reaching the sickroom beyond: the appearance of the 
priest, preceded by an attendant ringing a bell, was
held to have a terrifying and debilitating efect upon 
the patients in the wards and thus to make them more 
likely victims of childbed fever. In the Second Division,
this adverse factor was absent, since the priest had
direct access to the sickroom. Semmelweis decided to 
test this conjecture. He persuaded the priest to come
by a roundabout route and without ringing of the bell,
in order to reach the sick chamber silently and unob-
served. But the mortality in the First Division did not 
decrease.5 
Again, we have a new rival explanation: 
t5. The “terrifying and debilitating” efect of 
the deathbed priest’s appearance was caus-
ing childbed fever. 
But the experimental new data makes that a





















































e8. Changing the approach so that the priest 
could enter the sick room unobserved made 
no diference in the mortality rate. 
“Fortuitous” New Data 
Not all scientifc data are the product of experi-
mental procedures; sometimes, it’s simply good
luck. Semmelweis was out of the country at the
time of a terrible tragedy at the Vienna General
Hospital. Another of Rokitansky and Skoda’s dis-
ciples, Jakob Kolletschka, had been accidentally
cut by a medical student’s scalpel as they were
conducting an autopsy. He developed a massive
infection and died a few days later. When Sem-
melweis returned soon afer Kolletschka’s death,
he studied the pathology report and formed an
exciting new hypothesis: 
Totally shattered, I brooded over the case with intense
emotion until suddenly a thought crossed my mind; at
once it became clear to me that childbed fever, the fatal
sickness of the newborn and the disease of Professor
Kolletschka were one and the same, because they all 
consist pathologically of the same anatomic changes.
If, therefore, in the case of Professor Kolletschka a gen-
eral sepsis [contamination of the blood] arose from the
inoculation of cadaver particles, then puerperal fever
must originate from the same source. Now it was only
necessary to decide from where and by what means
the putrid cadaver particles were introduced to the
delivery cases. Te fact of the matter is the transmit-
ting source of those cadaver particles was to be found
in the hands of the students and attending physicians.6 
Tat one little “ah-ha” moment laid several new 
bits of data on the table. One was an overlooked 
diference between the two wards. 
e9. Medical students and their teachers
in the First Division regularly conducted
autopsies. The midwifery students and their 
teachers did not. 
Another had to do with regular medical practice 
at the time. 
e10. Doctors and students would routinely
transition from autopsies to gynecological
examinations and procedures, including
childbirth, with only the most cursory rins-
ing of their hands. 
Added to this, of course, was the information
garnered from Kolletschka’s death. 
e11. Details regarding the accident, subse-
quent progression of the disease, and ulti-
mate death of Kolletschka 
All this led to a completely new and original the-
ory about the cause of childbed fever. 
t0. Childbed fever is caused by the introduc-
tion to the blood of cadaver particles. 
An Experiment and a Treatment 
Semmelweis was, above all, a good and compas-
sionate doctor. His frst responsibility was to the
patients entrusted to his care. It’s not surprising,
therefore, that his instincts upon forming his
new hypothesis were all directed at putting this 
information immediately to work in the inter-
ests of his patients. Te reasoning was straight-
forward. If childbed fever was being spread by 




































    
  
63 
hands of the doctors and students, something 
had to be done to stop this from happening in
the future. Although nothing was known of the 
true nature of infectious disease, Semmelweis
and his colleagues knew that 
chloride solutions had long been used to rid objects
of the noxious odor of putrid materials. Semmelweis 
reasoned that a chloride solution would be the ideal
substance to destroy the foul-smelling cadaver par-
ticles. In the middle of May 1847, he ordered that a
bowl of chlorine liquida, a dilute concentration of
the disinfectant, be placed at the entrance to the First 
Division, and he insisted that every entering medi-
cal attendant wash in it before touching a woman in 
labor. Small, stif brushes were kept nearby, to be used
for cleaning under fngernails.7 
Although medical research was not his pri-
mary goal at this juncture, it is quite natural
to interpret Semmelweis’s actions as an inter-
esting experiment designed to test his new
hypothesis. One can imagine a bizarre and evil
experiment that could have been used to test 
the cadaver particles theory. He might have ran-
domly chosen twenty pregnant women and sep-
arated them into two groups. To ten, he might 
have intentionally introduced cadaver particles
into their bloodstreams; to the other ten, the
“control,” he would have scrupulously allowed
no entry of cadaver particles. He would have
then waited to see if the ten he predicted would
contract childbed fever did, while the other ten
did not. Tankfully, this was not his experimen-
tal procedure. He might, a little more sanely,
have also conducted a similar experiment with 
laboratory animals, but again, his focus was on
saving lives. 
His order of chlorinated lime, though, pro-




eIs and ChIldBed feVer 
e12. Semmelweis ordered the chlorinated
lime procedure in May of 1847. 
e13. By 1848, the death rate in the First Divi-
sion from childbed fever had fallen to 1.2 per-
cent, just a tick less than the Second Division,
at 1.3 percent. 
Semmelweis’s Evidence 
Let us pause for a moment and use inference
to the best explanation to assess the quality of
Semmelweis’s evidence. Tere is a great deal of 





Tere are also a number of rival explanations




When we now add t0 to this list and rank order 
all them in terms of the best explanation, we
would all agree, I trust, that t0 is by far the best 
explanation and that Semmelweis’s evidence
was quite overwhelming. 
I can imagine some of you seeing things dif-
ferently. You are sophisticated about the true





      
   
















































t6. Childbed fever is caused by the intro-
duction to the blood of a certain strain of
bacteria. 
fever and know that their cause is certain kinds 
of bacteria. You might argue, therefore, that a 
better explanation would be as follows: 
Indeed, we would nowadays say that all the
evidence, including a lot that was yet to come,
strongly supports exactly such a theory. We
would probably even say that we “know for cer-
tain” that childbed fever is caused by a bacterial 
infection. But all this is how the evidence stands 
at the beginning of the twenty-frst century.
Bacteria were completely unknown in Semmel-
weis’s day, and what he called “cadaver particles”
was a pretty accurate placeholder for their exis-
tence and causal role in childbed fever. 
The Tragedy of Semmelweis 
Te story of Ignác Semmelweis should have
ended in glory. He single-handedly solved a ter-
rible medical mystery and saved countless lives.
But glory was not to be his fate. He became so
obsessed, frst with solving the problem of
childbed fever and then with insisting that col-
leagues immediately adopt his new methods,
that he became a little hard to live with. He
actually accused skeptical colleagues of mur-
der for not disinfecting their hands. To make
matters worse, his direct superior was part 
of the entrenched older generation and never
accepted the theory or the empirical method-
ology that led to its discovery. In 1848, when
his assistantship was up, he was denied reap-
pointment to his position at the Vienna General
Hospital. He took all this very badly, and despite
the support of Rokitansky, Skoda, and Herba,
he abruptly departed Vienna and returned to
Budapest. 
He still might have garnered the fame and
prestige he so richly deserved had he only pub-
lished his results shortly afer the discovery. As 
we discussed earlier, he was never comfortable 
with his speaking abilities and even less so with 
his writing. He simply did not alert the Euro-
pean medical community to what he had dis-
covered. His friend, Herba, did make a couple
of short reports that were eventually published, 
but all this was distinctly secondhand. When he 
fnally did write a book about childbed fever, it 
was much later and consisted as much in char-
acter assassination of those colleagues who dis-
agreed with his theory as it did of the clinical
and experimental fndings. 
Semmelweis, like all of us, was a prisoner
of his times, his personality, and his training
and interests. He was pretty much ignorant of
good experimental technique. Although he and 
a medical student did conduct one inconclu-
sive set of experiments with rabbits, he did not 
pursue the systematic animal experimentation 
that would have strongly supported his theory. 
And although microscopes had been invented
and were being used by medical researchers, it 
apparently never occurred to him to look and
see if he could observe those cadaver particles
frsthand. One can only imagine the course of
medical history had he done so. 
Semmelweis went to an early grave an embit-
tered and disappointed man. He continued to
practice in Hungary but never attained the
recognition he craved. In early middle age, he
began to behave erratically and was ultimately
 















institutionalized. He died shortly thereafer. and death were a result of the infection. Professor
Tere is a common ironic story about his end. Nuland, whose two books on Semmelweis I have
Some have suggested that just like his friend used so freely, argues persuasively that Semmel-
Kolletschka, Semmelweis became infected with weis, in fact, developed Alzheimer’s disease and
childbed fever and that the behavioral changes died from beatings in the mental hospital. 
exerCIses 
1. Use all the steps in the IBE recipe to show how the new data concerning the deathbed 
priest gives us good evidence that the cause of childbed fever was not psychosomatic. 
2. Why did I argue that Semmelweis’s evidence was not undercut by the rival explanation 




eIs and ChIldBed feVer 
QuIz seVen 
The turning point for Semmelweis and his quest to discover the cause of childbed fever was 
clearly the death of his colleague, Jakob Kolletschka. Show how this event constituted signif-
cant new data that led to a new hypothesis about the disease. Now show how his “order” to 
the hospital staf about thoroughly “disinfecting” their hands can be seen as a classic little 
experiment. Given the results of this experiment, use inference to the best explanation to 
assess the quality of evidence Semmelweis now had as to the (partial) cause of childbed fever. 
3 Nuland, 97– 98. Notes 
4 Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, 5. 
1 Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Engle- 5 Hempel, 4– 5. 
wood Clifs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 1966), 3. 6 Quoted in Nuland, Te Doctor’s Plague, 99– 100. 
2 Teodor Billroth, Te Medical Sciences in German Uni- 7 Nuland, 101. 
versities (1876), quoted in Sherwood B. Nuland, Te 




   
 
  
   
 
 










    
 






Darwin and Common Descent 
When on board H.M.S “Beagle,” as naturalist, I was much struck with certain
facts in the distribution of the organic beings inhabiting South America, and in 
the geological relations of the present to past inhabitants of that continent. Tese 
facts, as will be seen in the latter chapters of this volume, seemed to throw some 
light on the origin of species— that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by 
one of our greatest philosophers. 
— charles DarwIn1 
Making Sense of What Is Already Known 
Te story of Semmelweis is one of a scien-
tist confronting a mystery and systematically
going out and gathering new data that helped
him solve the mystery. Te story of Darwin is
very diferent. On the Origin of Species, Darwin’s 
four- hundred- plus- page “abstract,” is one of
the best- argued works in the history of science. 
He makes a powerful case for, what we shall
see, are two monumental theories. Although he 
was an excellent feld biologist and geologist,
and although his experiences on the Beagle were
clearly formative, the evidence he presented in 
On the Origin of Species was not original; nor did 
it contain cutting- edge discoveries. Darwin’s
genius was seeing, I would say, explaining,
known facts in original and insightful ways. 
Te history of science is full of examples
where the revolutionary breakthrough comes,
not in the laboratory, but in the theorist’s study. 
Tis is hardly surprising, since when you are
trying to make sense of the myriad of facts and 
results that compose any of the natural sci-
ences, the level of generality and abstraction
required for the grand overarching theories will 














   




   
    
   




























fIgure 2. Simple cladogram 
Retrieved from https://www.geol 
.umd .edu/ ~jmerck/ honr219d/ notes/ 
06.html. 
experiment. Darwin was able to articulate gen-
eral principles that have unifed biology for more
than a century and a half. And most remarkably, 
ft perfectly with biological discoveries that Dar-
win himself could never have imagined. 
The Two Theories 
Te “theory of evolution,” what Darwin called a 
“theory of descent with modifcation by natural
selection,” is really three distinct theories, two 
of which owe a great deal to Darwin. We can
translate the term evolution as simply meaning 
“biological change.” Te biological world we see
today, including the species now in existence, is
diferent from the biological world at diferent 
historical periods. Many theorists before Dar-
win, including his own grandfather, Erasmus
Darwin, had proposed theories of biological
change. Te problem was that, although (as we
shall see directly) these theories nicely explained
many known facts, no one before Darwin had
any good ideas as to the causes of this change. 
Descent with modifcation, or equivalently,
common descent, is Darwin’s theory about the
patterns in, and the history of, this biological
change. Darwin cannot really be given credit for 
originating the theory of descent with modif-
cation, but one of the great achievements of On 
the Origin of Species is that he laid out the evi-
dence for this theory so powerfully that within 
less than a generation almost every biologist
accepted the truth of this view of biological
history. 
Te above very simple graphic gives us the
heart of descent with modifcation. Te verti-
cal axis represents time, and the horizontal axis 
represents the present or past picture of biologi-
cal diversity. So in this little snippet, we learn
about the history of three related species, A, B, 
and C. Tat they are related is indicated by the 
common ancestor at the bottom (i.e., earlier in 
history). We also learn that species B and C are 
more recent evolutionary arrivals than species
A, since the common ancestor that begins their 
history is higher (later). Descent with modif-
cation says that current species are related to
one another through a series of ever- narrowing 
common ancestors (thus common descent). Te 
logical extension of this line of reasoning is, as 
Darwin saw, that all life can be traced back to a 
single common ancestor. 
I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modi-
fcation embraces all the members of the same great
class or kingdom. I believe that animals are descended 
from at most only four or fve progenitors, and plants 
from an equal or lesser number. 
  
        
   
  
  
       







         
 




















     
   
      
 
  















Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, 
in the belief that all animals and plants are descended
from some one prototype.2 
Darwin worried that “analogy may be a deceitful
guide,” but contemporary facts about the molec-
ular structure of DNA make his speculation look
even stronger. 
If the history of life is as descent with modi-
fcation outlines, the obvious question is what 
brings about all this change? If new species
arise from ancestors, what is the origin of spe-
cies? Darwin’s stroke of genius was an original
answer to this question. Breeders “select” in
order to improve the stock. Nature, by analogy,
also selects, but not consciously, nor with a pur-
pose. Natural selection is the engine that drives
biological history. More individuals in every
generation are born than will survive, so there is
a “struggle for existence.” Some individuals are
lucky enough to be born with slight advantages in
this struggle, and these advantages improve their
chances of surviving and passing along these
advantages to their ofspring. So over time, there
is inevitable change within the species, and given
enough time, these changes accumulate to result 
in the start of a new species. 
Rival Explanations to Common Descent 
In the rest of this chapter, we will spend most 
of our time focusing on the least scientifcally
controversial of Darwin’s two theories but the
one that is clearly the most controversial in
the popular culture—descent with modifcation.
I want to try to convince you that evidence Dar-
win presented for this view of biological history 
is quite overwhelming. More recent additional
evidence has only further strengthened his orig-
inal argument. 
We should candidly address the sources of
this cultural controversy. Te primary source,
of course, is that Darwin is widely believed to
be antireligious. Te theory of descent is seen
by many as not only denying the literal truth
of the Old Testament but fat-out denying the
existence of God. Tis latter interpretation is
surprising in light of the fact that many contem-
porary scientists see themselves as conventional
religious believers yet accept the scientifc truth 
of common descent and natural selection. My
students are constantly surprised to hear that 
Darwin nowhere denies the existence of God,
nor does On the Origin of Species say anything
about either the creation of the universe or the 
origins of life. Many sincere theists have seen
complete consistency between what traditional 
religion teaches us and what our best natural
sciences, including biology, teach. 
Te second source of controversy regards the
place of our own species in Darwin’s picture.
Although he tried to sof-pedal it in Origin, it was
perfectly obvious to his contemporaries, both
opponents and supporters, that humans were
just as much a part of descent with modifca-
tion and natural selection as every other part of
the biological world. Tis is troubling to many,
I realize. I personally think it explains a lot of
what I know about myself, my friends, and the 
social world I live in. 
Before On the Origin of Species, the most
widely accepted rival account of biological his-
tory assumed that species were permanent,
unchanging, and the individual products of
divine creation. Tis view was not just a reli-





       
    
 
  
   
 
   
 
 












       
   
 








          
 
 





of special creation should be interpreted in our
context as a rival explanation for the facts that 
Darwin offered in support of descent with 
modifcation. It will be helpful to distinguish
two versions of special creation. One accepted
the book of Genesis as literal history—all the
earth’s species, as well as everything else, were 
individually created by God over the course of














t1. Fundamentalist special creation 
A second version of special creation that enjoyed
more support among Darwin’s contemporaries
in the scientifc community might be termed
relaxed special creation. It conceded some of the
data about biological change and allowed that 
divine creation of individual species took place at 
diferent times in the history of the earth and life. 
t2. Relaxed special creation 
The Expanded Age of the Earth 
Te frst part of Darwin’s case for descent with 
modifcation consisted of a review of, indeed a 
powerful subargument for, the relatively new
estimates of the age of the earth. 
e1. The earth is much older than had been
previously believed—thousands of millions 
of years. 
Tis was essential to his theory, for a great deal 
of time was required for the sort of biological
change he was postulating. It’s doubtful that 
any theory such as common descent could have 
come before the discovery of “geologic time.” 
We should pause here to notice something
general about inference to the best explana-
tion. You will remember that in chapter 4 we
treated the premises in an argument as data
and the theory being defended as an expla-
nation of the data. Tat is actually a bit of an
oversimplifcation. Ofentimes, important facts
will be included in the premises that are not 
explained by the conclusion but are relevant 
to that conclusion being an adequate explana-
tion of those data that are being accounted for.
Charlie’s being a poor writer was not explained
by his being a cheater but was still relevant for
this explaining the identical exams. Descent 
with modifcation does not explain a much
more ancient earth than previous generations
had believed, but it is required for descent with
modifcation to work. 
The Fossil Record 
Darwin spends a great deal of time discussing
fossils, and well he might. Whatever else it tells 
us, it virtually screams out change. 
Let us now see whether the several facts and rules
relating to the geological succession of organic beings, 
better accord with the common view of the immuta-
bility of species, or with that of their slow and gradual
modifcation, through descent and natural selection.3 
We see species that once thrived and are now
extinct. We see progressions such as the changes
in the American horse. His emphasis on fossils 
shows us that he saw this as a particularly strong
bit of evidence. 
e2. The fossil record 
 


































         
  
 
Te fossil record, particularly in Darwin’s time,
was a bit of a two-edged sword. Critics complained
that if descent with modifcation was true, there
should be a fossil record of these “transitional
forms.” Darwin wisely conceded the force of this
objection but also ofered a very sophisticated
explanation of how difcult it is for fossils to form
and why gaps in the record were inevitable. 
The Scala Naturae, or the 
Natural System 
A widely held view in the century before Darwin
postulated a very diferent kind of order to the bio-
logical world. According to the scala naturae (scale
of nature), life was static but hierarchical. Tere
was an observable and classifable progression
from the simplest and most primitive forms of life
to the most complex and advanced. Tis view had
been pretty thoroughly rejected by the time Dar-
win began his work. But a remnant of it remained
at the heart of biology. It was now understood that 
though the structure wasn’t hierarchical, there
was a structured order to life nonetheless. 
From the frst dawn of life, all organic beings are
found to resemble each other in descending degrees, so
that they can be classed in groups under groups. Tis 
classifcation is not arbitrary like the grouping of stars
in constellations.4 
Any intelligent four-year-old can go to the zoo
and recognize that the diferent feline species
in the cages are all cats, just like Boots at home. 
Feline species around the world are “related” to 
each other, and they are more “closely related” 
to each other than they are to canine species liv-
ing in the same environment with them. Nature 
seems to sort itself out into one giant natural
system. 71 
Te obvious question is why do we observe
the following? 
e3. The natural system 
Darwin’s answer was unequivocal: 
Te real afnities of all organic beings are due to inher-
itance of community of descent. Te natural system is
a genealogical arrangement, in which we have to dis-
cover the lines of descent by the most permanent char-
acters, however slight their vital importance may be.5 
Patterns of Geographical Distribution 
Darwin was fascinated by the connection
between life and where that life was found on
this earth. Before Darwin, the only viable expla-
nation of this connection was that God chose to 
put it there. Darwin is the founder of modern,
causal biogeography.6 And biogeographical facts
are, perhaps, the most widely used evidence in 





e4. Patterns of geographical distribution 
Let’s start with a macro question. If an omni-
scient and all-loving God deliberately created
each species to ft perfectly with its environment,
why do we see such diversity in virtually identi-
cal climates between the Old and New Worlds? 
If we travel over the vast American continent, from
the central parts of the United States to its extreme
southern point . . . Tere is hardly a climate or condi-























    
  























the New—at least as closely as same species generally 
require. . . . Not withstanding this general parallelism 
in conditions of the Old and New Worlds, how widely 
diferent are their living productions!7 
From continents separated by whole oceans to
islands separated by just a few miles of ocean,
the microquestions of biogeographical distribu-
tion are just as puzzling on the theory of special 
creation. 
Te same law which has determined the relationship 
between the inhabitants of islands and the nearest
mainland, is sometimes displayed on a small scale,
but in a most interesting manner, within the limits
of the same archipelago. Tus each separate island of
the Galapagos Archipelago is tenanted, and the fact is 
a marvelous one, by many distinct species; but these 
species are related to each other in a much closer man-
ner than to inhabitants of the American continent, or 
any other quarter of the world.8 
Descent with modifcation, of course, beau-
tifully answers both questions. Te fora and
fauna in the Old and New Worlds are generally 
diferent because they spring from very difer-
ent lines of descent. Species in the Galapagos
(think of his famous fnches) all descend from a 
common ancestor on the South American main-
land but have diferent histories of descent on
the individual islands. 
Morphological Facts 
Morphology is the science of shape and form,
hence the computer notion of an image “mor-
phing.” Consider the following four tetrapods.
Why the common four-“leg” structure? Te frog
hops, the lion runs, this particular dinosaur
swam, and the bird fies. If you were engineering
a hopping machine, a running machine, a swim-
ming machine, and a fying machine, would you
automatically use the same overall design? 
Darwin saw morphology as fundamental to
his defense of descent with modifcation. 
We have seen that the members of the same class,
independently of their habits of life, resemble each
other in the general plan of their organization. Tis
resemblance is ofen expressed by the term “unity of
type” . . . Te whole subject is included under the gen-
eral name of Morphology. Tis is the most interesting 
department of natural history, and may be said to be 
its very soul.9 
fIgure 3. Frog, lion, dinosaur, and hawk 
Retrieved from https://www.fickr.com/x/t/ 
0094009/ photos/ aspidoscelis/ 31098104412/, 
https:// www.fickr.com/ x/ t/ 0097009/ photos/ 
mathiasappel/ 26260010225/, https:// 
www.fickr.com/ x/ t/ 0093009/ photos/ 
internetarchivebookimages/ 14777663574/, 




















    
















   
 
          
 
       
 
  
    
 
 




Immediately following this quote, Darwin
articulates as a question the data regarding the 
forelimbs in mammals that is perhaps, for my
students at least, the most convincing bit of evi-
dence for common descent. 
What can be more curious than that the hand of a
man, formed for grasping, that of a mole for digging, 
the leg of a horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and the 
wing of a bat, should all be constructed on the same 
pattern, and should include the same bones in the
same relative positions?10 
Pretty darn curious, wouldn’t you agree? 
e5. Morphological commonalities 
Embryological Facts 
As Darwin remarks several times in his discus-
sion of embryos, just as the remarkable similar-
ity in the bones in the forelimbs of mammals
require an explanation, curious features of
embryos also must be accounted for. 
How, then, can we explain these several facts in
embryology,—namely the very general, but not uni-
versal diference in structure between the embryo and
the adult;— of parts of the same individual embryo, 
which ultimately become very unlike and serve for
diverse purposes, being at this early period of growth
alike;—of embryos of diferent species within the
same class, generally, but not universally, resembling 
each other;—of the structure of the embryo not being
closely related to its conditions of existence, except
when the embryo becomes at any period of life active
and has to provide for itself;— of the embryo appar-
ently having sometimes a higher organization than
the mature animal, into which it is developed. I believe
all these facts, as follows, on the view of descent with
modifcation.11 
Give me a common ancestor, Darwin seems
to say, and I can explain the circuitous route,
with many detours, from egg to adult in animal
development—why young baleen whales develop
teeth, why land-living vertebrates (including
ourselves) go through a gill-arch stage, and why
higher vertebrates have a notochord. 
Tere is no obvious reason why, for instance, the wing 
of a bat, or the fn of a porpoise, should not have been 
sketched out with all the parts in proper propor-






e6. Embryological oddities 
I must tell you here that were you to Google 
“Darwin, embryology,” you would fnd that some
of the sites are highly critical of Darwin and
argue that his appeals to embryology have been 
discredited in modern biology. Tis isn’t really
true, but we can make sense of these, I believe
sincere, criticisms. Part of the problem Darwin 
faced in his section on embryology was that cen-
turies of thought had tied embryonic develop-
ment to the static scala naturae that we discussed
earlier. These scientists believed that each
stage in embryonic development represented
an earlier, nonchanging stage in the hierarchy
of life. Darwin, of course, completely rejected
this view, but it remained part of the common
(mis)understanding within embryology. 
Even more problematic, though, was that 
























   
 
  
   








       
 
       
 
   
 

















believed that there was a very strong correlation
between the diferent stages of the history of
life—its phylogenetic structure and the difer-
ent stages of an individual’s embryonic devel-
opment. Tus one of Darwin’s contemporaries, 
Ernst Haeckel, claimed 
ontogeny is a concise and compressed recapitulation
of phylogeny, conditioned by the laws of heredity and 
adaptation.13 
We now know that the recapitulation theory
is mistaken and that embryonic development is
much more complicated than either Darwin or
Haeckel could have ever imagined. Darwin con-
ceived of descent with modifcation as applying to
individuals exemplifying a species—that species’
phenotype (its appearance and behavior). Modern
biology, though, also includes the descent with 
modifcation of its genotype (the genetic instruc-
tions for building the phenotype) and if that were
not complicated enough, it also must include the
descent with modifcation of the underlying bio-
chemical processes that take the information in
the genotype and physically develops the individ-
ual. We are really only just getting a handle on all
this in the twenty-frst century.14 
Darwin’s Evidence for Descent 
with Modifcation 
Te evidence can now be schematized. 
e1. The earth is much older than had been
previously believed—thousands of millions 
of years. 
e2. The fossil record 
e3. The natural system 
e4. Patterns of geographical distribution 
e5. Morphological commonalities 
e6. Embryological oddities 
t0. Descent with modifcation 
Te central question in inference to the best expla-
nation is always the same—is t0 the best explana-
tion? We’ve already discussed the two serious rival
explanations in Darwin’s time. 
t1. Fundamentalist special creation 
t2. Relaxed special creation 
Within ten years or so of the publication
of On the Origin of Species, say 1870, up to this
frst decade of the twenty-frst century, there
has been clear, overwhelming consensus in the 
broad scientifc community that descent with
modifcation—evolution—does such a mani-
festly better job of explaining all this uncontro-
versial data and that the evidence is so strong
that we can talk of common descent as a scien-
tifc fact. You, of course, must rank order the
explanations for yourself. Some of you will
insist on a diferent ranking, and I maintain that 
is your moral and intellectual right. My job as a 
philosopher and a teacher is accomplished if you
can simply see why Darwin, his contemporaries,
and his scientifc descendants all thought the
evidence was so powerful. I do want to remind 
you, however, that many traditional theists have
seen complete consistency between mainstream
religious doctrine and evolution. Consider the
words of Richard Swinburne, for many years the
Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Chris-
tian Religion at the University of Oxford, at the 









































Men evolved from apes, and apes from more primi-
tive animals, and the primitive animals evolved from 
the soup of inanimate atoms which consolidated to
form the Earth some four thousand million years ago. 
Although there is much uncertainty about the exact
stages and mechanisms involved, the fact of evolution 
is evident.15 
Natural Selection 
Why do we see such change in biological his-
tory? Why does this change so often seem
exactly what is required for changing circum-
stances? What is the engine that drives descent 
with modifcation? 
In considering the Origin of Species, it is quite con-
ceivable that a naturalist, refecting on the mutual
afnities of organic beings, on their embryological
relations, their geographical distribution, geologi-
cal succession, and other such facts, might come to
the conclusion that each species had not been inde-
pendently created, but had descended, like varieties
from other species. Nevertheless, such a conclu-
sion, even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory,
until it could be shown how the innumerable species
inhabiting this world have been modifed, so as to
acquire that perfection of structure and coadapta-
tion which most justly excites our admiration.16 
One of my teachers called natural selection an
algorithm, and Ernst Mayr, who I will be bor-
rowing heavily from in this section, calls the
theory “very logical.”17 All this could be taken
to mean that natural selection is automatic
or that the inference is deductive. Te argument,
though, is explanatory, just like the argument 
for common descent. I will follow Mayr, indeed I
will use his wording, and treat Darwin’s reason-
ing as “three inferences based on fve facts.”18 
Tree of these facts provide evidence for
what he called the “struggle for existence.” 
A struggle for existence inevitable follows from the
high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. 
Every being which during its natural lifetime pro-
duces several eggs or seeds, must sufer destruction
during some period of its life, and during some season 
or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geo-
metrical increase, its numbers would quickly become 
so inordinately great that no country could support
the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced 
than can possibly survive, there must be in every case 
a struggle for existence, either one individual with
another of the same species, or with distinct species, 





e7. All species have such great potential
fertility that their population size would
increase exponentially . . . if all that are born 
would again reproduce successfully.20 
e8. Except for minor annual fuctuations and 
occasional major fuctuations, populations
normally display stability.21 
e9. Natural resources are limited. In a stable
environment, they remain relatively constant.22 
t1 0. There is a ferce struggle for existence
among individuals of a population, resulting
in the survival of only a part, often a very small
part, of the progeny of each generation.23 
Te game of life is unfair—not all compete in
this struggle for existence equally. Darwin, who
was a pigeon breeder and recognized its rele-





     
 
  
       
 


























in any species would have slight advantages (and
others would have slight disadvantages) in sur-
viving long enough to reproduce. Nature, itself,
would be selecting. 
Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, how-
ever slight and from whatever cause proceeding,
if it be in any degree proftable to an individual of
any species, in its infnitely complex relations to
other organic beings and to external nature, will
tend to the preservation of that individual, and
will generally be inherited by its ofspring. Te
ofspring, also, will thus have a better chance of
surviving, for, of the many individuals of any spe-
cies which are periodically born, but a small num-
ber can survive. I have called this principle, by
which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved,
by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its














e10. No two individuals are exactly the same; 
rather, every population displays enormous 
variability.25 
e11. Much of this variation is heritable.26 
t2 0. Survival in the struggle for existence
is not random but depends in part on the
heredity of the surviving individuals. This
unequal survival constitutes a process of
natural selection.27 
From t2 0, Darwin makes one more inference that 
gives him the title for his book and the explana-
tion of descent with modifcation. 
t3 0. Over generations, this process of natural 
selection will lead to a continuing gradual
change of populations—that is, to evolution 
and to the production of new species.28 
One Long Argument 
Darwin called On the Origin of Species “one long
argument.” I have stressed that he actually
defended two, quite distinct theories, but at the
same time, it’s easy to see the truth in the one long
argument characterization. Having clearly pre-
sented the evidence for descent with modifca-
tion, he then (actually, this is not the progression
in the book) lays out the case for natural selection. 
e1. The earth is much older than had been previ-
ously believed—thousands of millions of years. 
e2. The fossil record 
e3. The natural system 
e4. Patterns of geographical distribution 
e5. Morphological commonalities 
e6. Embryological oddities 
t0. Descent with modifcation 
e7. All species have great potential fertility. 
e8. Populations normally display stability. 
e9. Natural resources are limited. 
t1 0. Fierce struggle for existence—more are 
born than will reproduce 
e10. No two individuals are exactly the same. 
e11. Much of this variation is heritable. 
t2 0. Survival in the struggle for existence is 
not completely random; it is the product of 
natural selection. 
t3 0. Over generations, this process of natural 
selection will lead to evolution and to the
production of new species. 
As always, rival explanations are possible.

























    
 














t2 0 as the best explanations. Some controversy questions, not about the overall theory, but about 
remains, however, regarding t3 0. Most grant that the details. Darwin wrote On the Origin of Species
natural selection does result in species change, in ignorance of genetics, population biology, and
but some question whether it is the primary molecular biology. It is quite remarkable that
cause. Tis kind of controversy, rather than call- these revolutions, rather than undercutting his 
ing evolution into question, is precisely what theories, actually over time came to add further 
healthy science is all about. Tere do remain support. 
exerCIses 
1. Darwin marshaled a lot of evidence in support of descent with modifcation—e2 through 
e6. If you had to make his case using just one of these categories of data, which would you 
choose? Why? 






The quiz for this chapter is to write a short (no more than three pages) paper on Darwin’s 
two theories. Your paper should do three things. It should carefully explain Darwin’s theory 
of common descent (or descent with modifcation). It should then explain what natural selec-
tion is. Finally, it should use the tools of inference to the best explanation (the IBE recipe) to 
critically assess the quality of Darwin’s evidence for the frst part of his “one long argument,” 
the theory of descent with modifcation. 
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In the testimony case a person comes to know something when he is told about
it by an eyewitness or when he reads it in the newspaper. . . . No obvious deduc-
tive inference leads to a probabilistic conclusion in this case; the acceptance of
testimony can be based on two consecutive inferences to the best explanation. . . .
First, we would infer that the speaker so testifes because he believes what he
says (and not because he has something to gain by so testifying, or because
he has gotten confused and has said the opposite of what he means, etc.). Second
we would infer that he believes as he does because in fact he witnessed what
he described (and not because he has sufered an hallucination, or because his
memory deceived him, etc.). 
— GIlBert harman1 
A Letter of Recommendation 
I have a good friend in the psychology program. 
He has asked me to write a letter of recommen-
dation in his search for a new job. I know him
pretty well—we have collaborated on a short 
article and have team- taught on two occasions. 
I tell his prospective employers that he is a fne 
teacher and a great colleague and that he will go 
on to be a major fgure in academic psychology 
someday. Suppose you read my letter and won-
der what kind of evidence it provides about the 
job candidate. 
Gilbert Harman, in the previous quote, pro-
vides a succinct characterization of how infer-
ence to the best explanation can be used to
unpack the reasoning involved in accepting the 
word of others. In most cases where we assess
testimony, we have more data to explain than
simply what has been said. Minimally, we will
know something about the speaker and some-
thing about the context in which the statement 
was made. Te abstract model looks something 
like the following. First of all, we have the infor-
mation contained in the language: 
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e1. Linguistic statement—“He is a fne
teacher . . . major fgure.” 
Almost as important in this case is the context in














e2. Context—letter of recommendation. 
Finally, we know something about the letter
writer himself: 
e3. Relevant biography—philosophy profes-
sor at a small state university. 
Te explanatory or interpretive question is,
Why did this speaker (biography) in this cir-
cumstance (context) say this (statement)? In
ordinary communicative contexts, we gener-
ally give people the beneft of the doubt. Until
given reason not to, we are presupposed to
believe that our interlocutors are being straight 
with us. Te conventions of normal linguis-
tic communication ask you to frst consider a 
theory that explains all these data in terms of
sincerity: 
t0. The letter writer said it because he
believed it to be true—he believed that his 
friend was a good teacher and a great col-
league and had the potential to make signif-
cant contributions to his feld. 
Unfortunately, years of reading these sorts
of letters have made some of us a little cynical. 
We can immediately conceive of two alterna-
tive explanations of the letter writer’s linguistic 
behavior. 
t1. The letter writer said it because he wants 
to get his friend a job. 
t2. The speaker said it to get rid of an unde-
sirable colleague. 
Inference to the best explanation asks us at 
some point to commit ourselves to a judgment 
of explanatory plausibility. What is the best
explanation of what the letter writer said? Basi-
cally, our answers fall into two categories. We
will either judge that the best explanation of the 
statement is the original one that normal com-
munication recommends— he said it because he 
believes it; he is sincere. Or we will prefer one of
the rival explanatory accounts that ofer some
other reason for his having made the statement. 
In this latter case, his testimony is of no use to 
us, indeed we should discount it. Even if it turns 
out that his friend is a great candidate for the
job, if we judge that the letter writer is insin-
cere or dishonest, his testimony is unreliable
evidence about this. 
If we do give him the beneft of the doubt on 
the question of sincerity, we must go through
a whole other level of assessment before we
can put complete confdence in the truth of his 
statement. Te frst level of evidence evalua-
tion yields some new data that must also be
explained. 
e4. The letter writer is saying these great
things about his colleague because he sin-
cerely believes them to be true. 
Why does this person (biography) believe these
things (the content of the statement)? Once again,


















   
 
















ask us to endorse a standard explanation for most 
sincere communicative attempts. 
t*0. The speaker believes this because he
knows what he is talking about—he believes
it because it is, in fact, true. 
Thus when we accept information through
the testimony or authority of others, we tac-
itly engage in a dual explanatory inference. We
explain the linguistic act as a sincere attempt 
to communicate the speaker’s belief and then 
explain the speaker’s having the belief in terms of 
the speaker knowing what they’re talking about. 
Larry Wright has helpfully distinguished
two quite diferent things that can go wrong 
when someone communicates a sincerely held
belief. Sometimes people have unreliable access 
to the information they are trying to communi-
cate. Tus a rival explanation of my belief that 
my friend is a good teacher might be that I have 
only observed him in specialized upper-division
courses that would be of interest to philosophy 
and psychology majors— I have never observed 
him, for example, in large introductory courses. 
t*1. The letter writer believes that his friend 
is a good teacher because he has never
observed his lousy teaching in large intro-
ductory courses. 
Even when authorities possess excellent access 
to information, we still worry sometimes about 
their ability to reliably interpret this informa-
tion. In this context, the cautious letter reader
might have at least two potential worries about 
my testimony. Te frst has to do with specialized
training. Obviously, my claims presuppose some
fairly technical knowledge about pedagogy, aca-
demia, and research standards in contemporary
psychology. One would like to think that expec-
tations for teaching and collegiality would not 
vary across the humanities and natural and
behavioral sciences. I, hopefully, have the nec-
essary background to provide relevant informa-
tion about these aspects of my friend’s career.
But what about the prediction for professional
distinction with respect to his research? I am
trained as a philosopher, not a psychologist.
Perhaps his psychological “insights” I observed 
in the course of our collaborative teaching and 
writing are common knowledge in the feld. Or 
worse, maybe they are discredited or eccentric. 
Am I really qualifed to say? A rival explanation 
once again suggests itself. 
testIm
ony 
t*2. The letter writer believes his colleague
will make a name for himself because of his 
lack of knowledge about contemporary aca-
demic psychology. 
A very diferent worry about the reliability of 
my belief focuses on my ability to “objectively” 
process the information to which I do have reli-
able access. Basically, the worry here is one of
perceptual or interpretive bias. Perhaps I so
admire his pedagogic technique because it is
so similar to my own inefective classroom style.
Or maybe I am so impressed with his psycho-
logical hypotheses because they nicely coincide 
with my own half- baked notions. He is, afer all, 
my good friend— might I not be guilty of “seeing 
more with my heart than with my eyes?” So we 






   






















































t*3. The letter writer believes these grossly 
infated things about his friend because of
some sort of perceptual bias. 
None of the above should be taken to suggest
that testimony is inherently unreliable. What 
could be more obvious than the fact that almost 
everything we claim to know comes to us second-
hand through the word of others? What I am
suggesting is that our assessment of testimony
can be structured and critically evaluated as a
kind of evidence—evidence that perfectly fts
the inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe. 
Testimony regarding Miracles 
In David Hume’s monumental book, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, there is a 
very short little argument with astounding
religious implications. Hume argues that we
are never justifed in accepting the testimony
of others that a truly miraculous event has
transpired. But since the three great theistic
religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—all
depend, at some foundational level, on reports
of miracles, Hume’s argument seems to threaten
their intellectual legitimacy. A full analysis of
Hume’s argument, let alone a full philosophical 
investigation of miracles, would be the subject 
of a whole book, maybe a whole career. Never-
theless, we now possess the tools to at least lay 
out the structure of Hume’s argument and per-
haps to begin the process of evaluating his evi-
dence. So what exactly is the argument? 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a 
frm and unalterable experience has established these 
laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature
of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experi-
ence can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than
probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of
itself, remain suspended in the air; that fre consumes 
wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that 
these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature,
and there is required a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is
esteemed a miracle, if it ever happened in the common
course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seem-
ingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because 
such a kind of death, though more unusual than any 
other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But
it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life;
because that has never been observed in any age or
country. Tere must, therefore, be a uniform experi-
ence against every miraculous event, otherwise the
event would not merit that appellation. . . . 
Te plain consequence is (and it is a general
maxim worthy of our attention), “Tat no testimony 
is sufcient to establish a miracle, unless the testi-
mony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be
more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours 
to establish. . . .” When anyone tells me, that he saw a 
dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with
myself, whether it be more probable, that this person 
should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, 
which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh
the one miracle against the other; and according to the
superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision,
and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood 
of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the 
event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he 
pretend to command my belief or opinion. 
In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that 
the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may 
possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the false-
hood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But



















   





















it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too 
liberal in our concession, and that there never was a 
miraculous event established on so full an evidence.2 
Let’s begin with the middle paragraph. Some-
one reports seeing a dead man restored to life. If 
we treat this report as potential evidence a gen-
uine miracle has occurred, we would schematize
this testimony as follows. 
e1. Linguistic statement—“I saw a dead man 
restored to life.” 
e2. Context—where, when, and how we were
told 
e3. Relevant biography—whatever we know 
about the person who tells us this 
t0. He genuinely believes that he saw a dead 
man restored to life. 
t*0 A dead man was restored to life. 
Hume now considers two rival explanations,
one for each of the inferences: “Tis person . . . 
deceive[s].” 
t1. He does not really believe that he saw a 
dead man restored to life. 
Or “this person . . . [was] deceived.” 
t*1. He was mistaken in thinking he saw a 
dead man restored to life. 
Hume proceeds to combine t1 and t*1 into what 
logicians call a disjunction—“t1 or t*1”—“he
deceives, or he was deceived.” Although he was
not explicitly using inference to the best 




t*2. He does not really believe that he saw
a dead man restored to life, or he was
mistaken in thinking he saw a dead man
restored to life. 
Hume then implicitly moves to step 3 in the
recipe and ofers a rank ordering of the origi-
nal explanation of the testimony regarding a
miracle and the disjunctive rival explanation.
Teory t*2 is a better explanation of what was
said than t*0. 
Why is he so confdent of this ranking? Te
answer is what Hume, and almost every philoso-
pher and theologian since, means by something
being a miracle. Miracles are violations of laws of 
nature. Given the laws of physics, biochemistry,
and biology, the natural world dictates that death
is permanent. Te very evidence that estab-
lishes these laws of nature automatically counts
against the reported miracle. For Hume, it’s obvi-
ous that the various law of nature hypotheses
are so much better explanations than rivals that 
allow for exceptions to these laws that miracles
are doomed to be exceedingly implausible. 
I agree with Hume about this so far. If a
casual stranger tells me that she has witnessed a
miracle, I would almost certainly judge that she
is either lying or honestly mistaken and not that 
there has been an interruption in the operations
of the natural world. But my judgment is based
on a subjective assessment of the plausibility of
difering explanatory accounts—classic appli-
cation of the inference-to-the-best-explanation
recipe—and not the meaning of the term mira-













      
   




       












    
    
 
 
      
 
    
84 
that laws of nature don’t hold or that the evi-
dence for them is in anyway flawed. They
believe, rather, that an omnipotent God created
the entire physical world, including those laws
of nature, and can, if He chooses, supersede
those laws by the exercise of His omnipotence.
Miracles, therefore, presuppose the existence
of God. Testimony about the occurrence a mir-
acle might count as good evidence for the exis-
tence of God, but as Hume saw, it will always
face serious difculty. For me to take seriously
this kind of testimony, it would need to come
from very special sources, so e3 would be very














of the qualities of the source, I would need the
corroboration of lots of equally good sources.
Finally, I think I would need some independent
evidence that God might exist. To see whether
such independent evidence available is one of
the oldest questions in Western philosophy. If
you are curious about using evidence, indeed
using inference to the best explanation (IBE),
to present arguments for and against the exis-
tence of God, I invite you to read my next book,
Religious Evidence, or perhaps some of my arti-
cles that attempt to apply inference to the best
explanation as a means of assessing the quality
of evidence we have for the existence of God.3 
exerCIses 
1. Why do the conventions of normal communication recommend that we assume honesty 
when someone tells us something? 
2. Assuming that I was being totally honest in my letter of recommendation, what were the 
two of worries that one might have that I knew what I was talking about? 
3. You read the following on a Facebook post: “I just observed a miracle—I saw a dead man 
restored to life!” Use the tools we have developed in this chapter to assess the quality of 
evidence you have for the claim that a dead man has been restored to life. 
QuIz nIne 
On November 6, 2012, Donald Trump tweeted the following: “The concept of global warming 
was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” 
(https:// twitter.com/ realdonaldtrump/ status/ 265895292191248385 ?lang = en).4 
Use the tools we have developed in this chapter to assess the quality of evidence you have for
the claim that global warming is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese to damage US manufacturing. 
Notes 
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ChaPter ten 
Textual Interpretation 
It is the task of the historian of culture to explain why there has been in the last 
four decades a heavy and largely victorious assault on the sensible belief that a 
text means what its author meant. 
— e. D. hIrsh1 
Sounds, Shapes, Gestures, 
and Dashes and Dots 
My generation grew up with two things that have
largely been spared to most of you. Radios, news-
papers, television, novels, and movies all told us
that the world would end in nuclear war. And
probably as a result of movies depicting World
War  II, we all had an idea of the telegraph and
Morse code. All this played into a wonderful, if 
creepy, movie classic, On the Beach. An acciden-
tal nuclear war has wiped out most of the world,
and only Australia has survivors, but they have
less than a year to live. A US Navy ship decides to
return to the West Coast, partly because they want 
to die at home and partly because the Australian
base has been receiving gibberish in Morse code
from a location in San Diego. What should we
make of those seemingly random dashes and dots? 
e1. The base has been receiving gibberish on 
its telegraph from a source in San Diego. 
How should we explain this? Is it a cry for help? 
A survivor simply desiring long- distance com-
panionship? Or is there some other explanation? 
You’re driving on the interstate; you come
up quickly on a car ahead, change lanes, and


























































up along the side of his head. Did he just give
you an obscene hand gesture? Or was he sim-
ply scratching his ear? I text you “Meet you at 
11” and get “?” as a response. Are you confused
about 11 a.m. or 11 p.m.? Did you mean to text 
“k,” or did I mistakenly text my mother-in-law, 
and she has no idea what in the world I’m say-
ing? Just as we must explain identical exams, the
car outside Joe’s bar, and morphological simi-
larities in mammalian forelimbs, we ofen fnd
ourselves in communicative contexts where we
must explain gibberish Morse code, potential
hand gestures, and “?” in a reply text. It should
surprise none of you that I believe inference to
the best explanation will be helpful to you in
these latter situations. 
Inference to the Best Explanation 
and Textual Interpretation 
Historians are concerned with texts, so are legal 
scholars, and indeed all of us rely on the spo-
ken and printed word as evidence for all sorts of 
hypotheses. We might well turn to other inter-
pretive disciplines such as biblical hermeneu-
tics and literary criticism for methodological
insights. Rather than begin with a tricky legal
statute or a puzzling short story, however, it will 
be clearer, and more amusing, to illustrate the
explanatory nature of textual interpretation
with an example that does not require the back-
ground of an academic specialization. Stanley
Fish provides a good one: 
I have in mind a sign that is afxed in this unpunctuated
form to the door of the Johns Hopkins University Club: 
PRIVATE MEMBERS ONLY 
I have had occasion to ask several classes what
that sign means, and I have received a variety of
answers, the least interesting of which is, “Only those
who are secretly and not publicly members of this
club may enter it.” Other answers fall within a pre-
dictable narrow range: “Only the genitalia of mem-
bers may enter” (this seems redundant), or “You may
bring in your own genitalia,” or (and this is the most
popular reading perhaps because of its Disney-like
anthropomorphism) “Only genitalia may enter.” In
every class, however, some Dr. Johnson-like positivist
rises to say, “But you’re just playing games; every-
body knows that the sign really means, ‘Only those
persons who belong to this club may enter it.’” He is
of course right.2 
Interpreting the sign involves making an
inference about what it means. We have a col-
lection of data that is in need of explanation: 
e1. The “text” is on a sign. 
e2. The sign is on a door. 
e3. The door is to the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Club. 
e4. The “text” reads, “PRIVATE MEMBERS
ONLY.” 
Such a characterization of the data implies
that we have already done a certain amount of 
interpretation. We have explained the shapes
“PRIVATE MEMBERS ONLY” as an attempt at lin-
guistic communication; they did not accidentally
appear when the building was being painted nor
are they modern art. Our explanatory question
focuses on what these words are intended to


































   
 








t0. Only those persons who belong to this
club may enter it. 
t1. Only those who are secretly and not pub-
licly members of this club may enter it. 
t2. Only the genitalia of members may enter. 
t3. You may bring in your own genitalia. 
t4. Only genitalia may enter. 
t5. The sign was intentionally designed with 
the double meaning by witty intellectuals. 
As Fish’s no-nonsense student insists, it is per-
fectly obvious what the best explanation of the
words on the door is. Clearly, t0 is the simplest,
most complete, least ad hoc, and most plausible
account. Linguistic communication and inter-
pretation is an inherently explanatory pro-
cess. From casual conversations and fun signs
on doors to the interpretation of literary, con-
stitutional, and biblical texts, the role of the
reader (or listener) is always the same. Tere
are shapes, gestures, and noises that need to
be explained. Given the frst order explanation
that they are attempts at linguistic communica-
tion, the question now becomes what hypothe-
sis best accounts for the meaning in the present 
context? 
Authorial Intention 
Virtually every one of the explanations we
have alluded to so far share a common feature.
Te gibberish was perhaps a cry for help (or
sad attempt to fnd companionship). Te ges-
ture might well have expressed his displeasure
at your driving. Te “?” text probably was a
request for more information. Te sign was say-
ing who (or what) could or could not come in
through the door. Te following picture is so
natural that we hardly think about it, and that,
indeed, is the magic of linguistic (or symbolic)
communication. Authors desire to communi-
cate. Tey use a medium—spoken or written
words, Morse code, hand gestures, motion pic-
tures, or smartphone texting—as their means
for communicating. In the ideal case, when we
are unsure of what they were communicating,
we simply ask them, What did you mean? If that
proves impossible, as in all the previous cases,
we must infer what they meant. As Hirsh put it
in this chapter’s epigraph, “A text means what 
its author meant.” 
textual InterPretatIon 
e1. There is a text. 
e2. The text has an author. 
t0. The text means what its author intended 
it to mean. 
A Notorious Interpretation 
of Hamlet 
It was a bad year, indeed, for Hamlet. He lef 
school and returned to Denmark to attend the
old king’s—his father’s—funeral. When he
arrives, he discovers that his mother has hast-
ily remarried his father’s brother, Claudius, who
has installed himself as the new king despite
the fact that Hamlet was heir to the throne. If
this were not bad enough, his father’s ghost
visits him and relates that Claudius, in fact,
murdered the old king. Just as you can go to a
romcom or a superhero fick and pretty much
know what to expect, playgoers in Shakespeare’s
time knew they were to be treated to a revenge 







        












    








































tragedy. Hamlet would surely spend the rest 
of the play avenging his father’s murder. Hamlet 
does eventually kill Claudius but more by acci-
dent than an avenging action. In the meantime, 
for a good four hours of the play, Hamlet mainly 
dithers, second-guesses himself, and seriously
messes up his love life with Ophelia. Why, crit-
ics have asked for three hundred years, doesn’t 
Hamlet get on with it and kill his uncle, as the
genre dictates? 
Earnest Jones begins his analysis of the
play with a very general summary of critical
responses: 
Te most important hypotheses that have been put
forward are sub-varieties of three main points of
view. Te frst of these sees the difculty in the perfor-
mance of the task in Hamlet’s temperament, which is 
not suited to efective action of any kind; the second
sees it in the nature of the task, which is such as to be 
almost impossible of performance by any one; and the 
third in some special feature in the nature of the task 
which renders it peculiarly difcult or repugnant to
Hamlet.3 
Besides its fame or perhaps infamy, Jones’s
essay ofering the Oedipus complex as an inter-
pretation of “the cause of Hamlet’s hesitancy in 
seeking to obtain revenge for the murder of his 
father”4 would merit some discussion simply
because of its title—“Te Oedipus-Complex as
an Explanation of Hamlet’s Mystery: A Study
in Motive.”5 Jones’s interpretation explicitly
appeals to the notion of explanation at two dis-
tinct levels. One, of course, is Hamlet’s inaction. 
Why all the dithering? Jones argues that Hamlet 
is sufering from an Oedipus complex and ofers 
as evidence in support of this hypothesis several
bits of textual data. Inference to the best expla-
nation (IBE) would structure this argument in
the following way: 
e1. What we know from the text about Ham-
let’s behavior—his inaction, his peculiar
relationship with Gertrude, his misogynistic 
treatment of Ophelia, and so on 
t0. Hamlet was sufering from an Oedipus
complex. 
Te psychoanalytic diagnosis explains all this
puzzling behavior. Te obvious critical problem 
for this interpretation is the embarrassing fact 
that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet almost three
hundred years before Freud identifed the Oedi-
pus complex. Jones wisely anticipates the prob-
lem and ofers an explanation of Shakespeare’s 
mental state in writing the play. 
We have fnally to return to the subject with which we
started, namely poetic creation, and in this connec-
tion to enquire into the relation of Hamlet’s confict
to the inner workings of Shakespeare’s [sic] mind. It
is here maintained that this confict is an echo of a
similar one in Shakespeare himself, as to a greater
or less extent it is in all men. It is, therefore, as much
beside the point to enquire into Shakespeare’s con-
scious intention, moral or otherwise, in the play as
it is in the case of most works of genius. Te play is
the form in which his feeling fnds its spontaneous
expression, without any inquiry being possible on
his part as to the essential nature or source of that
feeling.6 
So now we are presented with an explanation




























    

















as well. Again, Jones ofers evidence. He points
out that the Hamlet story was widely known in
Shakespeare’s time, that the famous Tomas
Kyd version was on the contemporary scene,
and that “Shakespeare in 1585 christened his
own son Hamnet, a frequent variation of the
name.”7 Te key, however, for Jones is Shake-
speare’s own father. 
Highly suggestive, therefore, of the subjective origin
of the psychical confict in the play is the fact that
it was in September, 1601, that Shakespeare’s father
died, an event which might well have had the same
awakening efect on old “repressed” memories that
the death of Hamlet’s father had with Hamlet; his
mother lived till some seven years later. Tere are
many indications that the disposition of Shake-
speare’s father was of that masterful and authorita-
tive kind so apt to provoke rebellion, particularly in
a frst-born son.8 
Tus we get a linked argument reminiscent
of the reasoning from the chalk on Watson’s
hand to the decision not to invest or the two-step 
inferences in cases of testimony. 
e1. What we know from the text about Ham-
let’s behavior—his inaction, his peculiar
relationship with Gertrude, his misogynistic 
treatment of Ophelia, and so on 
t′ 0. Hamlet was sufering from an Oedipus
complex. 
e2. Shakespeare’s familiarity with the Hamlet
legend and Kyd’s version of the play 
e3. Shakespeare’s son’s name 
e4. Shakespeare’s father’s temperament 
e5. The death of Shakespeare’s father 1601 
t″ 0. Shakespeare himself sufered from
Oedipus complex and unconsciously trans-
ferred character traits from himself to
Hamlet. 
textual InterPretatIon 
Te million-dollar questions are, of course,
whether t′ 0 and t″ 0 are the best explanations of 
the textual and authorial data. I think we would 
be hard pressed to fnd many defenders of the
Jones hypotheses. Te problem is not so much
the quality of Jones’s reasoning but the Freud-
ian paradigm that he so candidly and enthusi-
astically buys into. If one is skeptical that such a 
thing as an Oedipus complex exists, one is going 
to fnd it very difcult to explain the actions and 
creations of literary characters and authors in
terms of it. 
A Contemporary Psychological 
Interpretation of Hamlet 
It is interesting in this connection to consider
a more contemporary psychological account
of Hamlet. A. B. Shaw has recently argued that 
Hamlet sufered from depressive illness and
that this diagnosis explains his failure to exact 
revenge. 
Hamlet is a creature of Shakespeare’s imagina-
tion . . . He is not an actual patient. Terefore clini-
cal diagnosis must be tentative, but there is good
evidence in the play for depressive illness. Depres-
sive illness is characterized by low mood, anhedonia,
negative beliefs, and reduced energy. Hamlet actually
calls himself melancholic and the very frst speech he
makes in the play is devoted to a public statement of
his melancholy.9 

















    











        
92 
Shaw now proceeds to show how the text 















e1. Hamlet exhibits anhedonia—for example,
“He speaks at length to Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern, saying he has lost all mirth
and that man does not delight him.”10 
e2. Hamlet expresses negative beliefs—for
example, “He calls Denmark a prison. His
comments to Ophelia on women are bitter.”11 
e3. Hamlet “alludes to sleep disturbance
‘were it not that I had bad dreams.’”12 
e4. Hamlet “has experienced events likely to 
precipitate depression: his father’s sudden
death, his mother’s hasty marriage, and his 
disappointment in the succession.”13 
t0. Hamlet sufered from depressive illness. 
Shaw argues further that it is no embarrassment 
whatsoever that depressive illness only entered 
the clinical paradigm centuries afer the play
was written. We certainly grant that people
sufered from this devastating condition long 
before psychology and medicine cataloged and
began to treat it. Shakespeare was an excellent 
student of the human condition. Just as a per-
ceptive author can recognize overly ambitious
characters, jealous lovers, and power- mad lead-
ers, Shakespeare can recognize a person exhib-
iting the behavior brought on by depressive
illness—what his contemporaries would have
called melancholy. Further, he can locate his
depressive lead character in a play with perhaps 
larger and diferent artistic motives. 
We can only assess the quality of Shaw’s
depressive illness interpretation, of course, by
comparing his explanation of key parts of the
play to the many rival interpretations that have 
been ofered in the past three hundred years.
I make no claim that Shaw’s explanation is the
best explanation for two reasons. One is that I am
not a qualifed critical scholar, and this is a book 
about evidence evaluation, not Shakespearian
critical analysis. Te second is a kind of intel-
lectual confession. I fnd the play both aestheti-
cally and intellectually fascinating. Every time
I read a thoughtful interpretation of Hamlet, I 
fnd myself being won over to that critic’s point 
of view. I recognize, of course, that all these crit-
ics can’t be right, since many consciously write 
to refute one another. 
I suspect that my problem lies with the
whole notion of truth—truth in science, truth
in literary analysis, and truth in constitutional 
interpretation, a topic we will return to in later 
chapters. 
 
      
  
  
   














exerCIses and QuIz ten 
Retrieved from https://www 
.fickr.com/ x/ t/ 0090009/ photos/ 
mastababa/ 2354567815/. 
Retrieved from https://www 
.fickr.com/ x/ t/ 0099009/ photos/ 
mstabbycat/ 3127520409/. 
textual InterPretatIon 
Here are three images of signs I found on the web. A fourth image, which was protected by 
copyright, showed pedestrians walking a street with a sign in the foreground that read, “GO 
SLOW: ACCIDENT PORN AREA.” 
You may choose any one you want for this chapter’s quiz. The others may be used as
practice exercises. 
The directions for the quiz and the practice exercises are all the same. What is the sign 
saying— what does it mean? Defend your interpretation of the sign using the tools we have 
developed in this chapter. The fun, I believe, will be in coming up with your rival explanations. 
5 Jones, 74. Notes 
6 Jones, 102– 3. 
1 E. D. Hirsch, “In Defense of the Author,” Validity in 7 Jones, 103. 
Interpretation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 8 Jones, 103. 
1967), 1. 9 A.  B. Shaw, “Depressive Illness Delayed Hamlet’s
2 Stanley Fish, Is Tere a Text in Tis Class? (Cambridge, Revenge,” Medical Humanities 28, no. 2 (2002): 92–96. 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 274– 75. 10 Shaw, 92. 
3 E. Jones, “Te Oedipus-Complex as an Explanation 11 Shaw, 92. 
of Hamlet’s Mystery: A Study in Motive,” American 12 Shaw, 92. 
Journal of Psychology 21, no. 1 (1910): 75. 13 Shaw, 93. 
4 Jones, 74. 

 












Making Sense of the Numbers 
Data do not give up their secrets easily. Tey must be tortured to confess. 
— Jeff hopper1 
What Numbers Can Tell Us 
Here is a chart that seems to say quite a lot. 
Afer the disastrous recession of 2008, the story
about jobs in the United States seems rosy indeed.
Te trend from July 2010 until July 2018 shows
a dramatic decline in the national unemploy-
ment rate. As I write these words in the summer
of 2018, “job openings hit record highs and the
unemployment rate dipped to the lowest level in
decades.”2 Ordinarily all this would have resulted
in higher wages for working men and women 
and an increase in their standard of living. Tis
is not, however, how it feels to many working 
Americans. Perhaps the following chart gives a
more accurate account of what is really going on. 
fIgure 4. Civilian unemployment rate 












      
 
  
   
 
  
       
        






















fIgure 5. Median weekly earnings, 2004– 2014 
Retrieved from Bureau of Labor Statistics, The 
Economics Daily, https:// www.bls.gov/ opub/ ted/ 2014/ 
ted _20141028 .htm. 
All this stuf—“the seasonally adjusted civil-
ian unemployment rate,” “infation adjusted
median weekly earnings,” and the like—really
matters for a number of reasons. Te biggest 
concern, of course, is that most of my readers
have bills to pay, families to support, and fnan-
cial plans to make for their futures; what their 
paycheck is, and what it buys them, are of para-
mount importance. In addition, politicians of all
stripes demand their votes because the economy
is doing so well or because it is doing so poorly. 
Finally, as good explanation seekers, we would
all like to know what’s going on. 
Were it my paycheck, my vote, or simply my 
intellectual curiosity, I’d probably take an eco-
nomics course or two, read a bit more about 
where the parties and their candidates stand on 
all this, and as you may have guessed, apply the 
methods of inference to the best explanation to 
all this statistical data. 
Samples and Populations 
We will use the term population as jargon
for any sort of a group—a group of people; a 
group of things, such as vehicles that get better 
than thirty miles per gallon; or groups of very
abstract things, such as depictions of Santa
Claus in primetime television. We can use the
mathematician’s notion of a set to characterize a 
population. Similarly, we will use the term sam-
ple as jargon for any part of the group constitut-
ing the population. Tus samples are subsets of 
the set making up the population. In a familiar 
Venn diagram, the lighter, smaller oval consti-
tutes the sample and the darker, larger oval the 
population. 
Very ofen we are interested in samples because
we assume that they can tell us something inter-
esting about the population. You might well ask,
If we are really interested in the population,
why we wouldn’t just look at it directly? And the
  
   
   











































simple answer is one of practicality. It would
be too time consuming, too expensive, or other-
wise too impractical to survey the entire popu-
lation. Tus we use the sample, which can be 
examined and described, as a clue about the
whole population, which cannot. 
Inferences from samples to populations are
classic examples of inferences to the best expla-
nation. Our data are the discovery that some
sample has an interesting feature or property,
and we use this as evidence that the population 
also has this property. We ask the explanatory
question—Why does the sample have P? And
our hypothesis answers that it has P because the 
population as a whole has P. 
e1. Sample has property P. 
t0. Population has property P. 
Couldn’t It Just Be a Fluke? 
I hope by now you are almost programmed when
you see an argument such as the previous one
to begin to think of rival explanations. Sure, if 
the population has P, that would be a good expla-
nation of why the sample has P. But what else
might explain the sample having P? 
I get home at 6:00 on a Tuesday evening and
before I can fnish looking at the mail and fx-
ing a martini, the phone has rung three times,
all from charitable organizations seeking con-
tributions. I conclude that this Tuesday is a 
big push for getting money. My sample, those
three phone calls, is pretty skimpy. Afer all, I’m
ofering a hypothesis about the whole country
(or perhaps state or county). Isn’t the follow-
ing rival explanation just as plausible, perhaps
more plausible, than my charity full court press
theory? 97 
statIstICs 
t1. It’s just a coincidence that those three
calls were all from charitable organizations. 
Or more generally, 
t1. It’s just a coincidence that the sample has 
property P. 
Modern probability theory has devoted a
good deal of time and attention to developing
some very sophisticated mathematical tests of
how likely it is that a sample will have a given
property simply as a matter of random chance. 
Some of you may be familiar with some of these 
tests for what is called statistical signifcance
from other courses or computer sofware. Even 
those of you who hate numbers or math would 
be well advised, in my humble opinion, to learn 
a bit about all this by taking an introductory
statistics course. But that is not my goal in the
present context. 
Even those of you with the least experience 
and confdence with mathematics know that the
size of the sample matters in important ways.
A sample of three calls tells us almost noth-
ing, while a sample of three thousand can tell
us quite a lot. We will confne our discussion to 
an informal treatment of what statisticians call 
statistical signifcance. How accurate are our
measurements within samples of a given size?
A contemporary philosopher of science Ronald 
Giere ofers what he calls a rule of thumb for
answering this question.3 He ofers the follow-
ing scale for correlating the size of the sample



























     




































You might note a couple of things about this
little chart. One is how nicely the frst digit in
the sample size correlates with the accuracy
measurement, thus making it pretty darn easy
to remember. Te other is what economists call
“the law of diminishing returns.” Increasing
the sample from one hundred to fve hundred
buys you a lot of increased accuracy; increas-
ing it from two thousand to ten thousand buys
you hardly any increased accuracy. You will
fnd, I predict, that almost all the polls you read
about in the newspapers will have sample sizes
around fve hundred. Tis is because an accu-
racy of about ±5 percent is all that is needed for
most purposes, and it would be very expensive
and time consuming to improve that accuracy
signifcantly. 
Couldn’t the Sample Be Biased? 
Te notion of bias in colloquial speech ofen con-
veys a lack of openness or even prejudice, which 
counts as a kind of character defect— for exam-
ple, “he’s really biased in his grading against stu-
dent athletes.” I’m biased toward folk and rock 
music because it’s what I grew up with. Some
of you, God forbid, are biased toward hip-hop 
for the same reason. All the notion really means 
is that people are not equally open—to giving 
good grades, appreciating a song as a good one, 
or noticing that the dishes need to be washed.
We need to make sure that our samples are not 
biased but equally open to everyone or every-
thing in the population. 
Statisticians desire randomly selected sam-
ples. Tis is technical jargon that means every
single individual in the population has an equal 
probability of being selected as a member of the 
sample. My computer can approximate random 
selection, so it would be relatively easy for me
to feed in all my class rosters for the past fve
years, randomly select three students from each 
course, and then query this sample to discover 
things about my teaching, grading, and so on.
Not a bad idea, actually. 
In the real world, however, technical ran-
domness is often impossible. We only have
a couple of days to find out voter sentiment 
in the upcoming election, and so we phone
a sample of six hundred likely voters. Obvi-
ously, this is not a true random sample, since
every likely voter did not have an equal chance
of being selected—some didn’t have phones,
some were away on vacation, and some screen
their calls. But for practical purposes, if the
phone numbers are randomly selected from a
master list of likely voters who answer their
phones, the information we gather approxi-
mates what could be gathered from a techni-
cally random sample, and our sample might
be characterized as practically random. Techni-
cally random samples are the exception, while
what we hope are practically random samples
are the rule. 
Consider a very famous poll that went spec-
tacularly wrong. Te Literary Digest had been
conducting polls on presidential elections since 
1920 and had gotten the winner right in four
straight elections; indeed, in the 1932 election,
they got the popular vote right within 1 percent. 
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As the 1936 election approached, they once again
conducted a massive poll. Take a look at the rel-
evant data. 
e1. The Literary Digest mailed out more than
ten million straw vote ballots. 
e2. Their sample was drawn primarily from 
automobile registration lists and phone
books.4 
e3. “Over 2.3 million ballots were returned.”5 
e4. 55 percent planned to vote for Alf Landon,
41 percent for Roosevelt, and 4 percent for 
Lemke. 
Tis led to their conclusion that voters over-
whelmingly favored Landon and their cover
story prediction that he would win the election. 
Tey made a classic inference from a sample to 
a population. 
e1. Literary Digest sample strongly favors
Landon. 
t0. Voters, nationally, strongly favor Landon. 
Bad luck for the Literary Digest! You, of course,
know that Alf Landon never became president. 
I’ll bet a good number of you have never even
heard of him before. Roosevelt crushed Landon 
in the general election 61 percent to 37 percent. 
What went wrong? 
Te Digest’s sample was horribly biased. Not 
because they were prejudiced or had some ax
to grind but because the way they selected the
names and addresses was far from random—not 
the technical randomness that we almost never 
fnd, but the practical randomness that good
polling requires. Te clue is in e2. Tis was, afer 
all, the height of the Great Depression. Poor
people were much less likely to own a car. And 
even phones were then considered not necessi-
ties but, in a sense, luxuries. Again, poor people 
were much less likely to have phones. What the 
Literary Digest had unintentionally done is mea-
sure the sentiments of relatively wealthy voters,
not voters in general. Tis suggests the following
rival explanation: 
statIstICs 
t1. Wealthy voters strongly favor[ed] Landon. 
It is well known in political science that wealth-
ier voters tend to vote for Republicans and less 
wealthy voters for Democrats. It’s hardly sur-
prising, therefore, that a sample of voters biased
toward the Republican Party tended to favor the 
Republican candidate. 
Tere was a second source of bias in the
sample that is less well discussed in academic
circles. Te whole poll depended on what stat-
isticians call the “response rate.” Te Liter-
ary Digest sent out a truly amazing number of
straw ballots—more than ten million. Tey got
a pretty good response too—almost a quarter.
But we should ask ourselves if there was any-
thing special about those 2.3 million who took
the trouble to mail their ballots back. It seems
reasonable to suppose that they were more edu-
cated and politically concerned. So we have a
second rival explanation: 
t2. Better educated and politically concerned 
voters favored Landon. 
And, indeed, t1 and t2 nicely complement one





























          
 
         
 
   
 




t3. Wealthy voters, as well as better educated















Lest any of you think that all this concern
with polling for presidential elections is a thing 
of the past, you might well refect on the recent 
elections. Here’s what professional pollsters were
worried about as the 2008 election approached: 
“We were all scared to death in 2004, because we
had a close race and the cell phone- only problem was 
already with us then,” says Scott Keeter, the head of
surveys at the Pew Research Center . . . 
“Pollsters have learned quite a bit about the cell
phone- only users they do call. Tey are most likely to 
be under 30, unmarried, renters, making less than
$30,000 a year, and are slightly more likely to be black 
or Hispanic,” says Keeter. . . . 
He adds, “It suggests that if there are enough of
them, and you are missing them in your landline sur-
veys, then your polls will have a bias because of that.”6 
Naomi Oreskes’s Study 
Tere is an interesting segment in Al Gore’s
movie, An Inconvenient Truth, where he cites a 
scholarly study of peer- reviewed articles on cli-
mate change. 
A University of California at San Diego scientist,
Dr. Naomi Oreskes, published in Science magazine a 
massive study of every peer- reviewed science journal 
article on global warming from the previous 10 years. 
She and her team selected a large random sample of
928 articles representing almost 10% of that total, and
carefully analyzed how many of the articles agreed or 
disagreed with the prevailing consensus view. About a 
quarter of the articles in the sample dealt with aspects
of global warming that did not involve any discussion 
of the central elements of the consensus. Of the three- 
quarters that did address these main points, the per-
centage that disagreed with the consensus? Zero.7 
Here we have, a little bit secondhand, an incredibly
interesting, and potentially quite important, sam-
ple. Te argument leaves the conclusion unstated
but still quite obvious—almost all natural scien-
tists publishing on climate change endorse the
consensus view about climate change. 
e1. In a sample of 928 peer-reviewed articles 
dealing with climate change, 0 percent dis-
agreed with the consensus view. 
t0. Virtually all peer-reviewed research on cli-
mate change endorses the consensus view. 
Mr. Gore is quite right that Dr. Oreskes
published a short, but very infuential, article,
“Beyond the Ivory Tower: Te Scientifc Consen-
sus on Climate Change,” in a prestigious jour-
nal, Science, in December of 2004.8 She begins by
reminding her readers that policy makers and
the mass media ofen suggest that great scien-
tifc uncertainty about “anthropogenic” climate 
change but states fatly, “Tis is not the case.”9 
In defense of her thesis, she ofers a fairly
elaborate study she has conducted. She ofers
a working defnition of what she will call “the
consensus view,” from reports by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change: 
Human activities . . . are modifying the concentration 
of atmospheric constituents . . . that absorb or scat-













   















        
 




over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.10 
Notice the challenge she faces. She is making 
a claim about a very large, and not that well-
defned, population—science (“great scientifc
uncertainty”). To make matters worse, policy
makers and the media dispute her claim. 
Her frst move is to more carefully defne the
population she is interested in. She utilizes a 
standard reference tool in the natural sciences,
the Institute for Scientifc Information (ISI) data-
base. In this database, authors are asked to iden-
tify certain “key words,” really topics, that their
articles address. Professor Oreskes searched for
the key word “climate change.” Her team then
randomly selected more than 928 articles. 
Obviously not every article is going to explic-
itly endorse or disagree with the consensus view,
so Oreskes and her team had to read and “code” the
articles. Tey broke them down into six categories. 
Te 928 papers were divided into six categories: explicit
endorsement of the consensus position, evaluation of
impacts, mitigation proposals, methods, paleoclimate
analysis, and rejection of the consensus position. Of all
the papers, 75% fell into the frst three categories, either
explicitly or implicitly accepting the consensus view; 25% 
dealt with methods or paleoclimate, taking no position
on current anthropogenic climate change. Remarkably,
none of the papers disagreed with the consensus position.11 
She is also quite candid that a certain amount of 
judgment and editing of the sample was required. 
Some abstracts were deleted from our analysis because,
although the authors had put “climate change” in their
key words, the paper was not about climate change.12 
So what do we (none of us trained climate sci-
entists) think of Professor Oreskes’s evidence?
We possess the tools to make some sort of
evaluation. 
We have a fair amount of data that is being
ofered as evidence: 
statIstICs 
e1. Defnition of the “consensus view” 
e2. ISI database 
e3. Key word: climate change 
e4. 928 articles 
e5. Some articles did not really address cli-
mate change and were removed. 
e6. Six potential categories 
e7. 75  percent “implicitly or explicitly”
endorsed the consensus view. 
e8. 25 percent took no stand. 
e9. Not one article disagreed with the con-
sensus view. 
t0. Almost all scientists working and publish-
ing on climate change endorse the consen-
sus view. 
Rival Explanations of the Sample 
We will begin with two diferent rival explana-
tions that attribute the fact that no one chal-
lenged the consensus view to pure chance.
Perhaps it was just a fuke that all 928 articles
either endorsed the consensus view or took no 
position on it. Perhaps the study tells us some-
thing about the articles in the ISI database, but 
it’s simply a fuke that the articles that the data-
base includes are not skeptical but that other
peer- reviewed articles not included are skepti-
cal. Either of the following sorts of mathemati-




































      
      
 
       






       

















t1. It was a fuke that the 928 articles showed 
no skepticism about the consensus view; the
ISI database contained many articles that
were skeptical. 
t2. Although the sample told us something
signifcant about the ISI database, it was a 
coincidence that the articles they included
showed no skepticism when in fact many
peer-reviewed articles not included show
plenty of skepticism. 
I have already conceded that both of these
rivals are logically possible. I want to insist, how-
ever, that they are very improbable. Remember
Giere’s “rule of thumb”? He tells us that for random
samples, the margin of error is a direct function of 
the size of the sample. Samples of fve hundred
are accurate to about ±5 percent, and samples of 
two thousand are accurate to about ±2 percent.
Tat means that Professor Oreskes’s sample has
an accuracy of, conservatively, ±4  percent. For
a statistician adopting a 95  percent confdence
level, there is only a 5  percent chance that the
population falls outside of the ±4 percent margin
of error. Could it happen? Yes. Is it likely at all? No. 
Much more interesting rivals will have to do 
with the problem of bias, either intentional or, 
more likely, unintentional. I suspect that some
of you have already wondered if there might 
be a bias in the ISI database. Maybe they only
list “green” articles. Again, the following rival
explanation is possible: 
t3. The ISI database is biased in favor of the 
consensus view. 
A very diferent sort of bias is possible
because of Oreskes’s methodology. It is highly
unlikely that most of the articles in the sample
came right out and said where they stood on
the consensus view. Indeed, she tells us that 
some of the endorsement was implicit. Tat
must mean that her team had to “code,” or oth-
erwise interpret, that article’s intention and
subsequent endorsement or nonendorsement.
Perhaps her team was so unconsciously wedded
to the consensus view that they misinterpreted
many of the articles as endorsing or taking no
stand when in fact the authors of those articles
intended a rejection of the consensus view. Tus 
another possible rival explanation focuses on
the coding of the articles: 
t4. Oreskes, because of her biases, misinter-
preted many of the articles as favorable or 
neutral when in fact the authors were argu-
ing against the consensus view. 
A fnal rival explanation centers on the pos-
sible bias of the entire scientifc community.
One might argue, as some have in defense of
“creation science,” that there is a kind of pro-
fessional conspiracy that efectively censors
articles that challenge the consensus view (not 
just of climate change but of any accepted sci-
entifc theory) from being published in peer-
reviewed journals in the frst place. Here, the
rival does not really challenge the population
of peer-reviewed publications, but rather the
implied attitude of endorsement by working
scientists. 
t5. Respectable scientists arguing against
the consensus view cannot get their articles 
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The Best Explanation? 
In the case of the rivals focusing on a statistical
fuke, I could argue against their plausibility by
focusing on their mathematical improbability.
No such technique exists for dealing with the
rivals t3, t4, and t5. Nevertheless, I want to argue
that they are all implausible, at least when com-
pared to the original explanation that there
exists practically universal endorsement of
the consensus view regarding climate change
among trained climate scientists. 
Consider first the journal that Oreskes’s
article appeared in, Science. Te journal is one
of the most highly respected academic journals
in the world. Tey have a huge interest in polic-
ing themselves, since their name is on the cover
of every article they publish. 
Next, we must face the charge that the Insti-
tute for Scientifc Information is somehow biased.
Again, we are dealing with a very prestigious and
widely used reference tool, which is now oper-
ated by a for-proft corporation. Te ISI has a huge
stake, both its reputation and its fnancial outlook,
in being regarded as absolutely trustworthy. Tus
they too can be expected to police themselves. 
Te same may be argued for Professor Oreskes
herself. She is a highly respected scholar, educa-
tor, and university administrator. Her own pro-
fessional reputation is on the line. She would be 
insane not to carefully ensure the accuracy of an
article in a major journal that was guaranteed to 
be read and debated by a wide audience of sci-
entists and indeed, those outside of the sciences. 
Finally, we come to perhaps the most serious
of the charges in our rivals. Perhaps all climate
science is biased against critics of the consensus
view. As I said in an earlier chapter, these sorts
of conscious or unconscious conspiracy theories
are ofered by critics of natural selection. I want 
to concede that something like that can happen,
and the history of science tells us that it has hap-
pened on occasion. In a way, the criticism of Sem-
melweis’s theory by skeptics of the entrenched
generation had shades of this mechanism. But 
with all this conceded, I have to tell you that this
sort of thing is very, very rare. Most natural sci-
entists respect the need for skepticism from their
peers. Studies challenging the consensus view,
in one sense, have a better chance of being pub-
lished, if for no other reason than that they are
saying something new. Furthermore, we live in
the age of information. Much more is being pub-
lished, and many more venues for peer-reviewed
academic publishing exist now. Tus the fact
that the ISI database did not include even one
skeptical defense leads me to believe that there
just aren’t many skeptics out there, at least not 
within mainstream climate science. 
statIstICs 
exerCIses 
1. For the fall quarter of 2008, Eastern had 3,666 students. When you break down that num-
ber on the basis of sex, you discover something a little surprising. 2,344 of those students
were female, while only 1,322 were male. Why would it have been a bad idea to take the
2008 institutional data from Eastern as telling us anything signifcant about gender and
college attendance nationally?












       




     
         
         
  
  




   
   















3. Teaching evaluations for online courses have notoriously low response rates. Less than
10 percent of my online students return their course evaluations. What kinds of bias
might infect the accuracy of these student evaluations? Is this sample close enough
to practical randomness to tell us anything interesting about the quality of my online
teaching? 
QuIz eleVen 
A recent Gallup News story claims that “public concern about global warming is evident
across all age groups in the U.S., with majorities of younger and older Americans saying they
worry about the problem a great deal or fair amount. However, the extent to which Ameri-
cans take global warming seriously and worry about it difers markedly by age, with adults
under age 35 typically much more engaged with the problem than those 55 and older.”13 
The following results were “based on aggregated telephone interviews from four separate 
Gallup polls conducted from 2015 through 2018 with a random sample of 4,103 adults, aged 
18 and older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. For results based on the 
total sample of national adults, the margin of sampling error is ±2 percentage points at
the 95% confdence level. All reported margins of sampling error include computed design 
efects for weighting.”14 
Here is a summary of their fndings: 75 percent of respondents aged eighteen to thirty-
four believed that “global warming is caused by human activities,” while only 55 percent of 
respondents aged ffty-fve and over believed this. Apropos our earlier discussion, 73 percent 
of the younger cohort thought “most scientists believe global warming is occurring,” but only 
58 percent in the older group thought this was true.15 
Based on the information in the Gallup polls, use the techniques developed in this chapter 
to evaluate the quality of evidence we have for the author’s claim that “the extent to which 
Americans take global warming seriously and worry about it difers markedly by age.” 
Here is the complete article from Gallup: https://news.gallup.com/poll/234314/global
-warming -age -gap -younger -americans -worried .aspx. 
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ChaPter twelVe 
Correlations and Causes 
Most of you will have heard the maxim “correlation does not imply causation.” 
Just because two variables have a statistical relationship with each other does not
mean that one is responsible for the other. For instance, ice cream sales and forest 
fres are correlated because both occur more ofen in the summer heat. But there 
is no causation; you don’t light a patch of the Montana brush on fre when you 
buy a pint of Haagan- Dazs. 
— nate sIlver1 
Correlations 
Te Concise Oxford Dictionary ofers two defni-
tions of the term correlation: 
1. Mutual relationship between two or more things. 
2. Interdependence of variable quantities, quantity
measuring extent of this.2 
Te latter defnition gets most of the attention
in statistics courses. But the more generic def-
nition is at the heart of reasoning from a cause
to an efect. What is the relationship between 
two things—a car accident on Tuesday and a
backache on Wednesday morning? “Obviously”
the crash caused the back injury. Well, maybe,
but maybe not. Perhaps the back injury (caused
from too much of a workout at the gym on Mon-
day) resulted in the crash because of a muscle
spasm as the driver was trying to hit the brakes.
Or suppose some third thing— say, a small
seizure— simultaneously caused the crash by
distracting the driver and caused the back injury
as the driver wrenched in surprise. And maybe
the relationship is one of simple coincidence.
Te injury occurred at the gym and the crash



















    
     




















simply no causal relationship between the two the women in the same age range sufered from
occurrences. Tis all suggests four possible causal the disease. Tis tells us something potentially














1. A caused B. 
2. B caused A. 
3. Some third “common cause,” C, indepen-
dently caused both A and B. 
4. There is no causal relationship between A
and B. 
We shall see, directly, that there is a ffh pos-
sible causal relationship between A and B, but 
I’m saving that as a surprise. Just what we have 
so far, though, allows us to explain the correla-
tion between ice cream sales and forest fres.
Nate Silver says “there is no causation,” but 
this is a little careless. He’s right, of course,
that A is not the cause of B nor B the cause of A.
But there is a causal relationship that best 
explains the correlation. C (the summer heat)
is the common cause of the increased ice cream 
sales and greater number of forest fres. 
Explaining the Numbers 
Much of statistical reasoning in the social and
natural sciences can easily be reconstructed as a 
related pair of inferences to the best explanation.
In the frst inference, the explanatory question
focuses on a quantitative relationship. We typi-
cally have some study or sample that is asserted
to tell us something about a larger group or popu-
lation. Consider the extensive medical data that 
was uncovered over several decades in the famous
Framingham study. Medical researchers were
surprised to discover that 29 percent of the men in
the forty- to forty-nine-year range sufered from
coronary heart disease, while only 14 percent of 
e1. Of the 771 men in the forty- to forty-nine-
year age group, 29  percent showed some
signs of coronary heart disease. 
e2. Of the 954 women in the forty- to 
forty-nine-year age group, only 14 percent
showed signs of coronary heart disease. 
t0. Coronary heart disease appears much
more often in men than in women. 
One rival explanation that I believe current 
medical advances force us to take seriously
is that coronary heart disease is much more
prevalent in woman than was recognized by
medical experts at the time of the Framingham 
study—then current diagnostic indicators failed
to correctly identify all the signs of coronary
heart disease in women. So the following may
better explain some of the gender disparity: 
t1. All the clinical indicators of coronary
heart disease in women were not recognized
at the time of the study. 
But let’s grant that the Framingham data truly
indicated some real gender disparity and that 
the samples do suggest that coronary heart dis-
ease was more prevalent in men. 
Explaining the Correlations 
Noticing this striking correlation between gen-
der and heart disease is only the frst step in fg-
uring out what is going on here. We might think

































e1. Of the 771 men in the forty- to forty-nine-
year age group, 29  percent showed some
signs of coronary heart disease. 
e2. Of the 954 women in the forty- to forty-nine-
year age group, only 14 percent showed signs
of coronary heart disease. 
t0. Coronary heart disease appears much
more often in men than in women. 
t*0. The biological makeup of males, their
hormones, physiology, and DNA, causes
an increased danger of coronary heart
disease. 
But certainly, the possibility of a cultural expla-
nation must be taken seriously, particularly
since the data was collected at a time in our
history when gender roles were much more
pronounced. Perhaps something regarding the
diferences in workforce stress between men
and women accounts for the disparity in coro-
nary heart disease. Or, perhaps, it’s a simple as 
diet and alcohol consumption. We are once again
confronted with a serious rival explanation: 
t*1. The culturally defned diferences in
work and lifestyles between men and
women cause the diferences in coronary
heart disease. 
Or this may well be one of those times when the 
best explanation combines the features identi-
fed in alternative explanations: 
t*2. The biological makeup of males as well as
the culturally defned diferences in lifestyles
between men and women jointly cause an
increased danger of coronary heart disease. 
I hope that it is obvious by now that I am not 
suggesting that statistical studies such as the
Framingham study are too ambiguous to tell us 
anything important. Te message I take from
this is that explaining statistical data can be a
difcult task indeed and that carefully consid-
ering alternative accounts of statistical correla-
tions may suggest further studies that may need 
to be conducted before we can fully understand 
the causal connections between gender and cor-
onary heart disease. 
CO2 and Global Temperatures 
Consider the following data that played such a
prominent role in Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth. 
Mr. Gore used these data as evidence that CO2 con-
centrations cause global temperature variations. 
CorrelatIons and Causes 
e1. There is a strong correlation between CO2 
levels and the Earth’s average temperature. 
fIgure 6. Temperature variation from present-day values (blue), 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration (green), and dust (red) 
based on data from ice cores retrieved at the Vostok drilling site in 
Antarctica. 
Retrieved from Randy M. Russell, https://eo.ucar.edu/staf/rrussell/climate/ 





      








         
  
 
   
  
      




















     
  















Given that the correlation is real and not simply 
a fuke or coincidence—for the modern social
scientist, it is statistically signifcant—we must 
now determine whether t0 is the best explana-
tion of the correlation. We must compare it to
some rival explanations. Perhaps, as some skep-
tics have claimed, the direction of causation is
reversed: 
t1. Global temperature variations cause vary-
ing CO2 concentrations. 
Tis rival is probably a better account of the
historical data because many believe that we
see the changes in temperatures before we see
changes in CO2 level in the historical record. In
addition, before the advent of the Industrial
Revolution, it was hard to see what else could
initiate such large-scale changes in the CO2 
concentrations. 
It is likely that the temperature variations . . . drove
the CO2 variations, not the reverse. Tat might have
occurred, for example, when warmer temperatures
increased the rate of bacterial breakdown of plant
material, releasing CO2 to the atmosphere as it
warmed. Tis historical relationship does not, how-
ever, refute the modern relationship of human addi-
tions of CO2 to the atmosphere driving increases in
temperature.3 
Why, you may ask, doesn’t the “reverse cause”
rival, t1, refute the anthropogenic hypoth-
esis? Here comes the surprise possible causal
relationship between two things, A and B, that 
I promised earlier. 
[One] potential explanation for the observed warming
of the Earth is human activity. Tere are several rea-
sons to think that this can account for some portion of
the observed warming. We know that human activi-
ties have been increasing the concentration of CO2 
and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere for at 
least the past century or two. Measurements show the 
concentration of CO2 has increased about 30 percent 
over that time . . . while other greenhouse gases have 
increased by similar or larger amounts. Basic phys-
ics provides strong theoretical reasons to believe that 
such an increase in greenhouse gases should warm the 
Earth.4 
It now seems likely that the best explanation of 
the correlation is that the causal relationship
between CO2 and global warming actually points
in both directions; increased CO2 concentrations
cause increased temperatures, and simultane-
ously, increased temperatures cause increases
in CO2 concentrations. We probably have a kind 
of feedback loop. 
t2. Increased CO2 concentrations cause
increased temperatures, while increased
temperatures cause increases in CO2 
concentrations. 
In a way, of course, t2 does not really contra-
dict Gore’s original causal hypothesis in t0; it 
merely ofers more detail about the complicated 
causal relationship between CO2 and global tem-
peratures. So in the sense that we are using the 
term in the inference-to-the-best-explanation




   






























explanation. Gore himself is very careful in how
he articulates t0. 
It’s a complicated relationship, but the most impor-
tant part of it is this: When there is more CO2 in the 
atmosphere, the temperature increases because more 
heat from the Sun is trapped inside.5 
Causation and Explanation 
It’s hard to write a chapter on causal infer-
ences without noting that many philosophers
of science believe that the notion of causation
is the fundamental building block of any sort of 
explanation. 
According to the causal model of explanation, to
explain a phenomenon is simply to give information
about its causal history or, where the phenomenon
itself is a causal regularity, to explain it is to give
information about the mechanism linking cause to
efect.6 
We should expect to see causal reasoning deeply 
involved in all inferences to the best explanation. 
Recall poor Connie. She noticed a correlation 
between two events— her boyfriend’s extended 
absence and the lipstick stain on his collar
when he returned. Almost immediately there-
afer she observed a second correlation—the
all-too-obvious lipstick stain and Mary Jane’s
lipstick being a mess. Te heart and soul of Con-
nie’s inference regarding what happened is a
causal account of the lipstick stain as well as the 
causes of the absence and Mary Jane’s cosmetic 
disaster. Te simple A-caused-B or B-caused-A
accounts of the correlations all seem artifcial or
convoluted. 
t1. The extended absence caused the lipstick 
stain. 
t2. The lipstick stain caused the extended
absence. 
t3. The lipstick stain caused the Mary Jane’s 
lipstick to be all a mess. 
t4. Mary Jane’s lipstick being all a mess
caused the lipstick stain. 
But of course, Connie knew exactly what had
happened, there was a common cause of the
lipstick stain, the extended absence, and Mary
Jane’s messed up lipstick. 
CorrelatIons and Causes 
t0. Connie’s boyfriend had been smooching 
Mary Jane. The smooching caused the lip-
stick stain on his collar, as well as causing 
him to be gone for half an hour or more at 
the record hop and causing Mary Jane’s lip-
stick to get all messed up. 
Or consider Semmelweis’s predicament. He
recognized a correlation between his colleague’s
being cut while conducting an autopsy and his 
colleague dying with symptoms very similar to 
childbed fever. He was led to a straightforward 
causal explanation: 
t′ 0. The laceration introduced cadaveric
particles into his colleague’s bloodstream,
which then caused his colleague’s death. 
Almost simultaneously with this inference, he
noticed the key correlation between the high
death rate from childbed fever in the First 
Maternity Division and the fact that autopsies
were routinely conducted by the physicians and 













       
 






















And once again, the causal diagnosis was imme-














t″ 0. Cadaveric particles from the hands of
the physicians and medical students were
being introduced into the bodies of pregnant
women in the First Maternity Division dur-
ing childbirth and gynecological examina-
tions, and these particles were then causing 
the childbed fever. 
A Sad Story 
It’s late in the afernoon. Two young men in dif-
ferent cars are headed home. One is a thirty-year-
old professional who works for the state; we’ll
call him Tony. Te other has just graduated from 
high school and is planning to attend college the 
coming fall; we’ll call him Corey. Corey is driv-
ing well within the speed limit and approaches 
a stop sign. He comes to a full stop. Although 
he sees Tony’s car coming, Corey incorrectly
believes the intersection is a four-way stop, so
he feels safe proceeding through the intersec-
tion. Tony is also driving well within the speed 
limit and having no stop sign proceeds through 
the intersection. Te two cars collide at almost a 
perfect ninety- degree angle on their front ends. 
Corey is not hurt at all and leaves his car to check
on Tony, who initially reports that he is fne too. 
Corey and Tony exchange contact and insur-
ance information, and Corey heads home. Tony 
tries to drive home as well but discovers that 
the crumpled wheel well makes this impossible. 
Afer a long evening waiting for a tow truck,
Tony is fnally taken home by his fancée. 
Our story now focuses on Tony. A day or two
afer the accident, he is stif and sore and goes
to see a chiropractor he has seen before. Afer
hearing about the crash, the chiropractor diag-
noses Tony’s complaints as a back injury and
begins a treatment protocol based on this. His
symptoms start to improve, but over the next 
few months, pain in his hip and leg gradually
increase, and he consults his regular doctor. She 
suspects that Tony is sufering from some sort
of hip injury and even goes on to guess it might
be a labral tear. Afer an MRI and consulting an
orthopedic surgeon, the labral tear diagnosis
is confrmed. Afer months of more treatment 
with mixed success, Tony decides to have sur-
gery to repair the torn labrum. Tony almost dies
during surgery because of complications with
the anesthetic, but from an orthopedic per-
spective, the surgery seems to be a success. His
symptoms disappear, and he is virtually pain-
free. Afer just a few months, however, Tony’s
symptoms begin to reappear and new surgery
is planned. 
Tony decides to sue Corey for his expenses— 
almost $100,000—and for his pain and sufer-
ing, he asked for an additional $400,000. I was 
chosen to serve on the jury for this civil suit.
Although the story is indeed sad, sitting on this 
jury was something of a treat for me because I 
am a hopeless wannabe lawyer and because it 
gave me a chance to actually apply inference to 
the best explanation to a real-world case of legal 
evidence. 
Our jury was not asked to assign blame,
Corey had already admitted he was at fault for
the accident. Te plaintif, Tony, therefore, had 
already established Corey was, what lawyers
call, negligent, and Tony was almost certainly
going to get some damages. Te question was
what the amount of those damages should be.
 
 





































Te defendant’s attorney conceded that his cli-
ent was liable for some of Tony’s initial pain and 
sufering, that original trip to his chiroprac-
tor, and certainly the tow truck and body shop 
expenses. He argued vehemently, however, that 
Corey bore no responsibility, legally or morally, 
for extensive orthopedic surgery or the years of 
sufering that Tony had manifestly endured or
his diminished lifestyle as a result of the labral 
tear because the car accident was in no way
causally responsible for the injury. Tony’s whole 
case, of course, depended on the contrary asser-
tion that the crash had caused the labral tear and
that the ensuing three years of pain and psycho-
logical sufering were the direct result of Corey’s
negligent driving. 
Te basic evidence that got this civil suit 
going in the frst place was a classic inference
from a correlation—in the frst sense defned
above—to a cause. 
e1. Corey and Tony’s car were involved in a col-
lision, and shortly after (within three months),
Tony was diagnosed with a labral tear. 
t0. The collision caused the labral tear. 
We can imagine reverse cause, and common
cause, rival explanations: 
t1. The labral tear occurred three weeks
earlier while skiing. Tony could easily have 
avoided the accident by timely braking, but 
the loss of mobility from the hip injury pre-
vented him getting to the brake pedal on
time. Thus the tear caused the collision. 
t2. A loud crashing sound from a construc-
tion site nearby distracted Corey and led to 
his misreading of the stop signs. It also star-
tled Tony, and as he wrenched to see where 
the crash came from, he tore his labrum,
and because he was distracted, he was slow 
to apply the brakes. Thus the loud crashing 
sound caused both the labral tear and the
collision. 
Corey’s attorney wisely refrained from suggest-
ing accounts such as these and rested his case
on the null hypothesis rival explanation that 
something completely independent of the car
accident caused the hip injury. 
CorrelatIons and Causes 
t3. The collision did not cause the labral tear; 
something else was its cause. 
You may think that t3 is a pretty vague rival the-
ory, and indeed, it is. But it was probably a good
trial strategy for two reasons. One is the rules for
negligence suits. Te plaintif must “prove,” by
a “preponderance of evidence,” that the defen-
dant’s negligent action (remember, Corey had
already admitted that he was at fault for the
accident and thus legally negligent) caused
the fnancial and psychological loss that needs to
be compensated. Te defense need not, there-
fore, explain what did cause the injury but 
simply show that the generic rival is better (or
even just as good) as the plaintif ’s account. Te
second reason for keeping things vague is that
Corey’s lawyer could toss out hints as to what 
the outside cause of the tear might have been
without being committed to any of these theo-
ries being a better explanation. Te defense,
for example, made a big deal out of Tony’s own
admission that he had been a very avid skier for
most of his life and that the hospital records from
 
 





























      
 






Tony’s frst surgery showed that surgeon noted
a slight physiological abnormality in Tony’s hip.
Who knows if a lifetime of skiing caused the tear
or if Tony was genetically predisposed to develop
such a tear. 
Our jury had to decide between two causal














t0. The collision caused the labral tear. 
t3. The collision did not cause the labral tear; 
something else was its cause. 
We had before us some “direct” evidence—the
surgeon who testifed that labral tears almost
always came from traumatic forces such as ath-
letic injuries or car accidents and almost never 
from general wear and tear from an active life-
style such as Tony’s. Corey’s expert witness, also 
an orthopedic surgeon, testifed to exactly the
opposite. He told us that most common labral
tears came from insidious causes and go undi-
agnosed for several years. 
e6. Difering expert accounts of the etiology 
of labral tears 
chiropractor’s notes, the records from Tony’s
surgery, and the towing and body shop bills. Te
most important evidence, though, came from
expert witnesses who could tell us about crashes
of this sort, the causes of labral tears, and the like.
As you might suspect, the experts for the plaintif
difered quite a bit in their testimony from the
experts for the defense. 
e2. Records from Tony’s chiropractor, his
surgery, and the bills from the towing com-
pany and body shop 
e3. Difering expert accounts of the accident— 
Was it a T-bone or sideswipe?—and the forces
generated 
e4. Difering expert accounts of Tony’s chi-
ropractic history and his visits to his chiro-
practor following the accident 
e5. Difering expert accounts of how such an 
accident could cause a labral tear 
For me, and I believe for many of my fellow 
jurors, the key discrepancy in the expert tes-
timony concerned the etiology of labral tears.
Tony’s expert witness was a former orthopedic 
Te entire jury was told in no uncertain terms
by the judge that we were required to decide
the case solely on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented in the trial and that under no circum-
stances were we permitted to Google anything
concerned with the trial. I know that, except for
that clear instruction, I would have done a little
quick and dirty online research on labral tears.
When I did that afer the trial was over, I came to
the conclusion that the truth was sort of halfway
in between these two experts—labral tears ofen
result from traumatic injuries but also occur
from the slow degeneration of the hip. 
I hope you will remember from chapter 9,
accepting testimony, including the legal testi-
mony of expert witnesses, involves a two-step
inference to the best explanation. In our case,
the evidence would look something like the
following: 
e1. What was said in the testimony 
e2. Context—sworn testimony in a civil trial 
e3. Relevant biography—the professional
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t′ 0. The expert genuinely believes what he or
she said in the testimony. 
t″ 0. The expert believes what he or she said 
because what he or she said is true. 
I can only speak for myself, but I would be will-
ing to grant the absolute sincerity of every
expert we listened to; t′ 0 was always my best 
explanation of what each witness had to say.
Although I could imagine rival explanation
t′ 1— he or she said it because he or she was paid 
to say it— being the most obvious, I never really 
felt this was what was going on. 
We know as a matter of simple logic, how-
ever, that t″ 0 cannot be the best explanation of
what every expert testifed to, since they explic-
itly contradicted each other in several instances.
Labral tears can’t ofen be the result of insidious 
causes while at the same time almost never being 
the efect of them. For almost half of the expert 
witnesses, their sincere beliefs had to be mis-
taken. Te key question, of course, was, Who
was right and who was wrong? 
CorrelatIons and Causes 
exerCIses 
1. When two events, A and B, are correlated (in time and space or statistically), what are the
fve possible causal relationships between A and B (one of these relationships is actually
not a causal one in the strict sense)?
2. Use all the steps in the IBE recipe to assess the quality of evidence in the following causal
argument.
Obviously Sarah’s failure to attend the lectures caused her poor philosophy grade. She
has had regular absences for the past month or so, and her grade has gone down from a
B+ to a C˗ during that time period.
QuIz twelVe 
Given what you know from the following online posting from Oregon Public Broadcasting, use
all the steps in the IBE recipe to assess the quality of evidence for the claim that “Ms. Silva’s 
lung cancer was proximately and directly caused and its growth promoted by her exposures to
the above contaminants from the Bullseye facility.” 
The complete article is available online at “Terminal Cancer Patient Sues Bullseye Glass 
in Portland.” (https://www.opb.org/news/series/portland-oregon-air-pollution-glass/oregon
-portland -bullseye -glass -terminal -cancer -patient -sues/)7 
3 Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson, Te Sci-Notes 
ence and Politics of Global Climate Change (Cambridge: 
1 Nate Silver, Te Signal and the Noise (New York: Pen- Cambridge University Press, 2007), 59. 
guin, 2012), 187. 4 Dessler and Parson, Global Climate Change, 73. 
2 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 6th ed. (1976), s.v. 5 Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth (Emmaus: Rodale,
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6 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1991), 32. 
7 Ryan Haas, “Terminal Cancer Patient Sues Bullseye 
Glass in Portland,” OPB, June 15, 2016, https://www 
.opb.org/news/series/portland-oregon-air-pollution
-glass/oregon-portland-bullseye-glass-terminal























   
  
 
   
   
     
 
  
     
 
        
     
Te death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, 
and mistake. . . . Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the
desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscer-
ated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death 
penalty experiment has failed. 
— JustIce BlacKmun, callIns v. collIns1 
Arguments from Pure Principle: 
For and against the Death Penalty 
Americans are passionately divided about capi-
tal punishment. About 55 percent say that they 
are in favor of the death penalty, while about 
41 percent are opposed.2 Te argument that one 
most ofen hears in its support appeals to basic 
principles of justice. Te kinds of crimes that 
warrant death at the hands of the state are so
brutal, violent, and just plain evil that it is only 
reasonable that murders would pay the ultimate
price. Death penalty abolitionists appeal to con-
trary intuitions of basic principle. Tey argue
that the death penalty itself is brutal, violent,
and just plain evil. Yes, murder is the most seri-
ous crime and deserves the most serious crimi-
nal punishment. But opponents believe that at 
this stage of society’s development, life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole is an
incredibly serious form of punishment and to
go any further crosses a moral line and degrades 
the basic moral foundations of our society. I am 
far from neutral on this debate. As long as I
can remember having strong moral or political 
stances regarding anything, I have been a pas-
sionate opponent of the death penalty. 
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I would be happy and indeed proud to lay out 
for you my reasons for thinking capital pun-
ishment is morally wrong, but that is not my
intention in this chapter. I will eschew my nor-
mative case against the death penalty for three 
reasons. One is simple pedagogy. Tis is a book 
about practical epistemology and evidence eval-
uation, not contemporary moral controversies. 
Te second is that I want to explore the death 
penalty, not as a moral controversy, but as a con-
stitutional issue. One where many of the skills 
we have been discussing in the last few chap-
ters are directly relevant. Perhaps my main rea-
son for refraining from resting my abolitionist 
case on basic principles of justice, decency, and 
integrity, however, is that I have become con-
vinced that it would not work. Oh, sure, those
of you who already agree with me will applaud 
my insight, rhetorical skill, and moral vision.
But those of you who are in favor of capital
punishment are very unlikely to be won over.
Te same goes in reverse. Arguments appealing 
to retributive justice resonate well with death 
penalty advocates but carry very little persua-
sive power with those of us who are opposed on 
moral grounds. 
I want to rest my case against the death
penalty on a strategy that I have taken from
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, what 
I have called an “argument from contingent 
realities.” Blackmun argues that the US Con-
stitution may very well permit the use of the
death penalty in the abstract, but given certain
contingent facts about contemporary society,
its current application violates the Constitu-
tion. Blackmun’s concern, as we shall see, is
that certain facts about the American crimi-
nal justice system almost guarantee that it 
will be administered in such a way that it is
infected with “arbitrariness, discrimination,
caprice, and mistake.” He places particular
emphasis on the notions of arbitrariness and
caprice—the fact that the very similar kinds
of murders result in wildly diferent crimi-
nal sentences. We see very violent multiple
murders not even prosecuted as death penalty
cases, think of the O.  J. Simpson case, while
John Spenkelink, claiming sexual assault and
self-defense and ofered a plea bargain of a jail
sentence on a second-degree murder charge,
was executed. I think Blackmun was abso-
lutely right that we continue to see arbitrary
and capricious administration in capital cases.
But I want to extend his argument to focus on
other contingent realities. I will argue that
the statistics show that a disproportionate
number of defendants, and victims, in capital
cases are poor and that they are members of
racial minorities. 
Constitutional Texts 
Te US Constitution is justly heralded as a writ-
ten document. Te rules of the game of national
government and the rights of the citizens are
laid out in a beautiful legal text. Scholars, edi-
torial writers, and Supreme Court justices
ofen fnd themselves debating what this text
means and usually what it means in a specifc
and controversial context. In these cases, the
simple model from chapter 10 immediately
encounters predictable problems. Yes, there
is a written text, but this text is maddeningly
vague, ambiguous, and unclear, at precisely
those places where the scholarly, political, or
legal debates are occurring in the frst place.
  










      
 




































What does it mean to talk of “due process of
law,” “equal protection of the law,” “cruel and
unusual punishments,” or “respecting an estab-
lishment of religion”? And yes, this text had an
author, but in this case, that author was a col-
lective composed of the “founders,” including,
but not limited to, those at the Constitutional
Convention (surely Jeferson counts) as well as
those who authored its amendments. And what 
of those responsible for voting each time rati-
fcation was required? So what do we do about 
cases where the authors disagreed? Teir words
were at times (to say the least) unclear, they
are all dead now, we’re not really sure who to
count or not in the collective, and there must 
have been cases where they disagreed with one
another (think of slavery). 
Tis doesn’t, at least in my mind, mean that 
the model of textual interpretation we devel-
oped earlier must be abandoned for the Consti-
tution. But it does mean the model is far from
simple and will likely result in many controver-
sial interpretations for even the fairest and most 
conscientious user. 
Precedent 
It’s easy enough to imagine a system where
every time an issue comes before a judge, she
would simply exercise her professional knowl-
edge and render the opinion that she believed
is correct. We are lucky, though, that that is not 
our system. Consider what it would be like to
never really have an idea about how a tricky
case in torts or contracts would be decided.
How could you conduct business or decide on
what kind of insurance to have? Afer all, in our
imagined system, each case would be decided
afresh and depend on that judge’s view of the
law and justice. 
Te English and American common law sys-
tem puts a high premium on previous decisions
by other courts and judges. Te doctrine of prec-
edent says the earlier decisions help defne what 
the current state of the law is. Tere are many
complications with this simple model. For one
thing, there is a hierarchy of courts in our state
and federal system. And precedent is only bind-
ing on lower courts following the decisions of
higher courts. In addition, precedent only makes
sense for “similar” kinds of cases for which the
same articulated “principles” apply. Obviously,
there’s a good deal of room for disagreement
about all this. Finally, courts, at least at the same
or higher level, can overturn precedent on the
grounds that the earlier court made a mistake or
that circumstances had so radically changed that 
the earlier principles no make sense. 
Now there is no higher court than our
Supreme Court, but they do make it a practice
to honor earlier Supreme Court precedent. Tis
usually happens when they choose to not even
hear a case because it is settled constitutional
law. But even in those cases they do decide to
hear, there is, and I believe there should be, great 
deference to earlier rulings. Tere are occa-
sions, however, where the Court will, and again
I believe should, explicitly overturn an earlier
decision. 
Inference to the Best 
Constitutional Interpretation 
Te constitutional text, and what we know of its 
authors, provides a good deal of data that needs 
to be explained. 
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e1. The US Constitution says . . . 
e2. This text has many authors. 
e3. We know or can infer many things about 
the concrete attitudes and beliefs of these
authors. 
e4. We know many things about the abstract 
meanings of many important constitutional 
principles that are articulated in the text. 
e5. There is often relevant constitutional














Te Supreme Court does not have the luxury of
sitting around and asking themselves what does 
the Constitution mean? Teir business is mainly 
deciding whether a particular happening—
a decision in a lower court, an action on the part 
of a legal ofcial, or generally what they call a 
state action— ofends a specifc part of the Con-
stitution. So in addition to all the textual data,
there is also data about the occurrence that is
claimed to be unconstitutional. 
e6. It has been alleged that a particular state 
action violates the guarantees to citizens
within the Constitution. 
So what’s the best explanation of all this?
Tose of you who know anything about our
Supreme Court no doubt are well aware of this, 
but it should be acknowledged up front. Te best 
interpretation will usually be very controversial
for everyday citizens, for scholars and pundits, 
and also for the justices themselves. Further-
more, there seems to be a pretty clear correla-
tion between how many of the justices interpret 
the Constitution and who those justices are as
people—their politics and their legal philoso-
phy. Some become very cynical about all this
and see constitutional law as simply one more
political game. I prefer the view that constitu-
tional issues are incredibly difcult and that it 
is inevitable not only that they be intrinsically
controversial but that equally smart and dedi-
cated professionals, as virtually every justice is 
and has been, can hardly avoid bringing their
backgrounds and beliefs into the process. 
With all that then, we can simplify the
explanatory candidates to two: 
tc. The state action does not violate the
Constitution— it is constitutional. 
tuc. The state action does violate the
Constitution— it is unconstitutional. 
Some Key Constitutional Text 
Te frst sort of evidence that Blackmun needs
in his constitutional case against the death pen-
alty is the constitutional language itself. 
e1. From the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments: “[No person shall be] deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” 
e2. From the Eighth Amendment: “Cruel and 
unusual punishment [shall not be] inficted.” 
e3. From the Fourteenth Amendment: “[No
State shall] deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
Tis language, as it stands, is problematic to
Justice Blackmun’s case against the death pen-
alty for two reasons. Te frst, of course, is that 
the language of due process, equal protection,
and cruel and unusual punishment is abstract, 



















































words came to be in the Constitution, a funda-
mentally explanatory question, is the subject of 
deep historical and jurisprudential debate. Te 
interpretive question of what they mean is even
more controversial. Te second problem, though,
is more immediate. Te language of the Fifh and
Fourteenth Amendments strongly suggests that 
persons may be deprived of life by the state with-
out violating their constitutional rights. 
To address this second problem, Blackmun
should appeal to a useful interpretive distinction
frst introduced by Ronald Dworkin.3 Dworkin
notes that the venerable methodology of autho-
rial or original intent is ambiguous. Consider
the following: You have been elected as the very
frst student member of the Faculty Personnel
Committee. Tis is a huge tribute but also a huge
responsibility. Your vote will help determine who
is promoted, granted tenure, and, in some sad
cases, fred. You do me the great honor of schedul-
ing a meeting with me and asking my advice about 
how these personnel decisions should be made.
I ask you to give me the weekend to collect my
thoughts and we can discuss it at the beginning of 
the week. Bright and early next Monday, you show
up at my ofce door, and it’s time for me to put up
or shut up. Suppose my advice goes as follows. 
Personnel decisions should always be made in the
best interest of the university and its students.
Since we are primarily a teaching institution,
being a frst-rate classroom instructor is an abso-
lute precondition for tenure or promotion. We also
value scholarship, so being engaged in active and
productive research is also required. 
Here’s the problem. My little speech is a text,
and I am its author. According to authorial intent 
models, the words mean what I am trying to com-
municate. We both know that Professor Green is
up for tenure. Being indiscrete and more than
a tad unprofessional, I have let some of my stu-
dents know that I think Green should not be
granted tenure. I believe he enjoys a great reputa-
tion as a teacher because he is showy and an easy
grader. I don’t believe the students learn much in
his classes at all. I also think his research is a joke.
He’s published several articles—that’s true—but 
mainly in clubby journals edited by like-minded
colleagues. So since you ask my advice about ten-
ure, and you know my thoughts about the con-
crete case of Green, if you respect my advice, you
should vote against Professor Green. Right? 
Well, maybe not. My text didn’t talk about 
Green at all. It appealed to abstract notions
like “best interest of the university and its stu-
dents,” “being a frst-rate classroom instructor,”
and “being engaged in active and productive
research.” You’ve looked at Green’s record. You 
think the teaching evaluations are very impres-
sive, and he really has more publications than
I do. You think it’s defnitely in the best inter-
est of the institution to tenure one of its bright-
est young stars. Dworkin argues that words can 
have both an abstract intention and a concrete
intention.4 You might attempt to honor my advice
by voting along the lines of my concrete inten-
tion regarding Green. But Dworkin argues, and 
I certainly agree, that you do more honor to my 
advice when you focus on the abstract consid-
erations such as best interest, frst- rate teacher, 
and active and productive research. Of course, to
do that honestly, it becomes your responsibility 
to assess Green against these abstract standards.
Te same distinction applies to the language in 
the Fifh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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e4. The authors of the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments concretely intended
that capital punishment did not violate the 
Constitution. 
e5. The authors of the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments abstractly intended that
the entire criminal justice system, including
capital punishment, adhere to the theoretical
standards of avoiding cruel and unusual pun-
ishments and be administered with due pro-
cess of law and equal protection of the law. 
Te past almost ffy years are replete with 
important constitutional precedents on the
death penalty. In these fve decades, we have
gone from a period in our history where, though 
constitutional and with defendants being sen-
tenced to death, virtually no one was being exe-
cuted (1968–1972); where capital punishment as
it was then administered was ruled to be uncon-
stitutional (1972–1976); where newer laws for
the administration of capital punishment were
deemed to be constitutional (1976); where there
was a pretty steady ascendance in executions
(1981–1999) to a recent decline in executions
(2000–2018). Here are some of the highlights
of this tumultuous constitutional history. 
Some Key Constitutional Precedent 
e6. mCgautha V. CalIfornIa 
402 u.s. 183 (1971) 
Te constitutional issues are succinctly stated in
the case syllabus. 
Petitioner in No. 203 was convicted of frst-degree
murder in California, and was sentenced to death. Te
penalty was lef to the jury’s absolute discretion, and 
punishment was determined in a separate proceeding 
following the trial on the issue of guilt. Petitioner in 
No. 204 was convicted of frst-degree murder, and was
sentenced to death in Ohio, where the jury, which also 
had absolute penalty discretion, determined guilt and
penalty afer a single trial and in a single verdict. Cer-
tiorari was granted to consider whether petitioners’
rights were infringed by permitting the death penalty 
without standards to govern its imposition, and in
No. 204, to consider the constitutionality of a single
guilt and punishment proceeding. 
Te defendant’s attorneys argued that such sys-
tems inevitably resulted in arbitrary and capri-
cious administration of the death penalty. Justice
Brennan in an unchallenged characterization
of the then-common standards for capital sen-
tences characterized the situation as follows: 
Capital sentencing procedures . . . are purposely con-
structed to allow the maximum possible variation
from one case to the next, and provide no mechanism 
to prevent that consciously maximized variation from
refecting merely random or arbitrary choice. [Justice 
Brennan, dissenting.] 
In spite of this, however, Justice Harlan, writing 
for the Court, ruled that 
petitioners contend that to leave the jury completely 
at large to impose or withhold the death penalty as it 
sees ft is fundamentally lawless, and therefore vio-
lates the basic command of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that no State shall deprive a person of his life
without due process of law. Despite the undeniable
surface appeal of the proposition, we conclude that
the courts below correctly rejected it. 
















   
  




























e7. furman V. georgIa 408 u.s. 238 (1972) 
Te case of Furman v. Georgia was unusual in
many respects. It initiated the one and only time 
in our nation’s history when the death penalty
was determined to be unconstitutional. It was
an exceedingly close (5 to 4) ruling, with the fve
justices in the majority so at odds about why cap-
ital punishment was cruel and unusual punish-
ment that the Court issued a rare pur curium (by
the court) instead of the standard opinion of the 
Court authored by one or more of the justices.
Still, most legal analysts see the case as raising 
the same issues as McGautha, only phrased as
an Eighth Amendment concern rather than a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process one. Justice
Stewart’s reasoning is the most ofen seen as the 
relevant precedent. 
Tese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and 
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible 
as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously . . . 
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Broth-
ers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be dis-
cerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis
of race.  .  .  . But racial discrimination has not been
proved, and I put it to one side. I simply conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot toler-
ate the infiction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wan-
tonly and so freakishly imposed. 
e8. gregg V. georgIa 428 u.s. 153 (1976) 
Te Gregg v. Georgia case did three things, two
of which were to the dismay of death penalty
abolitionists like your author. Perhaps most sig-
nifcantly, it ruled that capital punishment was
not, per se, cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. It also ruled that new 
sentencing procedures initiated afer Furman
had successfully eliminated the problem of arbi-
trary and capricious administration of the death
penalty in Georgia. But, and this is crucial to
my argument, it reinforced the basic fnding of 
Furman (in many respects, this is unsurprising,
since the opinion was written by Justice Stew-
art who was quoted previously). Justice Stewart 
quotes both himself and Justice White. 
While Furman did not hold that the infiction of the 
death penalty per se violates the Constitution’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that 
the penalty of death is diferent in kind from any other
punishment imposed under our system of criminal
justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death pen-
alty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under 
sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk 
that it would be inficted in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner. MR. JUSTICE WHITE concluded that
“the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency 
even for the most atrocious crimes and  .  .  . there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which 
it is not.” .  .  . Indeed, the death sentences examined
by the Court in Furman were “cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of [capi-
tal crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the
petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death has in fact been imposed. . . . Te Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infiction
of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit 
CaPItal PunIshm










   
 
  
   
 
 









   







        
 
         
 
 














this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freak-
124 ishly imposed.” 
e9. mCCleskey V. kemP 481 u.s. 279 (1987) 
Warren McCleskey was a young black man who 
murdered a white police ofcer in the course of 
an armed robbery. At his appeal, evidence was
introduced that seemed to show that “the Geor-
gia capital sentencing process [was] admin-
istered in a racially discriminatory manner in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.” Justice
Powell sees the racial disparities in Georgia’s
death sentences (since the new law following 
Furman) as falling exclusively under the Equal
Protection Clause. He then fnds it relatively
easy to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to capital punishment. 
Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a
defendant who alleges an equal protection violation
has the burden of proving “the existence of purposeful 
discrimination.” Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550
(1967). A corollary to this principle is that a criminal 
defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimi-
nation “had a discriminatory efect” on him. Wayte 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). Tus, to
prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCles-
key must prove that the decision makers in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose. He ofers no evi-
dence specifc to his own case that would support an 
inference that racial considerations played a part in
his sentence. 
We shall have occasion to look at the data the 
Court was considering later in this chapter, but 
notice at this point how diferently this case was 
decided compared to Furman. In McGautha, the 
Court had ruled that potentially arbitrary and
capricious sentences did not, in and of them-
selves, constitute a denial of due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but in Furman, they
ruled that these same worries about procedural 
unfairness did constitute a kind of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment. One might have thought, therefore, that
even if equal protection precedent required
purposeful and particularized discrimination,
the Court could have found that discriminatory 
sentencing is even worse than arbitrary and
capricious sentencing and therefore counted as 
a very serious form of procedural cruelty under 
the Eighth Amendment. Tis was not their rea-
soning, though. And it’s hard for this author not 
to conclude that the real reason had to do with 
Justice Powell’s recognition that racial prejudice 
infects all the criminal justice system. 
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion,
[p315] throws into serious question the principles
that underlie our entire criminal justice system. Te
Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to
capital punishment, but applies to all penalties. Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289– 290 (1983); see Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 293 (1980) (POWELL, J., dis-
senting). Tus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that 
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sen-
tencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar 
claims as to other types of penalty. 
e10. CallIns V. CollIns 
no. 93– 7054 (1994) 
I want to conclude this lengthy, and far from
neutral, review of death penalty jurisprudence 
with one fnal case. Justice Blackmun, a moral
opponent of capital punishment but an early






















     
 











supporter of its constitutionality, fnally decided
at the very end of his career that no amount of
procedural tinkering could ever elevate capital 
sentences to the high standards imposed by the 
Eighth Amendment. 
It is virtually self evident to me now that no combi-
nation of procedural rules or substantive regulations 
ever can save the death penalty from its inherent con-
stitutional defciencies. Te basic question— does the 
system accurately and consistently determine which
defendants “deserve” to die?— cannot be answered in 
the afrmative. 
His eloquent and impassioned dissent from the 
Court’s denial of certiorari is doomed to be just
a footnote in the history of capital punishment. 
But he does state a succinct and clear expla-
nation of the Constitution’s language and the
Court’s precedent. 
t0. The death penalty must be imposed fairly
and with reasonable consistency or not at all. 
I am claiming that t0 is the best explanation of 
the abstract intentions of the authors of the Bill 
of Rights, the authors of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the emerging body of constitutional 
law developed over the past two hundred years. 
Tose of you who disagree with me— and I cer-
tainly realize that many of you will—have an
obligation to articulate an interpretive theory
you believe better explains all this. It is a chal-
lenge that I invite you to undertake. I remain
hopeful once you have tried to fnd a better rival,
the controversial nature of the constitutional
text with which we have been dealing. 
Statistics and the Death Penalty 
I want now to continue with my case against
the death penalty by arguing that both fairness 
and reasonable consistency are demonstrably
absent. My argument to this efect will depend 
on the analysis of statistical evidence. 
I take it that legal historians would agree
with me that capital punishment has, in the
past, been applied in a manner that was clearly 
discriminatory. We would like to think, how-
ever, that we have made some progress in the
area of racial justice. Tat is why the following 
data are so disappointing. 
Professor Baldus examined more than 2,400 
homicide cases in the state of Georgia during the
period between 1974 and 1979. Te dates are sig-
nifcant because the Georgia murder stature had
been rewritten afer Furman v. Georgia in order 
that death sentences not be administered in a
“random and capricious manner.” Here’s a brief
summary of what Professor Baldus discovered: 
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Black/white 50 of 223 22% 
White/white 58 of 748 8% 
Black/black 18 of 1443 1% 
whIte/BlacK 
Total by victim 2 of 60 3% 
White 108 of 981 11% 
Black 20 of 1503 1% 
you will come to agree with me that t0 is the
most plausible. Unfortunately, we may end up Te original Baldus study controlled for more







































       
 























the defendant’s record and the severity of the
crime. When all the data were considered,
the study concluded that murderers of white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive the
death penalty. Justice Brennan expressed this
correlation in characteristically vivid language. 
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubt-
less asked his lawyer whether the jury was likely to
sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question
would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details
of the crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal record
were more important than the fact that his victim
was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound
to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with kill-
ing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to
be sentenced to die as defendants charged with kill
blacks.5 
I have discussed the McCleskey case with hun-
dreds of students in the last several years. Many 
simply refuse to accept the following data. 
e11. When controlled for over two hundred
non- racial variables such as the defendant’s 
record and the severity of the crime, the
Baldus study concluded that murderers of
white victims were 4.3 times as likely to
receive the death penalty. 
It is, of course, true that life in the inner city is
diferent from life in the suburbs and that black
culture is in many ways diferent from white
culture. Te shocking fgure that more than
four times as many murderers of whites receive
the death penalty takes all that into account.
I know some of you will continue to believe
that “statistics always lie.” But the very same
techniques that tell us that cigarette smoking
causes cancer or that so-and-so will win next 
month’s election tell us that the connection
between race and the death penalty in Georgia
is for real. Tus the question before us is pro-
ducing an explanation of why this correlation
holds. Tere is no big mystery about the reason
for this disparity. Te original study contained
the crucial data. 
e12. District attorneys ask for a capital sen-
tence in 70 percent of the cases involving a 
black defendant and a white victim. When
the victim is black and the defendant is
white, however, a mere 19 percent are even 
prosecuted as capital cases. 
In one sense, the Baldus study’s database is not 
a sample at all but an analysis of the entire popu-
lation of homicides in Georgia from the time the 
state rewrote its aggravated murder statute in
response to Furman v. Georgia to the conclusion 
of the study in 1979. For the purposes of the Gregg
trial, this was ideal, since it was the laws and
behavior of legal ofcials in Georgia that were
at issue. But Justice Blackmun, and certainly
yours truly, believe that capital punishment,
in general, is discriminatory. We can treat the
Baldus study as telling us something about
the death penalty in this country. 
t′ 0. Capital punishment in the United States 
is administered in a racially discriminatory 
manner. 
Such an explanation of the data in the Baldus
study immediately invites two rival explanations














   
 
        
       
 



















        





t′ 1. All the data comes from a state in the
Deep South where there is a long history of 
racial discrimination. 
t′ 2. All the data comes from the late 1970s,
racial discrimination has greatly dissipated 
in the ensuing two generations. 
I concede that these are legitimate counter-
arguments, but I still believe that t′ 0 is the best 
explanation. It’s true that gathering all one’s
data from a single state or region of the coun-
try is a less-than-ideal polling technique, but 
sometimes one has to take the data that are
available. Remember that medical researchers
took the Framingham data very seriously, even 
though all of it came from the Northeast. As for 
the claim that attitudes about race have greatly 
improved since the latter half of the 1970s, I am 
of two minds. I would like to believe that your
generation, and your parent’s, is less racist than 
those who came of age in the ’40s, ’50s, ’60s, and
early ’70s. I think there is some evidence for this.
But at the same time, one need only turn on the 
TV or radio and be aware of what is going on
in our country right now to see that whatever
improvements we see with respect to race, we
still have a hell of a long way to go. 
My main reason for continuing to support t′ 0, 
however, is that the Baldus study is not all the
data that is available. In 1990, the United States 
General Accounting Ofce released a report,
“Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates
a Pattern of Racial Disparities,” that reviewed
research from across the entire county. Here is 
their summary of their fndings. 
Our synthesis of the 28 studies shows a pattern of
evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, 
sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty afer 
the Furman decision. 
In 82 percent of the studies, race of the victim was
found to infuence the likelihood of being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those
who murdered whites were found to be more likely to
be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks.
Tis fnding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques.6 
A Causal Explanation of the Correlation 
In Furman, the Supreme Court was concerned
with the arbitrary and capricious actions of trial
judges and particularly juries. It appears now,
however, that the judgments, both arbitrary and
prejudicial, of other legal ofcials are even more
problematic. An obvious explanation of the Bal-
dus data is the following. 
CaPItal PunIshm
ent and the ConstItutIon 
t″ 0. The race of the murder victim causally 
infuences the decision whether to seek the 
death penalty. 
Given my earlier interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment, this account of the murder statis-
tics in Georgia seems to demand that the Supreme
Court declare capital punishment, at least in the 
state of Georgia, to be unconstitutional. 
As I hope by this point you are all already
thinking, the crucial question is whether t0 is 
really the best explanation. I, personally, cannot 
see any way that this could be a case of “reverse 
causation.” Tus I reject any possibility that the 
following needs to be considered at all: 
t″ 1. The decision to seek the death penalty




















      
 
        













I, also, fnd it pretty hard to explain the Bal-
dus study results as simply a “statistical fuke.” 
Such things are always possible, but modern
statistical analysis guarantees us that they
are exceedingly unlikely. Consequently, the















t″ 2. It’s just a coincidence that victims’
race “correlated” with capital sentences in
Georgia. 
Te only serious competitor I can imagine,
therefore, is that there is some unnoticed “com-
mon cause” that is independently responsible
for both the race of the homicide victims and
the fact that their murderers received the sen-
tences they did. Te Baldus team tried to think
of some of the possible factors in their original
evaluation of the data. Tat’s what they were up 
to when they performed the statistical tests that 
“controlled for over two hundred nonracial vari-
ables.” Even when they did this, it turned out 
that murderers of white victims were 4.3 times
as likely to receive death sentences. Maybe
something else is responsible for the correla-
tion, but we have yet to see what it is. Hence I
am willing to take the following seriously as a 
potential rival explanation. 
t″ 3. Some unidentifed nonracial factor is
responsible for the correlation of victim race
and death sentences. 
Since we have yet to even think of what this
nonracial factor might be, I admit its possibility 
but rank it signifcantly lower than the causal
explanation in t″ 0. 
Some Other Contingent Realities 
My argument, so far, has depended on two con-
tingent realities, and so, even if the Constitu-
tion permits capital punishment in the abstract, 
given the world we live in, the death penalty still
remains arbitrary and capricious and, in at least 
some cases, racially prejudicial and is therefore 
unconstitutional. But there are at least two other
contingent realities that make capital punish-
ment even more constitutionally problematic. 
I believe passionately that the Baldus study,
and the others surveyed in the Government 
Accountability Ofce (GAO) report, tells us that 
racial prejudice plays a huge causal role in who 
receives the death penalty and who is executed. 
But I think that there may be other causal fac-
tors at work as well. Our nation does not gather 
data regarding socioeconomic class; we seem
to believe that we are a “classless” society. Were 
such data readily available, I am quite certain
it would show an even stronger correlation
between poverty and the death penalty than the 
one we saw in the Baldus study. I am convinced 
that poor people are treated by the criminal jus-
tice system as second- class murder victims, just 
as we have seen minorities are. But I am also
convinced that the death penalty is also a “poor 
man’s punishment.”7 Tose with the fnancial
resources to hire frst-class criminal lawyers,
and make the state’s murder trial very expen-
sive, have a much greater chance of having their 
charges plea bargained down to a noncapital
sentence. 
Te last contingent reality I want to mention 
seems to be actually changing some people’s
minds as an argument against the death penalty 
and changing the minds of some public ofcials 


















      
 








several cases where defendants are potentially us believe that demonstrably innocent prisoners
liable for capital charges, and in some cases, have actually been executed.9 Te mere possibil-
defendants charged and convicted in capital tri- ity that innocent defendants might be executed 
als have subsequently been shown to be innocent is certainly a worry that the current criminal
for the crime they were charged with.8 Some of justice system invites. 
exerCIses 
1. What do you think is the strongest argument, moral or constitutional, in favor of the death
penalty?
2. What do you think is the strongest argument, moral or constitutional, against the death
penalty?
3. Why do so many studies show a consistent correlation between race, either of the victim
or of the defendant, and capital sentences?
CaPItal PunIshm
ent and the ConstItutIon QuIz thIrteen 
In this chapter, I make a sustained argument that capital punishment, as it is now admin-
istered in our country, violates the Constitution. My argument depends on evidence for an 
interpretation of the Constitution, on evidence provided in a detailed statistical analysis of 
the death penalty (the Baldus study), and on a causal explanation of that statistical data. Your
task is to assess the quality of the evidence that I marshal in defense of my thesis. You will 
need to utilize the tools of inference to the best explanation for an assessment of my evidence
for the constitutional interpretation as well as the inference from a sample to a population 
and the inference from a correlation to a cause. 
Notes 
1 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). Justice Black-
mun, dissenting. 
2 Death Penalty Information Center, “Public Opinion
about the Death Penalty,” https://deathpenaltyinfo
.org/public -opinion -about -death -penalty. 
3 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 48– 55. 
4 Dworkin, 48– 55. 
5 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Justice Bren-
nan, dissenting. 
6 US General Accounting Ofce, Death Penalty Sentenc-
ing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities
(Washington, DC: General Accounting Ofce, 1990),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212180.pdf. 
7 See, for example, J. Johnson and C. Johnson “Poverty 
and the Death Penalty,” Journal of Economic Issues 35 
(2001): 1– 7; and S. Bright, “Counsel for the Poor: Te 
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer,” Yale Law Journal 103, no.  7 (1994):
1835– 83. 
8 See Michael Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau, and Con-
stance Putnam, In Spite of Innocence (Boston: North-
eastern University Press, 1992). 
9 See John C. Tucker, May God Have Mercy (New York: 



























Examining law as narrative and rhetoric can mean many diferent things: exam-
ining the relation between stories and legal arguments and theories; analyzing 
the diferent ways that judges, lawyers, and litigants construct, shape, and use 
stories; evaluating why certain stories are problematic at trials; or analyzing the 
rhetoric of judicial opinions, to mention just a few particulars. But as a matter 
of general outlook, treating law as narrative and rhetoric means looking at fact 
more than rules, forms as much as substance, the language used as much as the 
idea expressed (indeed, the language used is seen as part of the idea expressed). 
— paul GewIrtz1 
Legal Storytelling 
I am much taken these days with a trend in legal 
scholarship that I believe has direct relevance
to the themes we are developing in this book.
We have been concerned with notions of good
reasoning and good evidence. Legal academ-
ics spend a good deal of time analyzing these
concepts in the very specifc context of the law. 
Consider, for example, the defnition of legal
reasoning put forward by Lief Carter: 
In a nutshell, legal reasoning describes how efec-
tively an opinion’s blend of case facts, prior law, social 
background facts, and moral values create a legal out-
come that makes some plausible sense of the moral
and empirical world we know.2 
Tis defnition of legal reasoning seems overly
narrow. Certainly, understanding how to
unpack and evaluate appellate court opinions
is an import legal skill and deserving of care-
ful scholarly attention (we did a bit of this in
analyzing Justice Blackmun’s understanding
of the death penalty and the Constitution). But 
as Carter certainly knows, appellate court judges
















    
 
   
  
  

























        


















reason, as do their audiences—juries. Trial court 
judges reason. And academic lawyers, and a host 
of other legal scholars, reason. And sadly, not all 
legal reasoning counts as good legal reasoning. 
What is needed is something like a logic of legal 
reasoning. A surprising humanistic partner-
ship of philosophy, particularly the philosophy 
of science, as well as literary theory, particu-
larly narratology, ofers a promising outline of
just such a logic of legal reasoning. As you might 
have guessed, I believe that inference to the best 
explanation (IBE) forms the foundation of such 
a legal logic. 
One view of legal storytelling sees it candidly
as a method for presenting an argument. 
Te goal of storytelling in law is to persuade an ofcial
decision maker that one’s story is true, to win the case,
and thus invoke the coercive force of the state on one’s 
behalf.3 
And many academic lawyers explicitly endorse 
IBE as the internal logic of the arguments that 
lawyers produce at trial. 
Te process of inference to the best explanation itself
best explains both the macro-structure of proof at
trial and the microlevel issues regarding the value
of particular items of evidence. . . . Te probability-
based accounts, rather than being an alternative, are 
parasitic on the more fundamental explanation-based
considerations.4 
Tis nicely captures my portrayal of the trial
between Tony and Corey, and we will use IBE
and legal narrative as a way of looking at a cou-
ple more murder trials directly. 
As much as I admire the storytelling move-
ment in the law, many of its most strident cham-
pions endorse a view of legal narrative that I fnd
deeply problematic. Consider the following very
useful summary paragraph by two thoughtful
and sympathetic critics. 
Many advocates of storytelling explicitly contrast
rational argument and the more directly emotive
power of stories. As Gerald Lopez tells us, “Stories
and storytelling de-emphasize the logical and resur-
rect the emotive and intuitive.” Te “epistemological
claim” of feminist narratives, according to Kathryn
Abrams, is that there are ways of knowing other than
“scientifc rationality.” Radical feminist scholars—
especially those using narrative as a methodology—
thus reject the linearity, abstraction, and scientifc
objectivity of rational argument. Mari Matsuda
similarly recommends noncognitive ways to know
the good.5 
I contend that these views are fundamentally
mistaken. Now I certainly concede that stories
can, and ofen do, reach intended audiences in
ways that cold, structured syllogisms may not.
I also grant that human emotion plays a signif-
cant role in our ability to understand and suc-
cessfully navigate the physical and social world.
But none of this shows that there is not an under-
lying logic to successful storytelling. Indeed,
I will be arguing that this logic has remark-
ably close connections to “scientifc rational-
ity,” and rather than being “noncognitive,” it 
is (while not exactly demonstrating “linearity,
abstraction, and scientifc objectivity”) highly
structured and promises in many cases, if not 
objectivity, at least reliable intersubjectivity. 
  
 







      
 
 







   
 
 









Paul Tagard ofers a quick and dirty summary 
of the prosecution’s case in the O.  J. Simpson
trial. 
At first glance, the evidence that O. J. Simpson was
guilty of the murder of his ex-wife was overwhelm-
ing. Shortly after the time that the murder took 
place, he caught a plane to Chicago carrying a bag 
that disappeared, perhaps because it contained the
murder weapon and bloody clothes. Police who came
to Simpson’s house found drops of blood in his car
that matched his own blood and that of Ron Gold-
man. In Simpson’s back yard, police found a bloody
glove that was of a pair with one that was found
at the scene of the crime, and they found a bloody
sock in his bedroom. Simpson had a cut on his hand
that might have been caused by a struggle with
the victims who tried to defend themselves. More-
over, there was a plausible motive for the murder,
in that Simpson had been physically abusive to his
wife while they were married, and was reported to
be jealous of other men who saw Nicole after the
divorce.6 
Te state’s evidence looks like this: 
e1. The plane fight and missing bag 
e2. The blood in Simpson’s car matching his 
and Ron Goldman’s 
e3. The bloody glove and sock at Simpson’s 
house 
e4. Matching glove at the murder scene 
e5. Simpson’s history of jealousy and abuse 
And of course, they are asking the jury to accept 
their explanation of all this data: 
t0. O. J. Simpson murdered Nicole and Ron 
Goldman. 
Simpson’s attorneys get their say, as well. 
Te frst task of the defense lawyers was to generate an
alternative explanation of who killed Nicole Simpson
and Ron Goldman. Based on Nicole’s known history of 
cocaine use, they hypothesized that she was killed by
drug dealers . . . In order to explain the circumstantial
evidence linking O. J. to the crime scene, including the
bloody car, glove and sock, the defense contended that the
items had been planted by Los Angeles Police Department
ofcers determined to frame Simpson for the crime.7 
Tey ofer some additional evidence: 
eVIdenCe, exPlanatIon, and narratIVe 
e6. Nicole’s history of cocaine use 
e7. Mark Furman’s history of racist behavior 
And they propose a rival explanation of all the 
evidence. 
t1. Drug dealers murdered Nicole and Ron
Goldman, and ofcers for the Los Angeles
Police Department framed O. J. 
Te jury gets the complete case: 
e1. The plane fight and missing bag 
e2. The blood in Simpson’s car matching his 
and Ron Goldman’s 
e3. The bloody glove and sock at Simpson’s 
house 
e4. Matching glove at the murder scene 
e5. Simpson’s history of jealousy and abuse 












        









































 IBE can potentially lead us astray at this point. 
It appears that the jury must decide between the
two competing explanations that the attorneys 
have profered: 
t0. O. J. Simpson murdered Nicole and Ron 
Goldman. 
t1. Drug dealers murdered Nicole and Ron
Goldman, and ofcers for the Los Angeles
Police Department framed O. J. 
Tis is mistaken on two counts. First, the jury
should be considering, not the quite detailed
rival explanation ofered by Simpson’s attor-
neys, but one that is spectacular in its vagueness
and generality. 
t2. O. J. Simpson did not murder Nicole and 
Ron Goldman. 
Now the jury will undoubtedly be troubled by the
state’s physical evidence and the well-established
motive, so the defense needs to sow the seeds
of doubt, which the more detailed account of
drug dealers and a racist frame does so well.
But Simpson is innocent until proven guilty, so
the real rival is any account where he is in fact 
innocent. But even if we grant that t0 is a better
explanation than t2, this will only show that the
state has evidence that he is guilty, not that they
have proven it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Abe and His Daughter 
Te case involved a businessman named Hamilton who
had taken out a life insurance policy on his partner ten
days before the partner was gunned down by a profes-
sional hit man. Te district attorney (DA) was fnding 
it easy to persuade the jury that the timing could not
possibly be coincidental, and Abe had been racking his
brain for an answer. Emma [Abe’s seventeen-year-old
daughter], fnding that she simply couldn’t get his
attention, had decided to try to help him fgure out a
common-sense rebuttal to the DA’s circumstantial case. 
And she had. 
“Daddy,” she said, popping into his ofce late one 
night, “the answer is Chekhov.” 
“Why Chekhov?” Abe asked, his head still buried
in the books. 
“Because Chekov once told an aspiring dramatist
that if you hang a gun on the wall in the frst act, you
had better use it by the third act. We read it in lit class.”8 
Alan Dershowitz is a frst-class storyteller.
His little anecdote about Abe and Emma is
used to remind readers that narrative devices
and expectations can have undesirable legal
consequences. It is easy to read his essay as a
subtle indictment of the legal narrative project. 
I think, however, that Abe and Emma teach us
not to eschew law as narrative but to keep in
mind that the best narratives will sometimes be 
messy, unexpected, and even defy simple narra-
tive rules like Chekhov’s. Te DA told a plausible 
enough story about Hamilton. We are not privy 
to all the details in the story, but we can guess
that they involved facts about Hamilton’s rela-
tionship to his partner and perhaps information 
about Hamilton’s fnances. Te key dramatic ele-
ment, though, is the weird timing. A (large?) life 
insurance policy is taken out on the partner, ten 
days later the partner is gunned down. Obvi-
ously, Hamilton hired the hit man so that he
could collect on the policy. Abe, however, tells
        
  












    
 
   























a very diferent story. Life is complicated and
flled with coincidences. 
He’d convinced the jury not to look at the Hamilton
case as if it were a made- for-TV-movie, but rather as 
a slice of real life, full of irrelevant actions and coin-
cidences. He’d asked the jurors how many of them had 
taken out life insurance on a loved one and what their 
neighbors would have thought if the loved one died
shortly thereafer.9 
Both the DA and Abe were not just telling sto-
ries; they were arguing a case before a jury. Let 
us assume that the facts were not in dispute and 
looked something like the following: 
e1. Hamilton and his partner had a strained 
personal and professional relationship. 
e2. Hamilton had recently encountered
severe fnancial problems. 
e3. Hamilton had recently taken out a sizable
life insurance policy on his partner.10 
e4. Ten days later his partner was gunned
down by a professional hit man. 
From the inference-to-the-best-explanation para-
digm, the DAand Abe ofer competing explanations. 
t0. Hamilton hired the hit man to gun down 
his partner so that he could collect on the
life insurance. 
t1. Hamilton had nothing to do with his part-
ner’s murder. It was pure coincidence that 
the murder occurred so closely to the newly 
acquired life insurance policy. 
Perhaps you’re like me and are not quite sure
which of these explanatory stories is the best.
I think that if I were the DA, I’d have asked the 
police for more investigation before bringing
the case to trial. Te standard in a murder trial 
like this is that the evidence must show that the 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Tat means not only that t0 must be a better
explanation than t1 but that it must be much,
much, much better. 
Stories That Make Sense of Things 
Perhaps the most obvious question in this entire
book is what exactly is an explanation in the frst
place? Science has long struck philosophers as a 
kind of paradigm of good reasoning. IBE comes 
directly from the philosophy of science and
has been treated not only as a model of scien-
tifc evidence but as scientifc discovery as well. 
Likewise, some of the most signifcant models
of explanation come from the natural sciences
and philosophers seeking to model scientifc
thinking. 
We need to begin by noting that explanations 
are the result of things we do. We explain things.
Little Johnny is an inquisitive kid. He asks a
lot of questions: “Why do I have to go to bed
now?” “Why was Aunt Jane so mad?” “Why do
stars ‘twinkle’?” Sometimes we decline to really 
answer his questions: “Because I said so!” “Tat’s
grown-up stuff; you wouldn’t understand.”
“Gee, that’s a good question—I don’t know.”
Other times, however, we do him the courtesy
of responding in as truthful and informative
way as we can: “You have to get up early tomor-
row, and besides, I need the rest now.” “Well, I
think you hurt her feelings.” “It’s complicated,
but it has to do with light being refracted in the 
atmosphere.” So what exactly is involved when 
eVIdenCe, exPlanatIon, and narratIVe 
 
  
    














      
 
 






























we respond to Johnny in these latter, more help-
136 ful ways? 
Johnny asked questions about what was
going on—his bedtime, Aunt Jane’s anger, and
the twinkling stars. Connie implicitly asked a 
big question too—How’d that lipstick stain get 
there? We considered similar implicit questions 
about the car outside Joe’s bar, the observed red 
shifing, the identical exams, and those last two 
songs I heard traveling back from Portland.
Might this suggest that explanations have to do 
with asking and answering questions? I believe 
this is the real key to understanding what an
explanation is, and many philosophers agree
with me. 
An explanation is not the same as a proposition, or an 
argument, or a list of propositions; it is an answer. 
(Analogously, a son is not the same as a man, even if
all sons are men, and every man is a son.) An expla-
nation is an answer to a why-question. So, a theory
of explanation must be a theory of why- questions.11 
Mary Ann and Wanda 
In the 1990s, the songwriter Dennis Linde wrote 
a controversial song about friendship, spousal
abuse, and murder, “Goodbye Earl.” 
Lyrics to “Goodbye Earl” can be found here:
https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/dixiechicks/ 
goodbyeearl.html. The Dixie Chicks perform 
ing the song can be found here: https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v Gw7gNf_9njs.html. 
Te story told in the song is actually quite com-
plicated, almost like a good short story or even
a novel. In a nutshell, we meet Mary Ann and
Wanda, high school best friends. Afer gradua-
tion, Mary Ann leaves town, and Wanda enters
a sad relationship that culminates in marriage
to a loser named Earl. Earl is violent and consis-
tently batters Wanda. Wanda decides to divorce
Earl and gets a restraining order. Unfortu-
nately, Earl ignores it and assaults Wanda so
severely that she ends up in intensive care. She
calls her friend who immediately fies in and
visits her in the hospital. Tere they decide that 
the only thing to do is to murder Earl. Tey sub-
sequently poison him and dump his body in the
lake. Te police investigate but not with much
enthusiasm. And the ladies, without a trace of
guilt, buy some land and start a business and
apparently live happily ever afer. 
My reason for telling you all of this is the plan
that Mary Ann and Wanda cooked up in inten-
sive care— Earl had to die! What were their rea-
sons for thinking this? It’s easy to schematize
some of their central reasons. 
e1. It wasn’t two weeks after she got married 
that Wanda started gettin’ abused. 
e2. She fnally got the nerve to fle for divorce. 
e3. Earl walked right through that restraining
order and put her in intensive care. 
t0. Earl had to die. 
In this little argument, the ladies’ reasons seem to
function something like the reasons for Connie’s
suspicion did. Tey seem to provide evidence in
support of their theory about what had to be done.
But there are important diferences as well. Con-
nie’s theory was about what had happened. Her
method was akin to a police detective’s or a his-




























   
    
 























   
137 
theory is not about what happened but about the
right course of action in the circumstances. 
Tere is a crucial diference between the two
arguments that any devotee of inference to the
best explanation will note. Te second bit of rea-
soning is not explanatory in the same way the
first is. The smooching hypothesis explains
the lipstick stain, the extended absence from the
record hop, and the boyfriend’s lame excuse.
The Earl-has-to-die hypothesis doesn’t even
attempt to explain the pattern of abuse, the
divorce, the restraining order, or the assault.
Tis would seem to indicate that inference to the
best explanation will be of little use in deciding 
whether Mary Anne and Wanda’s reasons were
strong enough to justify the murder. 
For many years, I would have completely
agreed with this sentiment. I would have insisted
that IBE was useful to the police in investigating
what happened to Earl or even in understanding 
the origins of the ladies’ beliefs about what had
to be done but that a diferent kind of argument 
was needed to attempt to justify their action. Now,
I’m not so sure. Tere are important similarities
between the two stories. Connie’s story ofers
an explanation of what happened. We deem her
diagnosis reasonable because we judge her story
as superior to alternative stories about what 
happened—the laundry detergent story or the
revenge narrative. Although the normative rec-
ommendation regarding Earl is not an explana-
tion of any of the facts, the whole story does ofer
an account of what the ladies did and why they
think they were normatively justifed. So it seems
relevant to ask whether the Earl-has-to-die story
is superior to other stories that friends, loved
ones, counselors, lawyers, and the like would have
no doubt spun had the ladies given them a chance. 
Geneva and Brown v. Board of Education 
Consider a story that might have been a synopsis
of a movie— a mystery, a science- fction story, a 
satirical sci- f movie such as Get Out— or some-
thing more literary like a short story or novel. 
Te black students, every one of them, had vanished 
on the way to school. Children who had lef home on 
foot never appeared. Buses that had pulled away from 
their last stop loaded with black children had arrived 
at schools empty, as had the cars driven by parents or 
car pools. Even parents taking young children by the 
hand for their frst day in kindergarten or in preschool
had looked down and found their hands empty, the
children suddenly gone.12 
But the quote actually comes from a scholarly
discussion of race, law, and the famous Brown v.
Board of Education case. Why would a respected
constitutional scholar tell such a crazy story?
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic diagnose
three related reasons that critical race theorists
employ legal narrative. Tey allow for an “Open-
ing [of] a Window onto Ignored or Alternative
Realities.”13 In addition, legal storytelling gives
scholars a way of “Counterstorytelling.”14 And
fnally, they provide a “Cure for Silencing.”15 
Tese are all important and noble academic
undertakings. But I fear Delgado and Stefancic
have lef out the most obvious and important rea-
son Derrick Bell constructs his stories. He does
not simply desire to give voice to perspectives
that have been silenced nor present an alterna-
tive reality nor even, though this gets closer to
his underlying motivation, does he modestly
present a counterstory to the received interpre-
tation of Brown v. Board of Education. I take him to




















    


































be advocating and arguing that his view of Brown 
is superior to the received view. 
It is worth pausing to consider the elabo-
rate narrative structure that Bell uses to con-
struct the stories in And We Are Not Saved. His
two main characters are an unnamed narrator
(who bears an uncanny resemblance to Derrick
Bell himself) and a somewhat magical colleague
named Geneva Crenshaw. Each story begins
with a “chronicle.” Sometimes the chronicle is
dependent on Geneva’s magical powers, as in
“Te Chronicle of the Constitutional Contradic-
tion,” where she travels back in time to address
the Constitutional Convention and warn them
of dire consequences, and moral disgrace, of
enshrining the institution of slavery in the Con-
stitution. Other chronicles, like “Te Sacrifced
Black Schoolchildren,” are naked allegories that 
Bell refers to as “fairy tales.” Following each 
chronicle, there is an extended discussion of
the chronicle between the narrator and Geneva.
Te stories, thus, blend fantasy and the time-
honored philosophical trope of fictional
dialogue. 
Te narrative of the disappearing (or sac-
rifced) black school children and the ensuing 
dialogue are used to critique the accepted read-
ing of Brown as a historical and constitutional
triumph. Geneva argues that the Court’s rejec-
tion of legal segregation had more to do with 
whites’ interests, as a result of the Cold War and 
our nation’s international reputation, than it 
did in achieving moral and constitutional jus-
tice for black schoolchildren. She also argues
that the sad history of public education since
Brown demonstrates a failure to achieve any-
thing remotely close to equal public education. 
She advocates for a very diferent decision and 
gives voice to what she believes the Court should
have ruled: 
1. Even though we encourage voluntary desegrega-
tion, we will not order racially integrated assign-
ments of students or staf for ten years. 
2. Even though “separate but equal” no longer meets 
the constitutional equal-protection standard, we
will require immediate equalization of all facili-
ties and resources. 
3. Blacks must be represented on school boards and
other policy- making bodies in proportions equal to 
those of the black students in each school district.16 
Geneva’s evidence has a familiar structure: 
e1. “The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education should be seen as
furthering the nation’s foreign and domestic 
interests. . . .”17 
e2. The history of desegregation in St. Louis 
(and many other districts) where Brown
was frst resisted and the fact that when
fnally ordered to desegregate, these dis-
tricts used the newly increased funding to
improve largely white schools 
e3. The harm to black students who were
bussed to largely white schools 
e4. The many excellent black schools that
were destroyed by Brown 
e5. The blatant inequality and de facto segre-
gation that still exists in many school districts 
t0. The Court should have ruled as Geneva 
suggests. 
Tis argument looks much more like the one









     
































cases made in the O. J. Simpson trial or by Abe. 
Te recommended ruling in Brown, indeed Bell’s 
entire reading of the case, does not explain, at 
least in a scientist’s or detective’s sense, any of
the evidence. And just as we needed a standard 
to judge the evidential success or failure of
all these arguments, we need a standard with 
which to assess Geneva’s evidence. 
Fabula and Sjuzet 
Here comes some highfalutin technical terminol-
ogy. It comes from (yet some more jargon) nar-
ratology: “Te branch of knowledge or literary
criticism that deals with the structure and func-
tion of narrative and its themes, conventions,
and symbols.”18 Literary critics in the Russian 
formalist tradition distinguished between the
basic bare bones of the story, or the plot, and
the way the story was told. Te story, or narra-
tive, they labeled the fabula; the specifc telling
of the story, its narrative discourse, they called
the sjuzet. Te same story regarding a day’s worth 
of action can be told in a single sentence proceed-
ing forward or backward and from a frst-person
or a third-person point of view. 
When I woke up, I packed two loaded guns and a ski 
mask, drove to the bank, robbed it, and was back in
time for dinner. 
I was back in time for dinner, having robbed the bank 
to which I had driven with a ski mask and two loaded 
guns just afer my nap. 
He loved that old familiar, yet always strangely new, 
sensation of being someone else inside his ski mask,
a pistol in each hand, watching the frightened teller 
count out a cool million. Nothing like it to wake a guy 
up. Nothing like it to give him a good appetite.19 
A single fabula and three very diferent sjuzets. 
Tis distinction has obvious relevance to aca-
demic lawyers. Trial lawyers don’t just present 
facts for juries to consider; they tell them sto-
ries. Te facts were not in much dispute in the 
O. J. Simpson trial nor in the case of Hamilton
and his partner. It’s not just that the Los Ange-
les County District Attorney’s Ofce and O. J.’s
“dream team” told diferent stories by ofering
alternative explanations of the facts; they told
them in very diferent ways to the jury. Many
scholars believe that O. J. was acquitted because 
his lawyers were better storytellers. We know
that Abe’s ability to tell his story efectively was 
instrumental in getting Hamilton of: “Afer he’d
won, several jurors told him that his TV argu-
ment turned them around.”20 Te Dixie Chicks 
do a pretty good job of telling Mary Ann and
Wanda’s story. But I’m pretty skeptical of their
judgment that Earl had to die. When I’ve tried to 
tell my rival narrative to students, I have to not 
only add some reminders about the dangers of
vigilante justice but carefully frame my remarks
so that I don’t sound indiferent about the seri-
ousness of domestic abuse nor naïve about
the protection that the criminal justice system
can provide for Wanda. I can tell you frsthand 
that talking to students about global warming,
the death penalty, Brown v. Board of Education, 
or Mary Ann and Wanda requires every bit as
much attention to the sjuzet of my story as to
its fabula. 
I have a dear friend who truly despises all
talk of narrative in the context of political argu-
ments. He believes that the facts should speak

























        
 
  

























for themselves and that rational people should
be able to agree on what the facts tell us. I wish 
that were true, but I doubt that it is. It’s not
just in the law or political theory that the way
a story is told is relevant to whether the story
convinces its audience. Tis is ofen the case in 
science, scholarly disagreements, and family














Inference to the Best Narrative 
As we saw with Mary Ann and Wanda, and with 
Derrick Bell and Geneva, we ofen ofer evidence
for theories or positions that don’t explain any
of the data provided in the evidence. We ofer
the prediction that global warming will con-
tinue to increase. We defend it with evidence
from basic physics and chemistry, the histori-
cal record, and the testimony of respected sci-
entists. But the prediction doesn’t explain any
of this. Derrick Bell ofered a constitutional
analysis of Brown v. Board of Education, but this
analysis doesn’t explain the history of race in
this country nor what happened, and what 
did not happen, in the years since Brown was 
decided. Mary Ann and Wanda ofer a moral
justifcation for murdering Earl, but this justi-
fcation doesn’t explain the abuse, the divorce,
or the assault. It would be nice to have a general
tool for evaluating evidence in these kinds of
arguments. 
So how might we do this? I have already
suggested that we can capture much of the
structure of the reasoning that seems to unite
Connie’s diagnosis, and Mary Anne and Wan-
da’s proposed course of action, by treating both 
their arguments as narratives (i.e., stories) that 
attempt to “make sense” of the relevant facts.
We have seen that inference to the best explana-
tion rests on a comparative procedure where we
evaluate the success of competing explanatory
stories. How are we to accomplish this? You will
remember that at the beginning of chapter 5,
we considered Gilbert Harman’s answer to this
question: 
In making this inference one infers, from the fact
that a certain hypothesis would explain the evi-
dence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general,
there will be several hypotheses which might explain
the evidence, so one must be able to reject all such
alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in
making the inference. Tus, one infers, from the
premise that a given hypothesis would provide a
“better” explanation for the evidence than would
any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the
given hypothesis is true.21 
I believe we can extend Harman’s method to
encompass not just straightforwardly explana-
tory stories such as Connie’s but also norma-
tive stories such as Mary Ann and Wanda’s and 
Geneva Crenshaw’s. We arrive at a kind of com-
parative reasoning I am calling inference to the
best narrative. Notice how nicely the concept of
story replaces hypothesis, and making sense can
be substituted for explanation. 
In making this inference, one infers from
the fact that a certain narrative would
make sense of the reasons to the truth of 
the story. In general, there will be several
narratives that might make sense of the
reasons, so one must be able to reject all
such alternative narratives before one is








   
 
   
  
 





eVIdenCe, exPlanatIon, and narratIVe 
one infers from the premise that a given
narrative would make better sense of the
reasons than would any other narrative to 
the conclusion that the given true. 
Just as with inference to the best explanation,
we face the obvious question of what are the
criteria for one normative narrative to be better 
than another. 
exerCIses 
1. Why do the narratives about Hamilton and his partner invite the use of IBE to determine
the quality of the evidence each lawyer presents for what happened, but the narratives
about Wanda and Earl seem to preclude the use of IBE as a tool for assessing what Mary
Ann and Wanda should do?
2. Who is Geneva Crenshaw? How does she ft into the material in this chapter?
3. What is the diference between fabula and sjuzet? Is this distinction helpful to understand
the success or failure of an argument?
QuIz fourteen 
Here are two narratives about immigration and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program and the proposed DACA bill. Use “inference to the best narrative” to deter-
mine the quality of evidence each author has for his or her narrative. Which narrative make 
the most sense of things as you understand them. Feel free to do a little research and inform 
yourself a little more about the DACA debate and indeed the whole immigration debate. Also 
feel free to ofer your own rival narrative about all this. 
Narrative One: “I’m a Dreamer. I’d Have Nothing If It Weren’t for DACA,” http://fortune 
.com/2017/09/21/daca-dreamer-immigration/.22 
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Whenever we investigate anything— black holes or the causes of the First World 
War or the demography of the Cayman Islands or the ambiguity of Yeats’s
poetry— our intrinsic goal is to fnd the truth about something. If we did not
have that goal, we would not be inquiring. 
— ronalD DworKIn1 
Two Huge Problems 
David H. Glass clearly articulates the two biggest 
challenges inference to the best explanation: 
Despite its intuitive plausibility, IBE faces two key
challenges. First, how exactly is IBE to be understood 
and made precise? Tere are various conceptions
of the nature of explanation, but assuming some of
these are suitable for IBE this still leaves the question 
as to how one explanation should be compared against
another so that the best explanation can be identi-
fed. Second, what is the connection between expla-
nation and truth? Is there any reason for thinking 
that the best explanation is likely to be true? Or to
put it another way, does IBE track truth? Of course,
no approach should be expected to lead to the truth in 
every instance, but if IBE is to be accepted as a ratio-
nal mode of inference, there must be some reason for 
thinking that it provides a good strategy for determin-
ing the truth.2 
Inference to the best narrative (IBN) inherits
these same problems. How should one narra-
tive be compared against another so that the
best narrative can be identifed? And is there










    






































likely to be true? Does it provide a good strategy 
for determining the truth? But inference to the 
best narrative invites a third challenge. Does it 
even make sense to talk about truth in contexts 
involving violent ex- husbands or constitutional 
success or failure? All three of these challenges 
must be addressed, if not defnitively answered. 
Gilbert Harman foresaw Glass’s frst chal-
lenge in his initial treatment of inference to the 
best explanation. 
Tere is, of course, a problem about how one is to judge
that one hypothesis is sufciently better than another 
hypothesis. Presumably such a judgment will be based
on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, 
which is more plausible, which explains more, which 
is less ad hoc, and so forth. I do not wish to deny that 
there is a problem about explaining the exact nature 
of these considerations; I will not, however, say any-
thing more about this problem.3 
One might ask why is there is any problem in
the frst place. Harman seems to answer his
own question about explanatory virtue. Te best 
explanation must be determined by the stan-
dards of simplicity, plausibility, completeness,
and not being ad hoc. Te superfcial answer is 
obvious. His list of explanatory virtues is incom-
plete (“and so forth”), the virtues can work
against one another— the simplest account may 
not be the most complete—and each one is vague
and overly general. Just as with inference to the 
best explanation, we face the obvious question 
of what are the criteria for one narrative to be
better than another. Here, I think Harman’s little
checklist, however vague, is helpful. Te better 
narrative will be the one that best exemplifes
the following characteristics: 
• It will tend to provide the most complete 
story. 
• It will tend to provide the simplest story. 
• It will provide the most plausible story. 
• It will provide the least ad hoc story. 
But feshing out these criteria for explanatory
and narrative success is clearly unfnished busi-
ness in the philosophy of science and narratology. 
As serious as this problem clearly is, I don’t
believe that it is as serious as the skeptics make 
it out to be. I know how to speak, understand,
read, and write English. I know that the Eng-
lish sentence “Colorless green ideas sleep
furiously,” though nonsensical and probably
self-contradictory, is grammatically correct.
According to a dominant tradition in Western
epistemology, if I am right about my linguistic
skills, I should be able to plainly articulate the
rules I have used to recognize the grammatically
of the green ideas sentence. 
Obviously, every speaker of a language has mas-
tered and internalized a generative grammar that
expresses his knowledge of his language. Tis is not
to say that he is aware of the rules of the grammar or
even that he can become aware of them.4 
Chomsky concedes that the rules of this genera-
tive grammar may be cognitively inaccessible
and certainly difcult to articulate. Jason Stan-
ley vigorously demurs: 
Knowing how to do something is the same as knowing 
a fact. It follows that learning how to do something is 
learning a fact. For example, when you learned how 
to swim, what happened is that you learned some
facts about swimming. . . . You know how to perform 









   
 
























activities solely in virtue of your knowledge of facts
about those activities.5 
Socrates clearly articulated this epistemological 
principle 2,500 years ago— “and that which we 
know we must surely be able to tell.”6 
I side, however, with Michael Polanyi when
he says, “We can know more than we can tell.”7 
He uses a very apt example: 
Tis fact seems obvious enough; but it is not easy to
say exactly what it means. Take an example. We know
a person’s face, and can recognize it among a thou-
sand, indeed among a million. Yet we usually cannot 
tell how we recognize a face we know. So most of this 
knowledge cannot be put into words.8 
Polanyi introduces the technical term tacit
knowledge to label knowledge or skills that “can-
not be put into words.” Polanyi is surely engag-
ing in purposeful hyperbole. Most skills can
be put into words, but these words are usually
vague and general, and at times, the words are 
downright misleading. 
Te essence of Glass’s frst problem—“how
one explanation should be compared against 
another so that the best explanation can be
identifed”—is that most of the defenders and
critics of inference to the best explanation seem 
to seek something that I believe is unattainable. 
Tey seem to be searching for a kind of mechani-
cal algorithm that validates an objective deter-
mination of one explanation being superior to
another explanation. Perhaps the biggest temp-
tation for insisting on a list of necessary and suf-
fcient conditions for being the best explanation 
or story (or a better explanation or story) is the 
persistent illusion that all things we are skilled 
at can be articulated in clear, concise recipes or 
formulae. Tis is precisely the Plato and Stanley 
article of faith— “that which we know we must 
surely be able to tell.” We should know that is a 
mistake. 
Consider how remarkable it is that major
league hitters can hit ninety- fve-mile- an- hour 
fastballs. 
A typical major league fastball travels about 10 feet
in just the 75 milliseconds that it takes for sensory
cells in the retina to confrm that a baseball is in view
and for information about the fight path and veloc-
ity of the ball to be relayed to the brain. Te entire
fight of the baseball from the pitcher’s hand to the
plate takes just 400 milliseconds. And because it takes
half that time merely to initiate muscular action, a
major league batter has to know where he is swinging 
shortly afer the ball leaves the pitcher’s hand—well
before it’s even halfway to the plate. . . . A batter could
just as well close his eyes once the ball is halfway to
home plate. Given the speed of the pitch and the limi-
tations of our physiology, it seems to be a miracle that
anybody hits the ball at all.9 
So how do they do it? Tere are the clichés— 
“Keep your eye on the ball,” “Don’t open up too 
soon,” and the like. But these don’t tell you how 
it’s done; they are mnemonics to help skilled hit-
ters get back on track when they are in slumps. 
No one has yet, and I insist never will, articu-
late the logical criteria for hitting major league 
fastballs. Tis emphatically does not mean, how-
ever, that the hitting, not the describing, can’t
be done. Tis skill, like many others, is a kind of
tacit knowledge. 
My mentor, Larry Wright, tells an important 
story: 
exPlanatory VIrtue and truth 
 





















   
 
     





         
 
 






















Virtually everyone who has survived past infancy has
a more or less well developed set of perceptual skills.
Tese skills may be generally described as the ability
to tell what’s going on (sometimes) simply by seeing 
it .  .  . Tis ability to tell what’s going on—or what’s
gone on—even when we are not confronting it directly.
We can ofen tell what has happened from the traces
it leaves. We can tell there was a frost by the dam-
aged trees; we know it rained because the mountains
are green; we can tell John had some trouble on the
way home from the store by the rumpled fender and 
the broken headlight. We reconstruct the event from 
its telltale consequences. It is this diagnostic skill we
exploit in the most basic sort of inductive arguments; it
is the foundation of our ability to evaluate evidence.10 
Tis quasi-perceptual skill is what allows us to see
what’s going on and what’s true or at least what’s
the best bet given what we know. And the fact that 
the precise nature of this skill has proven incred-
ibly difcult to articulate in no way counts against
its existence and utility. Can anyone seriously
doubt that Pete Rose knew how to hit because he
could not say how he was able to hit? 
Literary Darwinism 
Wright talks of a “diagnostic skill,” “the ability
to tell what’s going on.” I’d characterize it as a
skill at making sense of things. What is the source
of this skill? Te answer to this question leads
us directly to Glass’s second worry—“Does IBE
track truth?” I am committed, of course, to a 
resounding afrmative answer. But I certainly
owe the inference-to-the-best-explanation and
inference-to-the-best-narrative skeptics at least 
an outline of “some reason for thinking that it pro-
vides a good strategy for determining the truth.” 
What is sometimes called literary Darwinism
traces human storytelling back to evolutionary 
origins of modern human cognition. 
Minds exist to predict what will happen next. Tey
mine the present for clues they can refne with help
from the past—the evolutionary past of the species,
the cultural past of the population, and the experien-
tial past of the individual— to anticipate the immedi-
ate future and guide action. To understand events as 
they happen, with limited time, knowledge, and com-
putational power, minds have evolved to register the 
regularities pertinent to particular species and infer 
according to rough- and- ready heuristics.11 
Tis little narrative assumes that we are pretty 
good at “predict[ing] what will happen next.”
But it explains much more than the ubiquity of 
human storytelling; it accounts for our general 
ability to make sense of things, to explain what’s
going on. 
We can tell stories to explain things, from a child’s or 
a country’s pouty “Tey started it” to why the world 
is as it is according to myth or science. . . . Why has the 
richest explanatory story of all, the theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection, been so little used to explain 
why and how stories matter?12 
Inference to the best explanation (IBE) and infer-
ence to the best narrative (IBN) track the truth 
because they rely, at base, on quasi-perceptual
skills that were selected for precisely to do this 
job. 
Consider this explanatory narrative: 
Babies may have little control over their bodies, but




































          
 
    
 
  













what a baby looks at can tell you something about how
it sees the world. Tis is because babies are like adults 
in some regards. If they see the same thing over and
over again, they get bored and look away. If they see 
something new or unexpected, they look longer. Tus, 
analyzing looking time can tell what babies think of
as being “the same thing,” and what they see as “new 
or unexpected.”13 
The above two-stage inference to the best
explanation—differential gaze times being
explained as boredom or surprise and then as
“same” or “new”—is the methodological presup-
position for a host of fascinating experiments
in the study of infant cognitive development.
Paul Bloom provides a nice summary of some of
these results: 
1. Cohesion: If a hand pulls at an object, babies expect
the entire object to go with the hand; if it comes of
in pieces, they are surprised, showing an expecta-
tion that objects are cohesive. 
2. Continuity: Imagine a stage with two vertical barri-
ers separated in space. A small object, like a box, goes
behind the barrier on the lef, continues between the
barriers, goes behind the barrier on the right, and
comes out the other side. Adults see this is a single
object, and so do babies. Now imagine that a box
goes behind the barrier on the lef, there is a pause,
and then the box emerges for the screen on the right,
never appearing in the gap. Adults assume there
are two boxes here, not one. Babies make the same
assumption; they expect continuity.14 
Why do we fnd diferential gaze times for the
hand pulling the object and it remaining whole,
and the hand pulling the object and it coming of
in pieces? Babies expect objects to be cohesive.
Why the perception of a single box in the frst
experimental scenario with the box and the barri-
ers but the perception of two boxes in the second
scenario? Babies expect continuity. But where do
these expectations come from? Bloom’s answer is
a classic blend of nature and nurture. 
Tese results show that although babies enter the
world with a foundational understanding of what
objects are and how they act, it is incomplete, and this 
foundation grows. Some of the improvement might be 
due to maturation of the brain—like the rest of the
body, the brain changes rapidly in the early years of
life, and this might cause corresponding increases in 
knowledge. But some of the improvement is plainly
due to experience.”15 
And fnally, what explains this foundational
understanding of objects and how they act? Tis
knowledge is clearly innate. Natural selection
has hardwired infant brains to expect cohesion
and continuity. It is easy to see the adaptive value
for human infants having rudimentary under-
standing not just of objects and “folk physics” but
also of agency and social relationships. Certainly,
shared understanding of folk physics, agency,
and social relationships are the cornerstones of 
the sort of the practical explanatory skill that 
would have been of value in hunter-gather times. 
Sally and Ann 
Let me tell you two stories about Sally and Ann. 
Sally prizes her special marble. When she leaves,
she always places it in a basket and carefully
covers it with a sof blanket. Ann has been hid-
ing and watching Sally’s little ritual. Afer Sally 
has gone home for lunch, Ann removes Sally’s











       
    
 















































marble from under the blanket and hides it in a 
nearby box. Sally returns afer lunch and goes to
retrieve her marble. She goes right to the box and
fnds it there! Why? Well, because that’s where 
the marble is! Te second story begins just as the
frst, but things take a turn when Sally returns 
from lunch. Sally goes straight for the basket 
and is heartbroken not to fnd her marble under 
the blanket. Why does she do this? Well, that’s
where she remembers putting it before lunch. 
When shown a puppet version of the begin-
ning of the Sally and Ann stories and then asked
to predict where Sally will go to look for her mar-
ble, children younger than around four typically
predict the box because they know that’s where
the marble is. But between four and fve, chil-
dren’s predictions dramatically change. Tey now
realize that Sally will look in the basket because
that’s where she would remember putting it. 
Why do the more cognitively mature children
simply recognize that the Sally-goes-to-the-
basket narrative is signifcantly better than the
Sally-goes-to-the-box account? Tey have begun
to develop what is ofen called a “theory of mind.” 
Teory of mind allows a much more precise and mul-
tiperspectival understanding of social event. Because 
we understand beliefs as the basis for forming desires, 
goals and intentions, and because we understand
the sources of belief, we automatically and efort-
lessly track what other might know about a situation 
and can therefore understand their behavior more
fnely. . . . Almost automatically we track what oth-
ers can know, and that makes all the diference to our 
capacity to cooperate or compete.16 
Even back in hunter-gather times, our human
ancestors were very skilled social explainers.
Contemporary cognitive science provides a very
plausible account of the origins of this skill. 
[Mind reading] is used by cognitive scientists, inter-
changeably with “Teory of Mind,” to describe our
ability to explain people’s behavior in terms of their
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires.  .  .  . Tis
adaption must have developed during the “massive
neurocognitive evolution” which took place dur-
ing the Pleistocene (1.8 million to 10,000 years ago).
Te emergence of a Teory of Mind “module” was evo-
lution’s answer to the “staggeringly complex challenge
faced by our ancestors, who needed to make sense of
the behavior of other people in their group, which
could include up to 200 individuals.”17 
If this is right, and I certainly think it is, it sug-
gests a somewhat surprising inversion in our
thinking about explanation. Rather than extrap-
olating from the more “basic” notion of a causal 
explanation to account for our narrative skills, 
it might actually be that our ability to construct 
narratives about the behavior and motives of
those in our social groups is what leads to the
wider ability to construct scientifc or causal
narratives in situations where agents are con-
spicuously absent. 
Disagreement 
But wait a second you may well counter. How
can I possibly claim that our skills, both innate 
and learned, at explaining and making sense
of things, are reliable enough foundation for
a general logical procedure such as inference
to the best explanation or inference to the
best narrative? Clearly rival explanations and





     
 
 




         
 
 
   
 



































endorsed by equally intelligent and refective
evidence assessors. Te district attorney and
Abe held dramatically diferent interpretations 
regarding Hamilton and the murder. I believe
Mary Ann and Wanda should have placed more 
confdence in the criminal justice system and
not murdered Earl; the ladies saw things very
diferently. Intellectual disagreement seems to
count heavily against my claims for explana-
tory and narrative skill. How can Justice Black-
mun and Justice Scalia be skilled constitutional 
explainers and story judgers when they see
things so dramatically diferently with respect
to the death penalty and the Constitution? Tese 
worries are legitimate and require attention and
potential solutions. 
A big part of the story to be told here is one 
of simple intellectual modesty. One can be very 
skilled at something and at the same time fail
spectacularly at exercising the skill. We are
all skilled at recognizing faces. But we still
misperceive all the time— “Hi Joanie! Oh, sorry, 
you look just like my mother-in-law.” Major
league hitters perform the minor miracle of hit-
ting ninety-fve-mile-an-hour fastballs, but they
also swing wildly, miss, and look foolish, and
lest we forget, they fail to get base hits between 
two- thirds and three- quarters of the time. Fur-
thermore, the skills that I am basing my argu-
ment upon were developed, honed, and tested in
hunter-gatherer times. Tey can only be applied
to science and the law by extension. 
Humans do not readily engage in [the highly
abstract reasoning required in modern science, phi-
losophy, government, commerce, and law]. In most
times, places, and stages of development consists
of quantities “one,” “two,” and “many”  .  .  . Teir
political philosophy is based on kin, clan, tribe and
vendetta, not on the social contract.  .  .  . And their
morality is a mixture of intuitions of purity, author-
ity, loyalty, conformity, and reciprocity, not general-
ized notions of fairness and justice . . . Nevertheless,
some humans were able to invent the diferent com-
ponents of modern knowledge, and all are capable of
learning them.18 
Please don’t misread my meaning here. I’m really
good at spotting my mother-in-law, I’m in awe of 
the hitting prowess of the guys on my fantasy
team, and as a teacher, I know frsthand that 
students, even the mediocre ones, can cast aside 
kin, clan, and vendetta and learn to embrace the 
social contract and justice and fairness. 
Truth 
Let’s see if we can do a little better than the
trivial defnition of “truth” I ofered in chap-
ter 3—truth = df not-false. Inference to the best 
narrative is unapologetic about a close connec-
tion between narrative superiority and truth.
Te best story does not guarantee truth, but it
does constitute evidence for what the truth is.
Perhaps there is a better yet story that no one
has thought to tell—that’s certainly been the
case at specifc points in the history of science.
Perhaps, as I believe is ofen the case with many
narratives, the best story is one that actually
combines elements and insights from the com-
peting narratives. But this is the nature of evi-
dence generally. Even the strongest evidence can
point in the wrong direction—evidence is not 
logical proof. But none of this implies that we
should disregard evidence. Indeed, what choice
do we really have but to base all our considered














      









   
 
      



















    
 
         
 
 

















judgments, not just in law and scholarship, but 
in every aspect of our lives, on what the best 
available evidence tells us is likely true? 
Legal, constitutional, and scholarly truth,
just like truth in science and regarding violent 
ex-husbands, remains philosophically prob-
lematic. I agree with Peter Kosso that the most 
intuitive sense of truth—at least in most explan-
atory contexts—is the correspondence theory,
but that correspondence must be inferred from 
coherence. 
Tough truth is correspondence with the facts it can-
not be recognized by its correspondence. We cannot 
rely on the facts to guide proofs of scientifc theories, 
since the facts are irretrievably at the outer end of the 
correspondence relation. . . . So any indicators of truth
must be internal. . . . Te process of justifying, then, is 
a process of comparing aspects of the system, and the 
accomplishment of justifcation is the demonstration 
of coherence among the aspects.19 
Such a model captures our intuitions about 
what really happened to Nicole and Ron or at 
the record hop. Tere aren’t just stories to be
told about these happenings, but clearly, some
stories are better than others—stories that point 
us to the truth. We believe that there’s a world
out there, though we will never see it from the 
God’s eye perspective, and in this world, things 
happened involving O. J., Connie’s boyfriend,
and the rest. Tese external happenings play a
signifcant role in what counts as true. 
Tings get much trickier, however, when we
consider the best narrative concerning Brown
v. Board of Education or Mary Ann and Wanda’s
predicament. We are still confdent that there
is a best story or, at least, stories that are sig-
nifcantly better than others. But where does
narrative superiority now point? What of the
standard jurisprudential questions of how to
interpret a statute, a line of precedent, or a con-
stitutional text? Or even how to interpret the
sad events confronting Mary Ann and Wanda?
To reiterate the previous argument, I claim that 
in these cases we tell stories that try to make
sense of the relevant texts and precedent as
well as Earl’s violent behavior and Geneva’s
story about Brown. When we tell these stories,
we tell them with passion and conviction. We
are convinced that our story is the best or, at
least, a heck of a lot better than the other sto-
ries that are out there. Does inference to the
best narrative not so much discover the truth but 
actually create the truth? Tis would be a mis-
characterized insight. Te insight, of course, is
that few of us believe there is a Platonic heaven
where moral and interpretive truth live and to
where we can retreat to adjudicate controver-
sies involving Earl’s murder or how we should
understand Brown v. Board of Education. But it 
is mischaracterized because truth is not being
created in the way Derrick Bell was able to
make up his story about the disappearing black
schoolchildren. It makes perfectly good sense
to insist that there is an “objectively” best nar-
rative, even when reasonable people disagree
about what it is. And what other laudatory title
would we bestow on such a superior narrative
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exerCIses 
1. How can a major league hitter possibly hit a ninety-fve- mile- an- hour fastball if he can’t
exPlanatory VIrtue and truth 
say how he does it?
2. What do the two Sally and Ann stories tell us about our ability to make sense of what oth-
ers do?
3. Is there an objective truth about what happened to Hamilton’s partner? Is there an objec-
tive truth about what Mary Ann and Wanda should do? What does all this say about the
notion of truth in the frst place?
QuIz fIfteen 
What are the two problems for inference to the best explanation (and for inference to the best
narrative) that were identifed by David H. Glass? What is my proposed solution to these two 
problems? Do you think my solution works? Why, or why not? 
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Inferring and Explaining is a book in practical epistemology. It 
examines the notion of evidence and assumes that good evidence 
is the essence of rational thinking. Evidence is the cornerstone 
of the natural, social, and behavioral sciences. But it is equally 
central to almost all academic pursuits and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, to the basic need to live an intelligent and reflective life. 
The book further assumes that a particular model of evidence­
Inference to the Best Explanation-not only captures the essence 
of (good) evidence but suggests a very practical, and pedagogically 
useful, procedure for evidence evaluation. 
The book is intended primarily for two _sor,ts of introductory 
courses. First and foremost are courses in critical thinking ( or 
informal or practical logic). In addition, however, the book has 
application in more general cou�ses ( or major sections of courses) 
in introductory philosophy. 
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